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Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania

A Connected and Chronological Record of the
Commercial, Industrial and Educational Ad-
vancement of Pennsylvania, and the Inner
History of all Political Movements since the
adoption of the Constitution of 1838.

BY

A. K. McCLURE, LL.D.

Illustrated with Portraits of over one hundred
distinguished men of Pennsylvania, including
all the Governors, Senators, Judges of the
Courts of to-day, leading Statesmen, Railroad
Presidents, Business Men and others of note.

VOLUME II

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LIV.

RANDALL AND WALLACE.

The Varied Careers of the Two Great Democratic Leaders in Pennsylvania for Nearly a Generation—Both Were Weakened by Leading Opposing Factions Against Each Other—Leading Characteristics of the Two Men—Interesting Incidents of Their Factional Disputes—Wallace's Last Battle and Defeat Closely Followed Randall's Death.

EIGHTEEN hundred and sixty-two brought to the front the two ablest of the Democratic leaders that Pennsylvania had for a full quarter of a century, after they became recognized Democratic factors in the politics of the State. These men were Samuel J. Randall, of Philadelphia, and William A. Wallace, of Clearfield. Wallace was elected to the senate in the fall of 1862, defeating Senator Louis W. Hall, of Blair, who had been elected in the same district three years before by a decided majority. Wallace served continuously in the senate for twelve years, when he resigned to accept the United States Senatorship, to which he was elected in the legislative session of 1875. Soon after he entered the National Senate he was recognized by the Democrats as their leader of the body. After he had served his full term in Washington he returned to the State senate, where he served until 1886, making sixteen years' service as State senator, and six years as United States Senator.

Randall had served in the city councils, and was chosen in 1857 to fill an unexpired term in the State senate. I was first elected to the house the same year, and, although on opposing political sides, our acquaintance of that session ripened into a friendship that lasted until he died, the father of the National House of

Representatives. He was chosen to Congress in 1862 from the First district of Philadelphia, composed of the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh wards, defeating Webb, the Union candidate, by 1,447 majority.

Randall and Wallace were equally able in the varied political conflicts they had to accept, but they were unlike in temperament and in method. Wallace's finely-chiseled face, surmounting his symmetrical, manly form, always appared in scrupulous neatness, would attract the attention of any one meeting him; while Randall's strong face, of heroic mold, with his often-careless dress and shuffling step, might pass through the multitude without special observation, but those who took a careful view of his features would see determination and self-reliance very clearly portrayed.

Of the two Wallace was much the greater organizer; indeed, for a quarter of a century after his entrance upon the political stage of Pennsylvania the Democratic party had no leader who equaled or even approached Senator Wallace in the power of organization, while Randall was a fighter rather than a strategist. Wallace would methodically and in detail plan a battle and then fight it to a finish, while Randall was always ready for battle regardless of method or preparation. Randall was impulsive, while Wallace's Scotch-Irish courage was greatly tempered by discretion. Both were fast friends and implacable enemies, and the greatest misfortune that befell these two men during nearly a quarter of a century of varying triumphs and defeats was the fact that they speedily became rival leaders, and their best energies were often entirely and desperately directed to the overthrow of each other.

Each aimed at the mastery of the Democracy of

the State, and great as they were, neither was great enough to understand that the State was quite great enough for two such men, and that they could and should be in harmony with each other. I served with both of them in the Legislature, and, regardless of all the mutations in political conflicts which at times made me support and at other times oppose them in their political struggles, the closest friendship was ever maintained between both of them and myself. I enjoyed the confidence of both, and in their many factional conflicts both conferred with me with absolute freedom.

On several occasions when they were about to engage in a factional struggle I brought them together in my office face to face, and appealed to them to pool their issues and cease their factional warfare. In every instance they left me after agreeing to do so, and in every instance the agreement was broken within a very few days, and each accused the other of precipitating the breach. In point of fact they, like all factional leaders, had dependent followers who hoped to profit by the triumph of their chief, and harmony would have lessened their importance.

A pointed illustration of the difficulty of reconciling opposing factions was given in 1884, when Randall had wrested the control of the party from Wallace, and had made himself so strong as a candidate for the Presidency that Wallace was powerless to oppose him with any measure of success. W. U. Hensel, later attorney general under Governor Pattison, was then chairman of the Democratic State committee, and a short time before the Democratic State convention met at Allentown, in 1884, Randall and Hensel were in my editorial office discussing the situation, and I proposed to Randall that he should, without consulting Wallace, or asking any pledges whatever from him, place him

at the head of the Randall delegation to the National convention. Randall's belligerent qualities asserted themselves with some violence at the suggestion, but Hensel heartily seconded the proposition, and Randall finally agreed that he would consider the matter fully and meet us again at dinner the same evening to decide it.

Randall was very positive in the conviction that he should place his most devoted friends at the head of the delegation, but after discussing the matter he finally yielded reluctantly to the positive advice of Hensel and myself, and assented to Wallace as the head of the delegation. The plan was that it should be done without approaching Wallace on the subject, as even Randall had to confess that if Wallace accepted the position, as he certainly would, he would feel that his personal honor and manhood required him to make exhaustive effort for Randall's nomination.

Wallace happened in my office on the following day. He spoke with some bitterness of the fact that the coming State convention would not be at all in sympathy with him. When I told him that he had been determined upon by Randall and his friends for the head of the Pennsylvania delegation to support Randall for President, Wallace, on the impulse of the moment, said it would be impossible for him to accept, but after a brief discussion of the matter he realized that it would be a high compliment to himself, and that in no way could he show his greatness more distinctly than by accepting the trust without condition and discharging his duties with the utmost fidelity. He left my office much gratified, but within forty-eight hours I received a curt letter from him stating that it was evidently meant to crucify him at Allentown by presenting and defeating him as a candidate for delegate-at-large, and advising me that the incident was closed.

I wrote him in reply not to bother himself about the Allentown convention, for he would be unanimously elected, and that I knew he would be highly gratified not only at the expression of confidence from the convention, but by the manly performance of his duty as chairman of the Pennsylvania delegation. He was unanimously elected, and I saw him at almost every stage of the conflict in Chicago, where he seemed to have but one inspiration, and that was to promote the nomination of Randall. His speech presenting Randall's name to the convention was one of the greatest and grandest of his life.

When the delegates met at Chicago and were lined up on the Presidency, it finally became evident that Randall could not be nominated, as his views on the tariff were not acceptable to a large majority of his party. I doubt not that Wallace shed no tears over the failure to nominate Randall, but in every public and private effort relating to the nomination he was tireless and earnest in support of Randall.

It would naturally be assumed that these two great leaders, when they were brought into such close relations in 1884, would have ceased to be opposing factional leaders, or at least had their factional hostility greatly tempered, but such was not the fact, and while Randall fully appreciated Wallace's manly exhibition of fidelity at Chicago, the battle of factions went on and continued until Randall's death on the thirteenth of April, 1890, when new political conditions arose over which neither could have exercised a mastery, and only a few months after Randall's death Wallace was defeated for Governor in the Democratic State convention at Scranton.

It was the final defeat that comes to almost every great leader, but he did not appreciate it fully until, after the election of Pattison, his successful competitor

for the nomination, he found it impossible to command the attorney generalship of the State for himself. He was then broken in fortune, and his home, that he ever appreciated as the most sacred altar of his devotion, had long been shadowed by a most accomplished and beloved wife and mother groping her way through life by his side in the starless midnight of mental infirmity.

Randall and Wallace had little opportunity for successful State leadership, as they came into political control after the Democratic party had committed the fatal mistake of a doubtful or hesitating attitude in support of the war, and the only hope of Democratic triumph in the State was by defection in the ranks of the majority party.

Wallace was for a number of years chairman of the Democratic State committee. He struggled against fearful odds to maintain a hopeful Democratic organization. In the United States Senate he was soon accepted as altogether the ablest of the Democratic Senators in defining the policy of the party on all important questions, and he fully sustained the reputation he achieved. Randall became Speaker of the House after having first suffered a defeat at the opening of the session. With the aid of Wallace, then a United States Senator, Kerr, of Indiana, triumphed over Randall in the caucus, but Kerr died a few months thereafter and Randall was then successful, and he was twice re-elected to that responsible position.

Randall was a thoroughly loyal Democrat during the war, and was in the three months' service with General Patterson as a member of the Philadelphia Troop. He ever exerted a most wholesome influence in restraining his party from its general trend to array itself in opposition to the war, and his devotion to a liberal protective policy that cost him the nomination for the Presidency in 1884, twice defeated his party

in earnest efforts to return to a revenue tariff. After his retirement from the Speakership in 1880, he was made chairman of the committee on appropriations, where his strong integrity commanded the confidence and respect of all parties. His severe economy was often criticised, as he resolved all doubts against appropriations and saved the Government many, many millions by his tireless efforts as watch dog of the treasury.

It was chiefly through his efforts in the very closing hours of the session of Congress that General Grant was restored to the roll of the army as General, retired. Mr. Childs had been to New York and learned for the first time the exact character of the malady from which Grant was suffering, and that his life could not be prolonged beyond a very few months at the most. It was just about the close of the Congressional session, and Mr. Childs urged me to proceed to Washington at once to present the matter to Randall, as without his aid it could not be accomplished. I hastened to Washington, Randall took hold of it without delay and forced its passage through the House, and nearly, if not quite, the last act that President Arthur signed in the Executive office, where the President usually attends at the close of Congress, was the act restoring Grant to the army roll, and the last communication sent to that Congress by President Arthur, even after the hour of adjournment, when the clock had been halted in marking the flight of time, was a message sending Grant's nomination to the Senate, which was promptly and unanimously confirmed.

Randall never enjoyed fortune. He lived most frugally on his salary as a member of Congress, but his services were so highly valued as a Philadelphia Congressman that a few business men, headed by Drexel and Childs, provided all the political expenses

for his district from year to year, and when a fund was raised by Childs and Drexel just before Randall's death, to give a very moderate income to his family, he refused to assent to it, and I was again sent to Washington by Mr. Childs to insist that he should not interpose against a gift to his wife and children, who would be left dependent. He was then on his deathbed with only a few days of life before him, and it was my last meeting with Randall until I stood beside his lifeless body at the tomb.

He finally consented that, as the gift had no relation to public affairs, it might be carried into effect. The money was invested by Drexel to yield an annual income of \$2,000, and, since his death, when some of the investments proved unfortunate, the full value was restored by the original contributors.

The one impassable chasm between Randall and Wallace was the fact that both could not be President of the United States. Both were very earnest candidates for that position for a number of years, as I know from very many conferences with them on the subject, and each was constantly in conflict to repress the other.

After Wallace retired from the United States Senate, Randall won the control of the party and became chairman of the State committee. He held the position for several years, but he was not an organizer. He was a political fighter rather than a manager, and defeat came to him as it had come to Wallace, although Randall narrowly escaped the Presidential nomination in 1880 at Cincinnati. The convention was held in the balance for two days awaiting the final decision of Tilden, who would have been nominated by the convention had he not decided to withdraw. After delaying quite too long he sent a declination and advised the nomination of Randall, but it was too late.



Samuel J. Randall

The Hancock feeling had been well managed and reached a tidal wave, and Randall fell through the indecision of his friends.

Wallace never was presented for President by his State, as Randall was in 1884, but for fifteen years before his retirement from active participation in politics he always looked hopefully to his election to the Presidency. Had Wallace been for Randall in 1880, as he was in 1884, Randall would have been nominated and might have been elected, as Hancock was crucified by Tammany.

Thus, in striving to accomplish the great ambition of their lives, the only thing that they accomplished in that line was to hinder the advancement of each other.

In 1886 Wallace had retired from the United States Senate, only a few years before, and had decided to become a candidate for Governor. He explained his purpose to me, and I well understood that his chief inspiration in the movement was to obtain such position in the party as would indicate his continued mastery in the State. I suggested to him that there was no reason why he and Randall should be at war on the subject, and proposed that they should meet in my office together, and in a few days they were there to confer on the subject.

Like all intensely inflamed factional leaders, they did many childish things in factional warfare, but I had a very plain talk with both of them, reminding them that they were lessening their own manhood and political importance by political conflicts, and I suggested to Randall that he should declare in favor of Wallace for Governor, to which he assented, and then, for the first and only time, as they shook hands at parting, I supposed the factional fight was ended, at least for a season.

But within ten days, doubtless because of the violence of the followers of both the party leaders, Randall conceived that he had good cause to break the compact, and he fought out at the State convention at York one of the bitterest struggles of his life, where he succeeded in defeating Wallace for Governor and nominating Chauncey F. Black.

Wallace was greatly mortified at his defeat, and intensely embittered against Randall, but his own senatorial district, after his defeat for Governor, gave him a unanimous nomination, and next to a unanimous re-election to the State senate.

Important incidents in the lives of public men best illustrate their qualities. When Randall transferred his force and thus assured the nomination of Cleveland for President, in 1884, it was understood, if not more formally agreed to, that Randall should control the patronage of the administration in Pennsylvania if Cleveland succeeded, and as his friends and the friends of Wallace were at daggers' points in every locality, Randall was naturally inclined to appoint his friends and offend his Democratic opponents. He at first carried this policy to such an extent that a tempest of protest reached the President, and a somewhat tempered line of policy was accomplished by a rather interesting incident. He had recommended for postmaster of Huntingdon a devoted follower of his against the candidate presented by ex-Congressman Speer and Senator McAteer, whose political control of the Democracy of the county was absolute. Randall succeeded in having Postmaster General Vilas endorse his candidate to the President.

Speer called upon me and made an earnest appeal to save him if possible from such a fearful humiliation in his own home, that would practically destroy his usefulness in the party. I told him that I would give

it immediate and earnest attention, as Randall's affront to Speer and McAteer was unpardonable, although forced upon him by his factional supporters.

It happened that Randall was in Philadelphia on the day that Speer visited me, and called to see me early in the evening. I said nothing to him about Speer's complaint, but asked him whether he would do me the favor to deliver a letter to the President in person as soon as he returned to Washington. He answered that he would certainly do so promptly. I wrote a brief letter to the President, stating that Randall had advised the appointment of a postmaster in Huntingdon who was opposed by ex-Congressman Speer and Senator McAteer, the absolutely controlling leaders of the Democracy in both the town and county, and that if the appointment was made neither Randall nor Cleveland would be likely to carry a delegate in that section of the State for some years.

After writing the letter I said to Randall that I thought I should read it to him before it was given to him for delivery in person, and I read it. The masterful combativeness of his character was instantly exhibited in his strong face, but he made no other reply than that he would deliver the letter as he promised, and nothing further was said on the subject.

Immediately on his return to Washington he called upon the President and delivered the letter. Naturally, the President was greatly surprised at its contents, and turning to Mr. Randall he inquired whether the statements were true. Randall said that he was not prepared to dispute them, to which the President answered that the contest for postmaster in Huntingdon might be considered as settled, and Speer's man was appointed.

Wallace made his last battle in 1890, and his old rival was borne to his grave in the early part of the

year. Wallace then believed the field to be clear for him, and in his methodical way he arranged to have Wallace men elected delegates in a majority of the counties of the State. He had little hope that he might be elected, but a nomination for Governor would reinstate him as the leader of the party. He many times visited and conferred with me on the subject, and was quite confident of success, but the granger movement then developed in huge proportions, the hayseeds of the rural districts stormed the Democracy, and a month before the meeting of the convention at Scranton it became evident to all but Wallace himself that even the tried followers of Wallace elected as delegates could not adhere to their chief and sustain themselves at home.

Three weeks before the convention met I ventured to tell Wallace that he could not be nominated. He retorted angrily that he had a Wallace convention, and that no human power could take it from him. I said to him that I did not believe his success was possible, and I begged of him to make careful investigation when the convention was about to meet and ascertain the precise situation. If he saw that defeat confronted him, I entreated him to enter the convention as a delegate, nominate Pattison himself, and let the convention unanimously nominate him for United States Senator, as there was one to be elected. If the Democrats carried the Legislature he would be the Senator; if not, he could certainly be the attorney general. He dismissed the proposition summarily, and I did not see him again until the week before the election, when he returned from Europe and delivered his only address in the campaign in Philadelphia.

Instead of facing and bowing to the situation at Scranton, he stood his ground sullenly, accepted defeat, and sailed for Europe a few days thereafter. When

abroad he was advised of the progress of the campaign and the probability of Pattison's success. He returned just in time to deliver a single speech, and at a little supper party after he had spoken, he stated to me his embarrassed financial condition, and expressed the earnest desire that he might be made attorney general; but his opportunity and his power had passed away, and a few years later, when Randall and Wallace had struggled in ceaseless conflict for nearly a generation to climb the treacherous heights of political mastery, they "sleep the'gither at the foot."

LV.

BUCKALEW ELECTED U. S. SENATOR.

Democrats Elected Their State Ticket in 1862 and One Majority on Joint Ballot in the Legislature—A Bitter Struggle for the Senatorship—Cameron Claimed the Support of One or More Democrats, and Received the Republican Nomination—Charles R. Buckalew Nominated by the Democrats—Democratic Apprehension of a Repetition of the Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller Defection That Elected Cameron in 1857—Organized Rioters Crowded the Capitol and Declared That Any Democrat who Betrayed His Party Would not Leave the Hall Alive—Open Charge of Corruption Made Against Democratic Representative Boyer—Buckalew Elected by a Strict Party Vote—His Career in the Senate.

THE election of 1862 was the first triumph the Democrats had achieved in Pennsylvania for five years. They had elected Packer Governor in 1857 with an overwhelming majority of the Legislature, but they were defeated in every contest thereafter, until they won out in 1862, electing Slenker auditor general and Barr surveyor general by about 4,000 majority.

The Unionists, as the Republicans were then called, had accumulated a very large majority in the senate, and held control of the body by nearly two to one even against the adverse vote of 1862. The Legislature stood 21 Republicans in the Senate to 12 Democrats, giving a majority of 9 to the Republicans, and the house stood 55 Democrats to 45 Republicans, giving the Democrats a majority of 10 in that body, and a majority of one on joint ballot.

A United States Senator was to be elected and the closeness of the Legislature again brought Cameron into

the field, as he was a master manipulator of close or tangled Legislatures, having elected himself to the Senate to succeed Buchanan in 1845 as an Independent Democrat with the aid of the Whigs and bolting Cameron Democrats, and re-elected himself in the Democratic Legislature of 1857, when he defeated Forney by the votes of Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller. David Wilmot had been elected to the Senate to succeed Cameron when Cameron retired from that body in 1861, having two years to serve, and as he was the ablest of the Republican leaders, it was at first expected that he would receive the nomination of his party for re-election; but Cameron called a number of the Republican leaders in council and he informed them that if he received the Republican nomination and the solid Republican vote, he could command one or more Democratic votes and thus assure his election. Wilmot, who was above all things manly and frank, said that he could not be elected; that he knew of no Democratic votes he could command, and did not believe that any Republican could break the Democratic lines. He stated, however, that he would not interpose his interests to embarrass Republican success, and if the leaders believed that they could elect a Republican Senator by taking Cameron, he was entirely satisfied that they should do so. The result was that Wilmot was retired from the contest; Cameron became an aggressive candidate and received the Republican nomination, and many believed he would be elected.

The factional bitterness between the Curtin and Cameron wings of the party had not been in any degree tempered, and at an informal conference of four of the leading anti-Cameron members of the Legislature, which I was invited to attend, the whole matter was fully discussed and the four members declared that they had fully decided not to vote for Cameron and

bring upon the party the stain of a corrupt election to the Senate if Cameron controlled one or more Democratic votes. Two of those men, Thorne, of Philadelphia, and Laporte, of Bradford, who were prominent among the Republican leaders, had organized the revolt and declared that the policy was to give no sign of their purpose to vote against Cameron until the roll was called for the election of Senator. With four members of the house thus positively and voluntarily pledged to defeat Cameron, his success was made absolutely impossible. Doubtless more could have been added to this list, but it was not deemed expedient to have it discussed, and the whole arrangement was made under a sacred obligation to secrecy.

I doubt whether Cameron ever knew that such a movement had been consummated to defeat him, as the men who had decided to carry out the programme never discussed it outside of their own circle.

There was no visible defection against Cameron in the Republican ranks, and Cameron threw himself into the contest, and exhausted his vast and varied powers of control to command one or more Democratic votes. The assertion was openly and positively made on every side by his friends that he had the necessary Democratic support assured, and it soon became whispered that the Democratic vote upon which he relied for his election was that of Representative Boyer, of Clearfield. Boyer was silent on the subject for some time after his position had become discussed as a possible or probable supporter of Cameron, but a condition speedily confronted him which compelled him to define his position, and he finally did so by declaring that he had been offered a large sum of money, variously stated at twenty or twenty-five thousand dollars, to vote for Cameron for Senator, and that he had apparently entertained the proposition solely, as he



Charles R. Buckelew.

alleged, to prevent Cameron from debauching other Democratic members of the Legislature; but the friends of Cameron, and those who had conducted the negotiation with Boyer, boldly declared that he had willingly entered into the compact, and would have executed it but for the fact that his life would have been imperiled if he had voted for Cameron. I do not assume to decide which of these explanations is the true one, but it was generally accepted at the time by those who viewed the conditions intelligently and dispassionately, that Boyer did not thus expose himself to public scandal and general distrust simply to prevent Cameron from dealing with some other Democratic member of the Legislature. It is due to Boyer to say that, thirteen years later, when Wallace was elected to the United States Senate, leaving an unexpired term of one year in the State senate, Boyer was elected as his successor.

The Democrats were greatly inspired to energetic action by the triumph they had achieved in the State after a series of defeats, and they well remembered how Cameron had been elected in a Democratic Legislature only six years before by diverting the votes of Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller to the support of the Republican caucus candidate; and at the first whisper of Cameron entering the field they assumed that their slender majority of one in the Legislature made the battle an inviting one for Cameron. There were a number of Democratic candidates for the Senatorship, but Charles R. Buckalew had so strongly entrenched himself in the confidence and respect of the Democrats of the State by his thoroughly honest, able and wise leadership in the senate, that he easily distanced his competitors, and was made the Democratic candidate for Senator with the hearty support of the entire party. There were no wounds within the Democratic house-

hold, such as had been caused by the forced nomination of Colonel Forney in 1857, and there was no shadow of excuse for any Democrat to desert his party.

The Democratic leaders took time by the forelock, and long before the Legislature met the most emphatic declarations were made in every section of the State demanding that there should be a united party for Senator, and that if any Democratic senator or representative deserted his party to elect Cameron, he should be driven from the State, or made a stranger in his community. In Philadelphia the expressions were even more belligerent, and as the reports came from Harrisburg after the Legislature met that Wilmot had been forced to yield the field to Cameron because Cameron had given assurance of commanding Democratic votes, the more violent elements of the party were inflamed to revolutionary action, and meetings were held in Philadelphia where it was openly declared that no Democratic member of the Legislature should be permitted to escape from the hall of the house alive if he cast his vote for Cameron. This was not mere bravado; it was deliberately planned, and I speak advisedly when I say that it would have been executed regardless of consequences.

A week before the day fixed for the election of Senator it was well known to all that a Democratic vote for Cameron would mean a violent death for the man who cast such vote. All professed to deplore violence in or about the hall of the Legislature, but fair-minded men could not but feel that the Democrats were not wholly to blame for resolving to gain the fruits of their admitted victory in the State, or leave a bloody landmark to deter all future Democratic apostates. I was in Harrisburg at the time, and was the senior military officer on duty as assistant adjutant general of the United States, but was engaged chiefly, if not wholly,

in closing up the complicated affairs of the State draft that had been made several months before. I have seen many bitter conflicts in the Pennsylvania Legislature, but none that equaled the Cameron-Buckalew contest of 1863. Cameron's friends did not doubt that they had his election secured if their Democratic friends could be protected in deserting the party, but they also well understood, what was an open declaration on every street corner, that any Democrat who voted for Cameron would imperil his life. It was not only known that the Democrats meant to kill in the hall of the house any Democrat who voted for Cameron, but they knew that several organized bodies of men from Philadelphia, who had been assigned to the task, had accepted it and were more than ready for its execution. Such was the condition of affairs when Boyer made a public statement that he had been in apparent negotiation with the Cameron people for the sale of his vote, but that he had never intended to desert his party.

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A few days before the election of Senator, Governor Curtin had been called to Pittsburg in the performance of important public duties, and he sent for me before he left for Pittsburg, and informed me that he was advised of the purpose of Cameron's friends to call upon him and demand that he protect the Legislature by a military force. He told me that he would not be back in time to dispose of the proposition, and it would naturally come to me, as I was the military commandant of the city. He asked my views on the subject, and I promptly answered that if a military force was to be thrown in and about the Legislature, he would have to summon the militia to perform that duty, as I would not permit any military force that I could command to commit such a violent exercise of military power. The Governor was entirely satisfied with my answer,

and as he knew that I was quite willing to accept the responsibility, he was content that the issue should be left to be disposed of by me from a military standpoint.

Cameron called upon me and informed me that he could be elected United States Senator if the members of the Legislature were protected in voting as they wished to vote. I, of course, knew that he had no chance whatever of election, even if he obtained two or three Democratic votes, but I could not give him any information on that point. He made a most earnest appeal to me to assent to the announcement that a military force would protect the members of the Legislature in voting for United States Senator and protect them also from violence after they had left the hall. I answered Cameron, as I had answered the Governor, that I would never permit the gleam of the bayonet in the legislative halls to intimidate or protect legislators in the discharge of their duties, and that such an atrocious violation of the fundamental principles of civil government was not a question even to be discussed. There was no bitterness exhibited by either in the full discussion of the question, but he was most persistent in urging me to assure his election by ordering the military force to take possession of the Capitol. I knew how hopeless the effort was, even under the most favorable conditions, as he viewed it, but I was not at liberty to express any views as to the defection in his own party. He undoubtedly believed that a military force to protect all who entered the hall of the house would assure his election, and it was only natural that he should feel greatly disappointed and grieved at my refusal to assent to his programme. After a conference of more than an hour Cameron left me without any exhibition of temper, but he certainly felt then that I was the one insuperable obstacle to his election to the Senate.

It was known to all the next day that the civil authority of the State would not be put under any restraint or offered any protection in the election of the Senator, and that practically ended the contest. Until then Cameron's friends were all absolutely certain that he would win. Several hundred men from Philadelphia had come to Harrisburg solely for the purpose of making it impossible for a Democrat to vote for Cameron, and when they found that there would be no interference by the military, declarations could be heard in any of the hotels or on any of the street corners that the Democrat who voted against his party would never emerge from the hall of the house alive. The declarations were not only made, but the men who made them meant just what they said. The Democrats had control of the house, and with the officers of the body subject to the orders of Democratic leaders they had absolute control of the spectators to be admitted to witness the Senatorial election. It is needless to say that the "killers" and "bouncers" from Philadelphia were given the advantage of positions in the house, and they were very earnestly determined on the immediate death of any Democratic member who voted for Cameron.

They knew that Boyer would vote for Buckalew, but they remembered that, when Cameron was elected over Forney, Lebo, Maneer and Wagenseller were not even suspected by the Democrats until they cast their votes on the ballot for Senator. They had no knowledge of the determinedly organized opposition to Cameron within the Republican lines; they assumed, as they had every reason to assume, that Cameron would receive the united Republican vote, and they were apprehensive that the Cameron Democratic vote might come from a wholly unexpected quarter. It would have come, I did not then doubt, and I do not now

doubt, but for the fact that every Democratic member of the Legislature well knew that he could hope to live over the day only by voting for Buckalew.

The hall was crowded to suffocation, but the Democratic officers of the house had taken care that sufficient of the Democrats who might be needed in an emergency should be admitted. George V. Lawrence, of Washington, was speaker of the senate and presided over the joint convention, and by his side, on the speaker's stand, was John Cessna, Democratic speaker of the house. Lawrence was an accomplished parliamentarian, and heartily supported Cameron. He doubtless completely understood the situation, and knew when he called the convention to order that Cameron's election was impossible solely, as he believed, because the Democrats who would be willing to vote for Cameron could do so only at the sacrifice of their lives. There was profound silence in the hall when the clerk of the senate began the roll call of the members, and it continued unbroken as the clerk of the house proceeded to call the roll of representatives. There was not an expression from any one until the name of Representative Schofield, of Philadelphia, was called. He was a fearless and rather dramatic character, and he responded by rising in his place and saying that in the face of an offer of \$100,000 to vote against his party, he cast his vote for Charles R. Buckalew. Thorne and the other Republican members of the house who had made the compact to defeat Cameron's election voted for him, as they knew that no Democrat would support him, with the exception of Bartholomew Laporte, who had become so thoroughly disgusted with the Cameron contest that he voted against him. After roll call the vote was tabulated and Speaker Lawrence announced that Charles R. Buckalew had received a majority of votes and was elected United States Senator. As soon as

the election of Buckalew was announced the crowd broke out of the hall of the house, and from that time until long after the midnight hour the roystering Democratic element that had come to Harrisburg expecting, and rather wishing, to carve out a record that would make future Democratic apostates impossible, made their cheers echo throughout every part of the city.

Charles R. Buckalew was one of the ablest men of the Democratic leaders of his time. He was not an organizer, he had little or no knowledge of political strategy, and was entirely unfitted for the lower strata methods of modern politics. He came to the senate in 1852 hardly known outside of his own district; he was singularly quiet and unobtrusive in manner, and never in any way sought to exploit himself. He won his position in the party solely by the great ability he possessed, his practical efficiency in legislation, and the absolute purity of his character. He was ordinarily a cold, unimpassioned speaker, but eminently logical and forceful.

Only on a very few occasions did I ever see him aroused to the exhibition of emotion in public debate. He took the floor only when there seemed to be a necessity for it, and always brief and incisive in the expression of his views while presenting his arguments. Had he entered the National Senate under different conditions he would have made a more creditable record in that body, but during his entire six years of service his party was in a pitiable minority, and with his old-school Democratic ideas he could not advance with the new revolutionary conditions which surrounded and overwhelmed him.

Buckalew was an old-time Democratic strict constructionist, and he had no sympathy with the violent advances precipitated by war or the overthrow of slavery, by methods as violent in politics as were the

deadly struggles in the field to sustain it. He commanded the universal respect of his Republican associates in the senate, and the unswerving confidence of his own party in State and country. In 1872, when the Democrats had every prospect of electing a Governor, because of the Liberal Republican movement, they nominated Buckalew without a serious contest, and that meant that the party wanted Buckalew rather than that Buckalew wanted the office. He was not capable of manipulating the nomination for himself, and he was made a candidate solely because the party preferred him and presented him as the strongest and cleanest standard bearer that could be offered to the people. He accepted the nomination and spoke in a number of the leading centers of the State, but did not attempt a systematic canvass. The collapse of the Liberal Republican and Democratic coalition at the October elections is well remembered, and Buckalew fell in the race. Later he was elected to Congress, where he served two terms, and that ended his public career. In both the National Senate and House he seldom participated in debate, but was a most faithful and efficient practical worker in all matters relating to legislation. Soon after his retirement the work of a highly honorable and useful life was ended, and he crossed the dark river to the echoless shore beyond.

LVI.

CURTIN RENOMINATED FOR
GOVERNOR.

Curtin's Broken Health Made his Retirement an Apparent Necessity—Curtin Movement to Nominate General Franklin, a Loyal Democrat, to be Supported by Both Parties, Rejected by the Democrats—Curtin Tendered a First-Class Mission by President Lincoln to Enable Him to Retire from the Contest—Interesting Interview with Lincoln by Cameron, Forney and the Author—Republican People Refuse to Accept his Withdrawal, and a Number of the Leading Counties Instructed for Him—He Was Renominated on the First Ballot.

AS SOON as the desperate contest for the United States Senator had ended in January, 1863, the consideration of the gubernatorial contest was the absorbing topic in political circles. It was not doubted at any time that Governor Curtin could command a renomination from the Republican party regardless of the opposition of Cameron, but two very important considerations made him and his friends take pause. He had been suffering for more than a year from a malady that required severe and exhaustive surgical operations, and his devotion to his exacting political duties never gave him opportunity to regain his strength. In the spring of 1863 there was every indication of a general and final breakdown of his physical system, and all felt that it was not possible for him to assume the responsibility and labors of another State battle for the Governorship. It would not have been possible for him to make a canvass of the State, and the general conviction of his friends was that if he accepted the nomination and attempted to make the fight, he would not survive the struggle.

The other consideration was one that was also a very grave one for himself and his friends to consider. Even with a thoroughly united party he could hardly hope to command success, and with Cameron's implacable hostility there was no reasonable prospect of his re-election. Our soldiers were disfranchised unless they could be furloughed home to vote, and with 75,000 Pennsylvania soldiers in the field, a very large majority of whom would support Curtin, and denied the right of suffrage, the contest appeared to be utterly hopeless. Curtin fully realized the gravity of both considerations, which forbade an acceptance of a renomination, and he was very earnestly desirous to be able to retire from office at the end of his term and have a successor who would be thoroughly loyal in his devotion to the cause of the government in its struggle against armed rebellion. He felt that the question of placing Pennsylvania in the attitude of giving the highest measure of moral and material support to the government was paramount to all party interests, and had the Democrats of Pennsylvania accepted his suggestion, they would have had a Democratic Governor as his successor, and the party would have been planted on a platform of unquestioned loyalty to the Union.

General William B. Franklin had won distinction in the army as a corps commander under McClellan. He was a native of Pennsylvania, a pronounced Democrat and earnestly loyal. When the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps was organized in 1861, Curtin first offered the command of that corps to General McClellan, who was then employed as a railroad engineer in Ohio, but on the very day that Curtin's invitation had reached him, the Governor of Ohio had asked him to accept a major generalship and take command of a number of Ohio regiments then just organized, and the Legislature had in a very few minutes passed an

act making him eligible, notwithstanding he was not a citizen of the State. McClellan had given his consent to accept the Ohio command, and was thus compelled with great reluctance to decline the command of the Reserve Corps. Curtin then offered the command to Franklin, who had just been promoted to a colonelcy in the regular army, but as the government had refused to accept the Reserves in immediate service, Franklin felt compelled to decline it, as it would retire him from active operations in the field. The command was then given to General McCall.

When the question of Curtin's candidacy was being very carefully considered by himself and his friends, I received an urgent despatch from him to come to Harrisburg, and I arrived at the Executive mansion in the evening. He told me that his purpose in sending for me was to inaugurate a movement for the nomination of General Franklin as a candidate for Governor on a non-partisan platform. He believed that as there was no question of Franklin's devotion to Democracy the Democrats would be glad to accept him, and Curtin's plan was that the Republicans should endorse the nomination, and thus bring the two great parties in Pennsylvania to the support of the war in solid phalanx. It was a grand, patriotic conception, and one that I believed, as Curtin did, the Democrats would be willing to accept, and there would have been no serious difficulty in securing for Franklin the endorsement of the Republicans. Franklin would have made a model Governor, and his election would have relieved the Democrats of the last vestige of disloyalty and greatly strengthened them for future contests.

It was decided to call into private consultation a number of the Democratic leaders, and if possible get them enlisted in the Franklin movement, but we were both surprised at the opposition at once developed

throughout the Democratic circles. The Democrats believed that they could elect the next Governor, because of the absence of the soldiers from the polls, and there were a number of earnest candidates, embracing Judge Woodward, of the supreme court; ex-Speaker Hopkins, of Washington; ex-Speaker Cessna, of Bedford; Senator Clymer, of Berks, and half a dozen others who were most prominent on the surface. I was utterly amazed to learn that not one of the potential leaders of the party was willing to accept Franklin, and the chief objection to him was that his views on the war did not accord with the dominant sentiment of the party. It was a great opportunity for the Democracy of Pennsylvania, but the Democracy that had favored and prosecuted every war in which the country was engaged, and boasted that it was the war party of the country, was greatly demoralized and weakened in its most vital quality, and it could not throw its powerful energies into the support of the war for the maintenance of the Union. Its great leadership was dwarfed and paralyzed, and a very large proportion of even the more intelligent Democratic people of the State believed that the war must finally be ended by compromise, as the South could not be conquered into submission to a reunion of the States.

I conferred with Cassidy, who was then a great power in the Democratic organization of the State, and who was thoroughly up-to-date, not only in political management, but in complete knowledge of his party. His answer was very significant, as he said that the Democrats would not accept Franklin solely because it was the wise thing for them to do. He declared that the Democratic leaders had lost their power and were political suicides. In conference with Cessna he admitted the force of the argument in favor of Franklin, but as Cessna had been pronounced in his

loyal support of the Government, and as the Governorship was the one dream of his life, he was unwilling to retire from the contest in favor of Franklin, when, as he put it, his own election would be just as pronounced a victory for loyalty as that of Franklin. It soon became evident that the Franklin scheme must be abandoned, and he was dropped out of the contest without his name ever having been in public discussion as a gubernatorial expectant. Franklin had no knowledge of the movement until after it had been abandoned. He told me later that he would have accepted the position because of the high honor it brought to him, but that personally he was very glad he would not be called from active service to civil life.

After the Franklin episode it was evident to all that the battle for the next gubernatorial election would be a square struggle between the two parties in the State, and Curtin was very anxious to find some method by which he could retire without discredit. The delegates were being elected from week to week, and in most instances were instructed for him, but he still hoped that some conditions would arise by which he could escape the responsibility and labors of the campaign.

Soon after Franklin's name had been dropped I received a message from Mrs. Curtin to come to Harrisburg at once, and I was with the Governor and his family the same evening. I was surprised to learn from Mrs. Curtin, the first opportunity she had to inform me on the subject, that she had sent for me without the knowledge of the Governor, and that she wished to have a talk with me alone. When an opportunity presented she said that she had viewed with great anxiety the efforts made to have the Governor retire from the gubernatorial contest, but now she saw that his nomination was almost certain to be made, and that he would not decline it even though he felt that it

would be likely to cost him his life. He was in a very feeble condition, and Mrs. Curtin said it would not be possible for him to accept the struggle of another campaign and survive. She pleaded with me with tears scalding her cheeks to find some method by which the Governor could be at once relieved from his position as a candidate, as it was a constant source of vexation and aggravated his illness.

Later in the evening I had opportunity to confer with the Governor alone and told him frankly what Mrs. Curtin had done and said, and I added that she was entirely right, and that he must in some way be retired from the field as a gubernatorial candidate. He suggested that if a foreign mission were tendered to him it would be a plausible excuse for his retirement in view of broken health, and added that I might find some way of bringing that about. I said to him that I would go to Washington at once, and did not doubt it could be accomplished if he would permit me to do it in my own way. He agreed to leave the matter entirely in my hands, and I went to Washington on the night train. I had no settled plan of action until I reached Washington. I had decided to confer with Forney, through whom I hoped that Cameron could be brought into co-operation with the arrangement. If I had intimated to Curtin that I contemplated any relations with Cameron, he would have forbidden it. I called at Forney's private office in the old building on Capitol Hill, where he often entertained friends, and where Cameron often went for a rest in the afternoon, as the relations between Cameron and Forney were then very friendly. I told Forney of my mission, and the necessities which had inspired it. It was necessary for Curtin to be retired, first, because he could not survive the battle, and second, because his election seemed doubtful in view of the Pennsyl-

vania soldiers in the field and the factional hostility that would be arrayed against Curtin. Forney was very warmly attached to Curtin and very cordially assented to the suggestion that he should be retired by the offer of a mission, and thus harmonize the party on a candidate who would not be offensive to any factional interests in the State. I suggested that I believed Cameron would favor the movement, as he would be gratified to have Curtin out of the Governorship, and also gratified to have him out of the State. Forney responded that Cameron would doubtless approve of it, and said that he could be called at once, as he was lying down upstairs in one of his rooms.

Cameron was sent for and appeared in a few minutes. The matter was presented to him by both Forney and myself, and he said that he very heartily approved of the suggestion. I said to him frankly that he wanted Curtin out of the field because he was not his friend, and that I wanted him out of the field because I was his friend, and asked him to go with Forney and myself at once to the President and present the matter to him, to which both Forney and Cameron assented. Forney ordered a carriage and we went directly to the White House, where we found Lincoln alone. He was quite amazed to see Cameron, Forney and myself come together, as it was seldom that we were entirely in accord on any of the many political disputes which were before him. I stated the situation in Pennsylvania to the President with entire frankness, telling him that Curtin was too ill to survive the struggle, that his election was certainly doubtful because of the political conditions in our State and the absence of the soldiers from the polls, and that if he could tender Curtin a mission at the end of his term, so that public announcement could be made of it, it would entirely eliminate him from the race, and the factional bitter-

ness of the State would not enter into the contest. Lincoln had a very high appreciation of Curtin and thoroughly understood the conditions. He said of course he would not offer Curtin anything but a first-class mission, to which Cameron replied that a second-class mission would serve the purpose, but I answered Cameron by stating that if a second-class mission was to be considered for Curtin, the conference was ended. Lincoln's face brightened as it always did when his love of humor asserted itself, and he said that he had but four first-class missions, all of which were filled by men who very much wanted to remain in them, and he added that he was much in the condition of Sheridan, the celebrated Englishman, whose rakish son had brought scandals about himself and his father. The father remonstrated with him about his life and insisted that he should take a wife, to which the young rake answered: "All right, father, but whose wife shall I take?" He said he wanted a mission, but whose mission should he take? After some further conversation on the subject, Lincoln said that we could consider the suggestion as accepted and it would be carried out. He said that he did not yet know in what form he would put it, but if I would call back again in the morning he would give a formal answer that would be satisfactory to all. We retired soon after, and the next morning when I called on the President, he handed me a letter in his own hand-writing to be delivered to Governor Curtin. The letter was as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, April 13, 1863.

Hon. Andrew G. Curtin:

MY DEAR SIR:—If, after the expiration of your present term as Governor of Pennsylvania, I shall continue in office here, and you shall desire to go abroad, you can do so with one of the first-class missions.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

I returned to Harrisburg by the first train and delivered Lincoln's letter to Curtin. He was greatly delighted, and at once had me prepare a statement for the Associated Press announcing that the President had tendered to Governor Curtin a first-class mission at the expiration of his term; that he had notified the President of his acceptance of the position, and that he would not, therefore, be a candidate for re-election as Governor. The announcement was a regular bomb-shell to the earnest Republicans of the State, who were enthusiastically devoted to Curtin, and, to the surprise of both Curtin's friends and foes, within a few days thereafter half a dozen of the leading Republican counties of the State, including Lancaster and Chester, elected their delegates and instructed them to support Curtin for Governor regardless of his announced retirement.

At the meeting with the President the question of who should take Curtin's place as the Republican candidate for Governor was freely discussed by Lincoln, Cameron, Forney and myself, although I did not introduce the subject. Forney suggested that John Covode would be the most available candidate, to which Cameron cordially assented, and after considerable discussion all agreed that the nomination of Covode would be almost certain to be generally accepted. I had informed Curtin on my return of the views expressed as to Covode, and he at once said that he had no objection whatever to Covode's candidacy, and would heartily support him. Senator Ketchum, of Luzerne; ex-Congressman Henry D. Moore, of Philadelphia; Senator John P. Penny, of Allegheny, and several others were at once pressed into the field by their friends, but the Republican counties continued to demand Curtin's nomination, notwithstanding his definite announcement that he was no longer in the race, and the pressure became so urgent for Curtin's

acceptance that the several opposing candidates for the place could make no progress.

Large committees were appointed in many of the counties to visit the Governor in person at Harrisburg and demand his acceptance of the nomination. Curtin repeated his declarations that his condition of health forbade him accepting further contests, but to all his protests the Republicans of the State turned a deaf ear, and within ten days of the meeting of the convention it had become evident that Curtin would be nominated in disregard of his public declination. He came to Chambersburg to spend a day or two with me and decide in what manner he should meet the new emergency that confronted him. He was entirely convinced that he ought not to accept the nomination, because his defeat would be quite probable, and because his health was such that he would be compelled either to let the contest go by default or sacrifice his life in the struggle to save himself and the party; but he was profoundly appreciative of the sentiment that demanded his nomination after he had publicly declined and in a manner that should have been entirely satisfactory to his personal friends.

The question then to be decided was whether, after the convention had nominated him, he would answer with a peremptory declination, or bow to the judgment of the party and accept the issue with all its seriously threatened consequences. I very earnestly urged him to announce that he could not, under any circumstances, accept the nomination, as I believed that he owed it to himself, his family and his friends to do so, but he did not reach a final decision until within an hour before he left me. We had sat up until after the midnight hour, going over every phase of the question, and while at breakfast he announced that he had reached a definite conclusion, and that if nominated,

he could not reject such a generous expression of devotion from the people of the State.

Our county delegation had been chosen soon after his declination, and I had declined to serve as a delegate. I told him that I would obtain a substitution from one of our delegates and attend the convention, which I did. The convention met in Pittsburg, the hotbed of opposition to Curtin, and it was intensely inflamed by the old railroad war and Curtin's approval of the repeal of the tonnage tax. It was publicly announced that if Curtin's name was presented to the convention in Pittsburg it would be hissed and jeered by the galleries, and the statement was not entirely unwarranted. It was an unusually able convention with Mann, MacVeagh, Dickey, Judge Maxwell, Tom Marshall, Lawrence and many others who stood in the front of Republican leadership, and the opposition to Curtin, although a scattered and feeble minority, was intensely bitter in the struggle. At the first session of the body when Curtin's name was mentioned it was hissed and jeered, but Tom Marshall, himself a delegate from Pittsburg, arose and apologized for the blackguards who had, in some way, found their way into the lobby, and gave notice that if there was any repetition of insult to the convention when any name was mentioned he would at once move to have the gallery cleared, as a matter of justice to Pittsburg. There were no more offensive demonstrations from the gallery. Curtin's friends had scrupulously avoided all provocation and reached a ballot as speedily as possible. Covode, seeing that his case was hopeless, did not permit the use of his name, and the ballot resulted in 90 for Curtin, 18 for Moore, 14 for Penny, 3 for Brewster and 1 for Moorehead. The opposition moved for the unanimous nomination of Curtin, and it was received with the wildest enthusiasm.

LVII.

CURTIN RE-ELECTED GOVERNOR.

Justice George W. Woodward Nominated for Governor by the Democrats
When Lee Was Approaching Gettysburg—From the Democratic
Standpoint He Was Their Strongest Candidate—The Union Vic-
tories of Gettysburg and Vicksburg Decided the Contest of 1863—
Chairman MacVeagh's Adroit Handling of the Soldier Element—
Soberness of Political Discussion in 1863—Woodward Defeated and
Curtin Re-elected—Woodward's Distinguished Career.

THE issue of the memorable gubernatorial con-
test of 1863 was irrevocably decided by the
repulse of Pickett's charge and the retreat
of Lee's army from the battlefield of Gettysburg. It
was not fully understood at the time, nor indeed at
any period during the contest, that the mandate for
Curtin's re-election came from the decisive battle-
field of the Civil War, but it was none the less the truth.
Had Lee's campaign in Pennsylvania been crowned
with any important measure of success it would have
been accepted very generally in the North that the war
was likely to be indefinitely continued, with none able
to foretell the final result with any degree of certainty;
but when, on the Fourth of July, 1863, General Meade
announced the retreat of Lee's army, and General
Grant announced the surrender of Vicksburg, the con-
fidence of the loyal people of the country was greatly
strengthened, and the feeling was very general that the
military power of the Rebellion was broken, assuring
the overthrow of the Confederacy.

The readers of the present day who did not live during
the appalling trials of the war can have no just concep-
tion of the dark clouds of doubt and despair which

hung over the North until after the victories of Meade and Grant in 1863. The Army of the Potomac had fought battle after battle, and suffered defeat in every struggle, with the single exception of the drawn battle of Antietam, and Grant had been twice repulsed at Vicksburg when he had attempted to carry the enemy's works by assault. So strong was the feeling in some of the great centers of the North that New York city was plunged into bloody riots, with anarchy reigning for days because of the attempt to enforce the National conscription law, and the Mollie Maguire combination in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania was not entirely alone in the disposition to resort to revolutionary measures against the further prosecution of the war. When the enemy was on the border, with a large army threatening the invasion of the North, I saw regiments march away from the front to enforce submission to the law in the Schuylkill region. Congress had just enacted an effective National conscription law, and that was an invitation to all who were willing to accept violent measures against the government to precipitate their action. In fact until the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg, and his retreat to his old battle lines of Virginia, there did not seem to be a ray of hope for the election of a Republican Governor in Pennsylvania with 75,000 Pennsylvania soldiers disfranchised.

The Democratic State convention met in Harrisburg when the thunders of Lee's guns were heard on the border in the Cumberland Valley. It was a great opportunity for the Democrats to give General Franklin a unanimous nomination, as it would have emphasized the attitude of the party and relieved it of the crushing millstone of actual or apparent disloyalty that always more or less hindered Democratic success. It was one of the ablest conventions the Democrats ever held in the State, and it is safe to say that nine-

tenths of the delegates cherished the conviction that the Union could not be restored by force of arms. They believed the abolishment of slavery by Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was an utter impossibility, not only because it did not abolish slavery, but also because they regarded it as a brutum fulmen, entirely without constitutional or legal warrant.

They well understood that they could not put themselves in the attitude of open hostility to the war and the soldiers engaged in it, and they gave a diplomatic deliverance declaring in favor of the maintenance of the Union, with emphatic protest against the lawless war policy of the government. They believed that peace would come in the end only by a union based on compromise, or by the absolute severance of the South as an independent government.

It was only natural and logical that such a convention, with such convictions and environment, would call for the ablest representative of the Democratic party of the time as the candidate for Governor, and in that position George W. Woodward, of Luzerne, then a justice of the supreme court, stood foremost of all the Democratic leaders of the State. He was nominated for Governor, receiving 75 votes to 53 for Heister Clymer and 5 for Nimrod Strickland, and every member of the convention confidently expected him to be elected by a large majority. He was chosen because he was confessedly among the ablest, if not the ablest, of the Democratic jurists of the State, as it was believed that when the period of the close of the war was reached the gravest constitutional and legal questions would be presented to him for solution, and Judge Woodward was regarded as the man of all others in the Democratic party to meet such emergencies.

When the Democratic leaders had decided not to

unite with the Republicans and make common cause with the loyal supporters of the government, Judge Woodward was altogether the strongest candidate that could have been presented. He was a man of most imposing presence, his symmetrical form and finely chiseled face towering above his associates, sternly honest alike in conviction and action, genial in intercourse with others, the peer of any in judicial or political disputation, and accomplished in all the graces of a gentleman. Such was the candidate presented by the Democrats of Pennsylvania to succeed Curtin in 1863, and the two distinguished competitors for the highest trust of the Commonwealth most clearly and distinctly represented the opposing political convictions of the people. The leaders of both sides fully appreciated the fact that the judgment of Pennsylvania between the two great parties in 1863 would be decisive as to the dominating political power of the State for years to come.

The victories of Vicksburg and Gettysburg had re-inspired the Republicans of the State to confidence in the final success of the war for the restoration of the Union, and they at once rallied with earnest and often desperate energy for the great battle that was before them. To Wayne MacVeagh, of West Chester, since foreign minister and National cabinet officer, was assigned the responsible task of chairman of the Republican State committee. His appointment was at first ridiculed by the Democratic leaders as the advent of a sophomoric political amateur, but he proved himself to be more than equal to the vast responsibilities imposed upon him. Instead of being the figurehead that his opponents had declared him to be, he at once settled down to hard work and soon had the party of the State under the highest organization and discipline. His familiarity with the public men

of the political centers of the State made him a master in directing the details of the struggle. He was aided by experienced men of tireless energy, and the organization of the party in every township of the State was speedily accomplished. It required little more than intelligent and judicious direction, as never in any political contest that I recall were the people of both parties so soberly earnest in political effort.

When the home organization was thus perfected, a great work, and the only one that gave promise of success, was systematically undertaken and carried out with a degree of perfection that has never been surpassed in political management. The 75,000 soldiers in the field were generally devoted to Curtin. They had learned to accept him and speak of him as the "Soldiers' Friend." Every Pennsylvanian in the field, however humble, who addressed the Governor on any subject, however trivial, received a prompt answer bearing the Governor's signature, and always heartily aiding the soldier's wishes or fully explaining why they could not be acceded to. The Pennsylvania soldier sick or wounded in a hospital, even though far off in the Southwest, felt the sympathetic touch of Curtin's devotion to the soldiers by the kind ministrations of the Governor's special agents assigned to the task of caring for the helpless in the field. He had announced his purpose to have the State declare the orphans of our fallen soldiers to be the wards of the Commonwealth, a promise that was more than generously fulfilled, and the Pennsylvania soldiers killed on the field, or dying from sickness or wounds, were always taken possession of by officials representing the patriotic philanthropy of the Governor, and their bodies brought home at the expense of the State, for sepulture with their loved ones at home.

Thus had Curtin not only won the personal affection



George W. Woodward

of Pennsylvania soldiers by his practical devotion to their interests, but he was known to be in earnest sympathy with their cause, and even Democratic soldiers, of whom there were many, believed that the issue directly affected their attitude as soldiers and the care of the State for themselves and their families, and their party prejudices largely perished. These Pennsylvania soldiers were disfranchised when the "Soldiers' Friend" was upon trial before the people of the State for the continuance of his loyal and humane administration. The election was held early in October, a period very favorable for military operations, and it was not possible to expect any considerable number of them to be furloughed home to vote.

The great problem of the campaign that Chairman MacVeagh had to solve was how to bring the influence of the disfranchised soldiers in the field into practical effect upon the fathers, brothers and immediate friends at home. There were very few families in the State which were not more or less directly interested in individual soldiers in the field. Most of them had fathers, sons or brothers offering their lives in the flame of battle for the preservation of the Union, and the hearts of every one at home, of fathers, mothers, sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, were ever thoughtful of their friends at the front, and ready to do anything within their power to add to their comfort and strengthen their hopes of success. One of the duties performed by Chairman MacVeagh's committee was to ascertain every Democratic family that was immediately represented in the field, and there were thousands of Pennsylvania soldiers, officers and privates, who needed no special appeal to make them take up the cause of the "Soldiers' Friend" in the contest. In their midst around the campfire the question was discussed by the Pennsylvania soldiers, and certainly

three-fourths of them sent home the most urgent appeals to their fathers, brothers and friends to vote to sustain the patriotic and philanthropic Governor of the State as a matter of duty in support of the soldiers' cause. Not only did the soldiers appeal to the members of their immediate families, but to their many personal friends whom they knew at home, and the result was a mute but omnipotent expression from our soldiers in the field to their relatives and friends at home, that turned the scales and made Pennsylvania, with not less than 30,000 majority of Democratic voters at the polls, re-elect Curtin by over 15,000 majority.

Curtin had also strengthened his cause with the soldiers by pressing upon the Legislature of 1863, that had adjourned before he was renominated, an amendment to the State Constitution, authorizing the soldiers to vote in the field, and it had been passed by both branches, but without cordial support from the Democratic party. It was well understood that if the Republicans carried the Legislature at the election of 1863, the new Legislature, to meet in January, 1864, would pass the proposed amendment the second time, as required by the fundamental law, and thus bring about the right of the soldiers to vote in the field. The Republicans carried the Legislature along with Curtin; the proposed amendment to the Constitution relating to soldier suffrage was promptly passed and a special election called by the Legislature for its ratification by the people in midsummer, so that at the Presidential election of 1864 the soldiers were given the right of suffrage in the field.

Governor Curtin was physically unable to make a general campaign of the State, but he made a few brief speeches, and the desire to see and hear him was such that when an appointment was announced for him in

any part of the State, the people as a rule came regardless of party, and his broken health, that was so visible to all, aroused his friends to tireless action in his behalf to relieve him as far as possible from the necessity of exhausting his enfeebled powers in the contest. Judge Woodward made few deliverances in the campaign, and they were always of the most dignified and courteous character. He avoided discussion of some of the vital issues pressed by his opponents because of his position as a judge. The constitutionality of the National conscription law had been brought before the courts, and the case of *Kneedler vs. Lane* was pending in the supreme court, of which he was a member, and it had been argued by able counsel on both sides before the October election. The fact that the decision of the supreme court was delayed until the 9th of November, a month after the October election, made the question of sustaining the National conscription act a vital one on the side of Curtin and his supporters, and Woodward was silent on the subject, as he was a sitting judge who had heard the case, and must join in delivering final judgment upon it.

Had the supreme court decided the conscription act to be unconstitutional before the election, as it did on the 9th of November, a month after the election, that decision alone, if supported by Woodward, would have defeated his election, and the fact that the decision was held until after the election became an important factor in hindering Woodward's success. Additional embarrassment was given to the Democrats by the fact that Chief Justice Lowrie was the other candidate on the Democratic State ticket, he having been renominated to succeed himself. Thus the two leading members of the supreme court who held the constitutionality of the conscription act in their keeping, and failed to announce a judgment before the election, were aggres-

sively antagonized on the conscription issue, as it was well understood that without a National conscription act the armies could not be maintained in the field, and both from their judicial position were compelled to maintain silence, while their party leaders could not assume to speak for them.

In all my long participation in and observation of political campaigns in Pennsylvania I can recall none that approached the contest of 1863 in impressive soberness. The wide-awakes and the marching clubs which made the air ring with hearty hurrahs in 1860, were unfelt as a factor in 1863. There were marching clubs, of course, but they were not the rollicking, shouting, caped and lanterned boys who had enlivened the Lincoln campaign three years before. The hurrah speeches of ordinary political campaigns would have jarred harshly upon the sensibilities of the political audiences. The people came to hear words of truth and soberness; they came to unite soberly and earnestly for political action, and their convictions and their earnestness of purpose were ever with them. It was a struggle eye to eye and face to face, not for the triumph of a party, but for the triumph of a sacred principle involving the life of the Republic. Such were the convictions which ruled the contest, and they were universal. Never were so few doubtful voters returned by political committees; never did positive and aggressive conviction assert itself with so little ceremony and ostentation. The vote polled was the largest ever cast in the State, considering the absence of 75,000 soldiers, as is shown by the fact that while Lincoln received 268,930 votes in 1860, giving him some 50,000 majority over all, Curtin in 1863 received 269,506 votes, giving him a majority of over 15,000.

I met Judge Woodward frequently during the campaign, and, like all who knew him, I cherished not only

the highest respect but a strong personal affection for him. He was a man of strong partisan prejudice, resulting from the fact that he was a Democrat of the old school, a strict constructionist and sincerely convinced that there was no safety to popular government in the revolutionary innovations which are ever precipitated by civil war. He regarded coercion as unwarranted by the Constitution, and logically held that the Emancipation Proclamation was an act of Executive usurpation. On a journey one afternoon from Philadelphia to Allentown, where I was to deliver an address for Curtin in the evening, Judge Woodward was my companion on the train, and we discussed the political situation and the war with entire freedom, and, of course, with the utmost courtesy. He expressed his views very earnestly, because on all the great questions of the day his convictions were as earnest as they were sincere. As we approached Allentown I asked him in a jocular way whether he would permit me to declare to the audience I was to address that evening the views he had expressed on various subjects relating to the war, to which he answered that "a conversation in the free intercourse common among gentlemen is of course not for public criticism." He knew of course that I was incapable of violating the sanctity of casual intercourse among friends. I reminded him that he had two sons in the army who had won distinction and stood among the heroic soldiers of the State, and asked him whether he or I in the opposing positions with the soldiers was best supporting the cause of the soldiers in the field. He answered with visible pride that his sons were soldiers, and as soldiers they would do their duty.

His defeat was not only a great disappointment, but a severe humiliation. By the retirement of Chief Justice Lowrie, who was defeated at the same election,

Woodward succeeded to the chief justiceship, and he was one of the few members of our supreme court whose judicial deliverances ranked as approaching the ability of Gibson as a jurist. After his retirement from the supreme court, his taste for political life that had brought such keen disappointments in his defeat by Cameron for Senator in 1845, and his defeat for Governor in 1863, made him willing to accept a nomination for Congress, and he was twice elected. In the House he at once took high rank as one of the ablest of the Democratic leaders, but entirely unskilled in the political strategy that often makes men of moderate intellectual force the masters of intellectual giants in legislation. During his service in Congress he was prominently discussed as the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, but his political life was ended, and he never was formally presented as a candidate by his State.

He had rounded out his patriarchal years, and he turned back to his first love, the court of common pleas, and announced his willingness to accept the nomination from the Democracy of Luzerne for that position, intending to end his career in the calm and quiet of local administration of justice. He was promptly nominated, but those were times when local and general political tempests were common, and to the surprise of friends and foes, and to the fearful humiliation of the great jurist himself, he was largely defeated by the Republican candidate. Soon thereafter he went abroad, where his culture could find pleasant enjoyment, and on the 11th of May, 1875, the swift message that traverses the seas with the rapidity of the lightning flash, told the story of his death. The supreme court was sitting at Harrisburg, and a case was on for hearing in which I was to make the closing argument on the following morning. The cable despatch was received

announcing his death just a few minutes before the period of adjournment. Soon after the adjournment I was notified by the chief justice that I should deliver my argument in the pending case the next morning, and when it was concluded, announce the death of Chief Justice Woodward to the court, and then move adjournment. The next morning I delivered my argument on the pending case, and when through with it announced the death of Chief Justice Woodward in a brief address, of which the following was the concluding paragraph:


“And now in the fullness of his days, ripe in years and wearing the chaplet of honors that even malice would not dare to stain, he has passed away. The fitful clouds and angry tempests of prejudice and passion, which at times obscure the attributes of greatness, have long since vanished like the mists of the morning, and in the calm, bright evening time, he who so justly judged between man and man appears before the great Judge of all the living. But his blameless life, his pure example, his revered judgments remain, and like the beautiful dream of the departed sun that throws its halo over the countless jewels which soften the deep lines of darkness, so will his lessons of wisdom and honesty illumine the path of public and private duty for generations to come. In respect to his memory I move that the court do now adjourn.”

LVIII.

THE GREAT CONSCRIPTION BATTLE.

The Complete Story of the Efforts Made to Declare the National Conscription Act Unconstitutional by a State Court—Volunteering Had Ceased and Conscription Was the Only Hope of Filling the Union Armies—Proceedings Instituted at Nisi Prius Before Judge Woodward, Who Summoned the Entire Court to Hear and Decide the Important Question—After Exhaustive Argument Decision Delayed Until After the Election—The Court, by Three to Two, Declared the Act Unconstitutional—Chief Justice Lowrie Was Defeated by Justice Agnew—On Final Hearing Justice Agnew, Successor to Chief Justice Lowrie, Reversed Preliminary Hearing and Declared the Conscription Act Constitutional.

THE most momentous question ever submitted to the supreme court of Pennsylvania for its arbitrament arose in 1863, and was doubly momentous because of its immediate bearing upon the gubernatorial contest of that year, and also upon the power of the State to furnish its quota of troops to the Union army. The case is known to the profession as *Kneedler vs. Lane* (9 Wright, 238), but there were really three plaintiffs in the case, as three conscripts joined in the legal proceeding to restrain the provost marshal from forcing them into the military service of the government. The parties to the action were Henry S. Kneedler *vs.* David M. Lane, Charles S. Barrett, J. Ralston Wills, Isaac Ashman, Jr. The second was Francis V. Smith, against the same defendants. The third was William Francis Nickells *vs.* William E. Lehman, N. N. Marsellis, Charles Murphy and Ebenezer Scanlan. Lane and Lehman were provost marshals under the conscription act, and their associate defendants were the men who made up what was called



Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

*J. Hay Brown D. Newman Fell S. Leslie Mestrezat
 William P. Potter James T. Mitchell John P. Elkin
 John Stewart*

the enrolling board, of which there was one in each congressional district.

Volunteering had ceased, and it became a necessity for the government to fill up the ranks of its armies by conscription, or permit the Union to be overthrown by armed rebellion. Congress responded to this condition by passing "An act for enrolling and calling out the National forces, and for other purposes," that was approved March 3, 1863. The plaintiffs received notice that they had been drafted into the military service of the United States, and that from the time of receiving such notice they were under military regulations and subject to military rules, although not yet mustered into the service, and if they failed to report for duty at the time and place specified, the act provided that they should be "deemed as deserters and subject to the penalty prescribed therefor by the rules and articles of war."

In those days one member of the supreme court usually was assigned to sit at nisi prius, and the plaintiffs filed bills before Judge Woodward asking that the defendants be restrained from forcing them into military service, and that they be discharged. The importance of the case made Judge Woodward decide that it should be heard by a full court, and he fixed the 23d of September, 1863, for the plaintiffs and defendants to be heard by counsel before a full court in Philadelphia. On the day named all the judges of the supreme court were present, consisting of Walter H. Lowrie, of Allegheny, chief justice, with George W. Woodward, of Luzerne; James Thompson, of Erie; William Strong, of Berks, and John M. Read, of Philadelphia, justices. The political complexion of the court was four to one Democratic, Justice Read being the only Republican. George A. Coffee, United States district attorney; John C. Knox and J. Hubley Ashton, who were under-

stood to be associated with the district attorney in the case, were notified by the court of the time and place of hearing, but when the case was called no counsel appeared for the defendants, and George M. Wharton, Peter McCall, Charles Ingersoll and George W. Biddle appeared for the plaintiffs. The court refused to proceed with the case until furnished proof of ample notice to the counsel who represented the defendants, and a special messenger was dispatched by the court to ascertain whether such notice had been received, but the only answer given was that the defendants would not be represented by counsel in the proceeding.

I do not doubt that political considerations had something, perhaps very much, to do with the failure of the defendants to appear by counsel. The Republicans assumed that the supreme court of the State had no authority whatever to pass upon the constitutionality of a National law, and the fact that Justice Woodward had entertained the proceedings and summoned the entire court to hear the case within two weeks of one of the most important elections ever held in the State, when Chief Justice Lowrie was the nominee of his party for re-election and Justice Woodward the nominee of his party for Governor, gave the Republicans what they regarded as an opportunity to emphasize their aggressive hostility to such interference by the State judicial authority to obstruct the execution of a National law that was the government's sole dependence in filling up our depleted army in the field. The case was ably argued chiefly by Mr. Wharton and Mr. Biddle, and the decision was withheld until the 9th of November, one month after the October election, when Chief Justice Lowrie had been defeated by Judge Agnew, and when Woodward had been defeated for Governor by Curtin.

This case entered into the State campaign at an early stage, and it hung like a shadow over the loyal men of the Commonwealth, as they feared that a court composed of four Democrats with only one Republican might decide to declare the conscription act unconstitutional, and thus not only hinder the reinforcement of our armies, but bring the State into actual conflict with the National authority.

The Republicans were tirelessly aggressive in assailing the Democrats and the court, of which both of the Democratic candidates on the State ticket were members, as interposing to prevent the government from preserving its own life, and it was the common theme of every Republican orator on the hustings. The Democrats could only answer that the case was before an able and upright court, whose decision they were prepared to accept, and that it was not an issue for popular discussion in the campaign.

It was not then known, but Curtis' "Life of Buchanan" brings out the fact, that ex-President Buchanan felt that the issue was one of such magnitude that he departed from the generally uniform rule of his life, and wrote an earnest personal letter to Justice Woodward, urging him to sustain the constitutionality of the National conscription law as the only means of safety, alike for the nation and for the party.

Long before the battle ended it became whispered in political circles that Justice Strong was quite likely to sustain the conscription law. He had always been an earnest Democrat, had represented the Democrats of Berks in Congress, and was elected to the supreme court in 1857 along with Judge Thompson. The law then provided, as it now does, that when two supreme judges are elected at the same time they must decide by lot which shall receive the senior commission and thus become chief justice. Judge Thompson drew

the senior commission and rounded out his highly creditable judicial career by four years' service as chief justice.

When Thompson became chief justice in 1867, Judge Strong resigned, chiefly because there was no hope of him obtaining the highest judicial honors of the State, and he located in Philadelphia to resume the practice of law. The position occupied by Judge Strong was one of peculiar embarrassment. He had represented the Democratic party in high civil positions, both political and judicial, and he certainly cherished the highest personal respect for his associate, Justice Woodward, who was the Democratic candidate for Governor; but he felt that the issue was so grave, and his duty so clear and imperative, that he voted against his friend for Governor, and when the supreme court gave its decision in Pittsburg, on the 9th of November, 1863, Strong wrote an able and earnest dissenting opinion.

The question was considered of such exceptional importance that each member of the court filed an elaborate opinion, Chief Justice Lowrie delivering what was given as the decision of the court. The opinion of Lowrie is temperate in tone. He opened with an expression of regret that the defendants had not been heard by counsel, to which he added: "For want of this assistance I cannot feel such an entire conviction of the truth of my conclusions as I would otherwise have. I cannot be sure that I have not overlooked some grounds of argument that are of decisive importance, but the decision now to be made is only preliminary to the final hearing, and it is to be hoped the views of the law officers of the government will not then be withheld." This declaration of the chief justice, who delivered the opinion of the court, becomes specially important when it is read in connection with the final dissenting opinion of Justice Woodward.

Chief Justice Lowrie declares that the decision is only preliminary to the final hearing, while Woodward declares that it was the final judgment of the court in the case.

The chief objection presented by the three judges, who declared the conscription act unconstitutional, was that while Congress had power to raise and support armies, it was required to call out the militia of the several States to execute the laws, to suppress insurrection or to repel invasion. The conscription act did not call for the militia of the several States, although it called upon precisely the same men who constituted the militia of the Commonwealths, but they all agreed that if Congress did possess the power to call upon the men composing the militia of the State to reinforce the armies, the method of executing the law was entirely unwarranted.

The opinion of the supreme court, as delivered by Chief Justice Lowrie, concluded with the order dated November 9, 1863, granting a preliminary injunction in each of the cases, but requiring the plaintiffs to give bond with approved surety in the sum of \$500, and the injunctions refused for any other purpose.

Justice Woodward in his opinion was much more emphatic in his condemnation of the National conscription law. He denied that Congress had the power to draft the militia into the service of the government when engaged in a foreign war, and he added that "the power of draft to suppress insurrection is not to be employed, since another mode of suppressing insurrection is expressly provided." Again he said, "The great vice of the conscript law is that it is designed on the assumption that Congress may take away, not the State rights of the citizen, but the security and foundation of his State rights, and how long is civil liberty expected to last after the securities of civil liberty are

destroyed?" Justice Thompson's opinion was quite as elaborate as the others, in which his constitutional objections to the conscription laws are stated in the most dignified and courteous manner. He insisted that the act "plainly and directly destroys the militia system of the States as recognized in the Constitution." While thus denying the right of Congress to reinforce our armies under the provisions of the conscription law, he expressed himself with great emphasis in favor of suppressing the Rebellion. He said: "There is nothing on earth that I so much desire as to witness the suppression of the unjustifiable and monstrous Rebellion. It must be put down to save the Constitution, and the constitutional means for the purpose I believe to be ample, but we gain but little if in our efforts to preserve it from assault in one quarter we voluntarily impair other portions of it."

The dissenting opinion of Judge Strong attracted very general attention not only in the State, but throughout the country, as he was known to be trained in the same Democratic school with Judges Lowrie, Woodward and Thompson, and had worn Democratic honors. He sustained the constitutionality of the act in all its details, and Judge Read delivered a more elaborate dissenting opinion broadly sustaining the National law and refusing an injunction for the protection of the plaintiffs.

As previously stated, both Chief Justice Lowrie and Justice Woodward had been defeated for supreme judge and Governor just a month before the preliminary injunction had been granted, and less than three weeks before the retirement of Chief Justice Lowrie to be succeeded by Justice Agnew.

On the 12th of December, 1863, when Agnew had taken the place of Lowrie in the court, Judge Strong was holding court in *nisi prius* in Philadelphia, and

ex-Judge John C. Knox appeared before him for the defendants in each of the several cases, and appealed to the court to dissolve the injunctions which had been granted. Judge Strong received the motion and appointed the 30th of December for their hearing, and, as in the former case, requested his brethren to sit with him so that the case might be heard by a full court. On the day named a full court appeared in Philadelphia, and the case was fully argued by Knox for the defendants and by Biddle, McCall and Ingersoll for the plaintiffs.

On the 16th day of January, 1864, the final decision of the court was rendered, Justice Strong writing the opinion, which was concurred in by Read and Agnew, and dissented from by Woodward and Thompson. The order of the court was as follows: "And now, to wit, January 16, 1864, it is ordered by the court that the orders heretofore made in all these cases be vacated and the motions for injunctions are overruled." The concluding sentence of the opinion of the court, delivered by Judge Strong, is in these words: "I am satisfied that the bills of the complainants have no equity and the act of Congress is such as Congress has the constitutional power to enact."

Justices Read and Agnew also delivered separate concurring opinions. Justice Read's opinion concludes in these words: "The armies of the Union are not fighting for any single State, but they are fighting for their common country, the United States of America, as Americans, and those who have perished in this contest for the preservation of the Union have died under the National flag which, I trust, will soon wave over the whole undivided territory of our glorious and once happy Union." Justice Agnew delivered his first opinion in this case, and he approaches the important duty of reversing a former judgment of the same court

in a somewhat apologetic manner. He referred to the fact that the claim was made that a new member of the court was bound by the rule of *stare decisis*. He said he bowed to that doctrine as a safe maxim wherever it applies, but he added: "I must decide as my views and conscience dictate, and why not now? I find the case before me and I certainly cannot decide it against all my convictions of law, duty and patriotism." His opinion is the most elaborate of all those delivered by the court.

Chief Justice Woodward, who had succeeded to the head of the court by the retirement of Lowrie, delivered a most vigorous dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Thompson concurred. He declared the proceeding to be extraordinary, as the decision given on the 9th of November, at the preliminary hearing, "was as regular, fair and solemn a judgment as this court ever rendered." He insisted that it was final, and it was not within the power of the court to reverse it, even though the personnel of the judges changed. Chief Justice Woodward was a man of strong and earnest conviction, and his elaborate dissenting opinion in the case bristles with fearless criticism of the action of the court in permitting a change of judges to change its judgment, and also with the most pronounced expressions against the power of Congress to enforce such a conscription law.

I have given in brief the story of the National conscription crisis that convulsed the State in 1863. The three Democratic judges, Messrs. Lowrie, Woodward and Thompson, who decided against the constitutionality of the conscription law, were bitterly denounced at the time for disloyalty to the government and unfaithfulness to their high judicial office, but as the intense passions of fratricidal war and of the partisan strife that was accentuated by it have gradually per-

ished, all have accorded to those three great judges the credit of sincerity in the exercise of the highest judicial qualities in rendering the decision. They had been trained in the political school that accepted the resolutions of 1798, which came from the great political teachers—Jefferson and Madison—and with their long judicial experience and the isolation it involved from the world's progress it is not surprising that they revolted against the violent, indeed revolutionary, methods which become imperious when grave peril confronts the government. They were simply unmindful that "uncommon things make common things forgot," and that revolutionary perils often demand revolutionary protection.

The considerate judgment of the State and of the country to-day is that their judgment was erroneous, but all of them retired from the judicial position that they had adorned without public or private blemish, and they are all named to-day among the men who have added to the luster of the first judicial tribunal of the State.

LIX.

LEE'S INVASION A NECESSITY.

Hooker's Brilliant Strategy in Crossing the Rappahannock to Meet Lee
When Hesitation Lost Him the Battle—The Story of Hooker's
Wounds—Great Depression Among the Loyal People of the North—
The Blunder of the Confederacy—The Northern Invasion Was
Enforced with a Hope of Winning a Decisive Victory over the Union
Army, and Securing the Recognition of England and France.

THE struggle between the legions of Cæsar and Pompey on the Plains of Pharsalia was not more decisive of the destiny of Rome than was the battle of Gettysburg in deciding the destiny of the Confederacy. Many bloody battles were fought thereafter between the Union and the Confederate armies before the war ended, solely because the most earnest and most heroic of all the peoples of the world were engaged in fratricidal conflict, and surrender was unthought of while battle could be waged. After all the bloody conflicts between the armies of Grant and Lee, and Sherman and Johnson, in 1864, Appomattox was simply the echo of Gettysburg.

To reach an intelligent understanding of the battle of Gettysburg and its decisive judgment against the Confederacy, the whole situation from military, political and material standpoints should be well considered. Much discussion has been inspired and many conflicting views presented as to the considerations which decided the Confederate leaders to inaugurate the fatal Gettysburg campaign. The people of the North were greatly discouraged by the failure of the Union armies to achieve the victories so confidently expected. The North had overwhelming numbers in the field, but their

different armies were operating in an enemy's country with long lines of supplies which greatly reduced the effective fighting force, and they had the generally more serious disadvantage of being compelled, as a rule, to attack the enemy in chosen positions where his inferior numbers were more than atoned for by strictly defensive strategy and tactics.

Hooker had opened the campaign of 1863 by moving out with his grand Army of the Potomac to attack Lee south of the Rappahannock. He was a magnificent specimen of the American soldier, a born fighter and possessing absolute faith in his ability to march the Army of the Potomac to Richmond, or to any other points in the South. I saw him in the war office a fortnight before he made his movement, and he was a most interesting study. His handsome features, with a complexion as silken as a woman's, and his bright blue eyes grandly reflected the enthusiasm of the new commander. He conversed with great freedom on the campaign he was about to open, and I well remember his answer to my question as to the sufficiency of his force to meet the enemy in chosen and fortified positions. He said he would cross the Rapidan without losing a man, which he did, and that he could then march the Army of the Potomac from the Rappahannock to New Orleans. To use his own Westernism, for he was among the "Forty-niners" in California, he told me that when he crossed the Rappahannock he would take the enemy "where the hair is short."

His march until he crossed the river is admitted by all experienced military men of the country to have been a masterly strategic movement, but when he was face to face with the enemy, then for the first time his limitations were exhibited. If he had marched directly from the Chancellorsville house, with Lee's command immediately in his front, and forced the battle, his

overwhelming numbers could hardly have failed to break Lee's army in the center, and he then could have defeated it in detail; but he hesitated, and his hesitation was fatal.

While standing on the veranda of the Chancellorsville house, a solid ball from the enemy's artillery struck one of the pillars of the house, split a large piece from it that was hurled with great violence upon Hooker and struck him squarely on the breast. He fell insensible and remained so for a half hour or more. Stimulants were applied, and, when he was restored to consciousness, his first utterance was a command that no movement should be made by the army until he gave the orders himself. General Couch, senior officer of the army next to Hooker, was present, and greatly to his regret he was thus forbidden by his commander to make any movement.

It was this hesitation and this accident, and this order from Hooker, that enabled Jackson to divide Lee's army in front of Hooker, make his rapid detour and strike the right of Hooker's army on front and flank, defeating and routing Howard's corps and compelling the final retreat of the army back to the northern side of the Rappahannock. This disaster to Hooker's right wing deprived General Sedgwick, commander of the left wing, then occupying Fredericksburg, of the support he had been promised and confidently expected, and an overwhelming force of the enemy attacked him and compelled him to retreat with very serious loss.

Such was the unpromising opening of the third year of the war, and the patriotic sentiment of the North was greatly chilled by our multiplied disasters. General Grant was then besieging Vicksburg, and he had twice attempted to carry the enemy's defenses by assault, but was repulsed with heavy loss, and very grave doubts were cherished as to his final success in

winning that Confederate stronghold, the final capture of which, as Lincoln so well expressed it, enabled the Father of Waters to "again go unvexed to the sea." The military situation until the Fourth of July was such as to offer little encouragement to the North to hope for substantial victories over the Confederate armies.

The government had exhausted its resources and energies to create an ironclad navy. It was the construction of the little Monitor by Captain Ericsson in its battle with the iron-mailed Merrimac that revolutionized naval warfare in a day, and we had in the early part of 1863 an iron-clad fleet that was regarded by many as invincible. It was believed quite capable of fighting its way into Charleston, and capturing that city, the fountain of rebellion, and it was decided that the despair of the people over military failures should be dissipated by a triumph of our ironclads in Charleston. The ironclad fleet was concentrated and hastened to the South Carolina waters. There was no secrecy in the movement, and it became generally known that on a particular day the fleet would be there and fight its way into the harbor and capture the forts and city.

The loyal North turned to this expedition as the one movement that was certain to turn the tide of battle and inspire the North by a substantial victory in the one place in the South that was regarded as most responsible for the fratricidal conflict. I accompanied Governor Curtin to Washington the day before the attack was to be made, and we spent the entire day and night until long after the midnight hour waiting for news at the Navy Department, but none came. Greatly disappointed, we returned to our hotel and were back in the White House immediately after breakfast, and found President Lincoln in the office of his secretary. He informed us that no news had yet been

received from the fleet. I have many times heard him discuss the sorrows and sacrifices of war when his great sympathetic heart poured out upon his sleeve the sorrow that he keenly shared of those who suffered from war, but I never heard him discuss the war as earnestly as he did on that occasion. He knew that the loyal North was struggling on in despair, and he felt that if Hooker's disaster at Chancellorsville and Grant's repulses at Vicksburg were followed up by a repulse of our fleet at Charleston, the effect would be most serious.

Suddenly the door opened and the face of Secretary Welles was partly thrust in as he beckoned the President from the room. The moment we saw him all knew that he had no welcome message to bring. The President left, asking us to remain, as he would return as soon as he could give definite information. In half an hour he came back with his sad face deepened in sorrow as he told us that the fleet had been repulsed, and that the attempt to capture Charleston was absolutely hopeless.

Such was the military situation in June, 1863, when the Confederate government committed the fatal error of transferring the war to the North by the invasion of Pennsylvania, whereby Lee's army, that was always outnumbered in men and guns by the Union army, gave up the advantages of defensive campaigns in which the strength of the enemy could be neutralized, and marched into Pennsylvania, weakening his army as he moved by the necessity of protecting his lines of supplies, and challenging the Union army to battle where its largest numbers could be best concentrated. The movement was entirely at variance with Lee's military policy and certainly never was advised by him as a desirable movement from a military standpoint. Viewing the Gettysburg campaign from the surface as presented by history, it will be pronounced

by all as a blunder worse than a crime, but when the facts are carefully winnowed out from the chaff of conflicting disputation it is not difficult to understand why the invasion of Pennsylvania was decided upon by the Confederate government.


I have had many opportunities of conversing with the leading Confederate officials of that time, including such as President Davis, Vice-President Stephens, Postmaster General Regan, Senator Orr and others, and with such military chieftains as Johnson, Longstreet, Beauregard, Pemberton, Hamilton, Fitzhugh and Custis Lee, Imboden, Chief of Staff Taylor, Alexander, and many others, who were well informed on the subject.

During a visit to Jefferson Davis, at his home in Mississippi, some ten years after the war, where he received me most hospitably, he spoke with great freedom on all matters relating to the war, after exacting the assurance that no publication should be made of his utterances without his approval. I asked him why he had decided to send his army far from its base to meet an army that largely outnumbered it, in the enemy's country. His answer was that the movement was a necessity; that it was believed that Lee's army could defeat the Army of the Potomac wherever they might meet, and that such a victory won on Northern soil was most important to the Confederacy. I asked him distinctly whether General Lee had advised the Gettysburg campaign as a wise movement from a military standpoint, and he answered evasively by saying that it would not have been undertaken if he had not approved it. General Longstreet has criticised this statement when I gave it in another place, and declared that General Lee advised the Gettysburg campaign and that he had personal knowledge of the fact. General Longstreet stated what he believed to be the exact truth, and what was the truth at the time

had he conferred with General Lee on the subject, but no one who appreciates Lee's consummate military ability and discretion will ever assume that he advised the invasion of Pennsylvania simply as a desirable military movement. It had become a military necessity; all questions of the expediency of the movement were silenced and Lee bowed to the inevitable.

The one paramount reason for the Gettysburg campaign was the necessity for the Confederacy to gain the recognition of England and France, and the Gettysburg campaign was solely the result of that imperious necessity. Lee had then the largest Confederate army that ever was formed in line of battle, but he well knew, as did the Confederate authorities, that the supply of men was almost entirely exhausted, and that the South could not stand the strain of a long-continued war. If the recognition of the Confederacy by France and England could have been accomplished, it would practically have ended the war, as the North would have been unable to maintain the conflict with such odds against it. The campaign was most carefully planned, and it was expected that Lee should cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, defeat the Union army in battle, and thus open the way for the speedy capture of Baltimore and Washington. Could that have been achieved there is little doubt that England and France would have promptly recognized the Confederacy and thus established it permanently among the nations of the earth.

But while the question of winning recognition from England and France made an aggressive movement necessary on the part of the Confederacy, there were other reasons which, in the opinion of the Southern leaders, fully warranted the belief that the chances were largely in favor of the complete success of such a campaign. The officers and men of Lee's army



Superior Court of Pennsylvania

*William D. Porter George B. Colady John J. Henderson
 Charles E. Rice
 Thomas A. Morrison James A. Beaver John B. Head*

firmly believed that they could defeat the Army of the Potomac wherever they might be brought face to face in battle. They greatly underestimated the valor and fighting qualities of the Northern troops, who had been compelled to fight Lee's army in chosen positions which often largely outweighed all of the Union army's advantage in numbers. A considerable portion of Lee's army during the invasion was in and about Chambersburg for a week, and conversed freely with our people. Some of them doubted the expediency of an aggressive campaign in the North, but all felt absolute confidence in achieving victory over the Army of the Potomac whenever and wherever they should meet in battle.

In addition to the confidence that the Southern leaders all felt in the success of Lee's army in any battle with the Army of the Potomac there was, in the judgment of most of them, a strong incentive to a campaign of invasion in what they regarded as a divided sentiment in the North that would be developed into revolutionary action by the success of Lee's army in a battle on Pennsylvania or Maryland soil. General Lee himself refers rather vaguely to this condition, which certainly was regarded as one of the strong arguments in favor of the movement in his official report of the Pennsylvania campaign. After stating the military reasons for the movement, he adds: "In addition to these results, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success."

Congress had enacted a National conscription law that was approved on March 3, 1863, and a large draft had been ordered by the government. There were murmurs of revolutionary opposition to the draft in some sections of the country, notably in New York city, where fearful riots were the result of the enforcement of the conscription act, and in the anthracite regions of Pennsylvania, where the Mollie Maguires,

who had many sympathetic followers, were in open rebellion, and in Indiana, where powerful secret organizations were maintained to hinder enforced military service.

It was naturally believed by the Confederate government and by General Lee himself that if he succeeded in defeating the Army of the Potomac on Northern soil, and captured Baltimore or Washington, not only the recognition of the Confederacy by European governments would follow, but that the North, in the face of such a hopeless conflict, would be precipitated into open rebellion against the war. The National conscription act was assailed before the supreme court of Pennsylvania, and the issue of its constitutionality was pending at the time of Lee's invasion, with the general belief that the decision of the court would be adverse to the validity of the law. Strong reasons were thus presented to both the civil and military authorities of the Confederacy in favor of the invasion of the North, and there is little reason to doubt that had success crowned Lee's struggle at Gettysburg, and the capture of Washington or even Baltimore accomplished, the recognition of the Confederacy by foreign governments would have been prompt and general and the success of the Confederacy assured.

Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stephens, President and Vice-President of the Confederacy, with their trusted advisers in the administration of their government, had very carefully planned in all details the diplomatic aid that was to be given to the Gettysburg campaign in forcing the recognition of the Confederacy by European governments. None of them seemed to entertain any doubts as to the victory of Lee over the Army of the Potomac wherever he might happen to meet it on Northern soil, and a very important part of the great scheme was to have the government at

Washington refuse to receive Vice-President Stephens on a peace commission. It was believed that with the Union army defeated in Lee's campaign of invasion, and the Washington government rejecting peace proposals coming directly from the President of the Confederacy, England and France would at once lead the way in recognizing the Confederacy.

This is clearly established by a letter addressed to Vice-President Stephens by President Davis, dated Richmond, July 2, 1863, when the battle of Gettysburg was in progress, and when the only information from the field told of the overwhelming triumph of the Confederates in the first day's conflict. In this letter President Davis prepared very careful instructions to Stephens, who was to proceed to Washington as military commissioner under a flag of truce. The letter was given to Stephens in duplicate. One was signed by Davis, as President of the Confederacy, but assuming that such a letter would not be received, because of the refusal to recognize such an officer of the Confederacy, the duplicate letter was signed by Davis as commander-in-chief of the military forces of the Confederacy. Of course, Davis well knew that President Lincoln would admit no Confederate commissioner with a peace proposal involving the perpetuity of the Confederacy, and in order to put the Washington government in the position of having even refused a military commissioner to confer on matters relating to the conduct of the war, the duplicate letters were written.

The Davis letter was written with scrupulous care, not for the purpose of instructing Stephens, who needed no instructions on the subject whatever, but to present the strongest possible case against the Washington government when it refused to receive the Southern commissioner after Lee had defeated the Union army

on Northern soil. In point of fact, it was a very shrewdly devised movement to force the Union government into the attitude of going somewhat beyond the mere recognition of the belligerent powers of the Confederacy or refusing to hear peace proposals. It was a paper most adroitly framed to inspire prejudices abroad to aggressive action in recognizing the Southern government, and Stephens proceeded at once on his mission, hoping that by the time he reached the Union lines he would learn of a decisive victory gained by Lee over the Army of the Potomac; but when he reached Fortress Monroe, and made his application for permission to proceed to Washington under a flag of truce as a military commissioner of the Confederacy, Pickett's charge had been repulsed and Lee was retreating with a defeated army, and the officers of Fortress Monroe were promptly instructed from Washington to refuse Stephens permission to visit the Capital, or to enter the Union lines.

Mr. Pollard, in his "History of the Civil War," who was often the severe critic of Davis, but always the ardent supporter of the Confederate cause, states that Stephens, by verbal instructions, was "fully empowered, in certain contingencies, to propose peace; that President Davis had sent him on this extraordinary visit to Washington anticipating a great victory of Lee's army in Pennsylvania, but the real design of the commissioner was disconcerted by the fatal day at Gettysburg, which occurred when Stephens was near Fortress Monroe," and that it was "in the insolent moments of this Federal success that he was sharply rebuffed by the Washington authorities." Thus is the evidence cumulative from every side that the Gettysburg campaign was dictated solely by the inexorable necessity of gaining the recognition of foreign governments for the Confederacy.

LX.

MANEUVERING FOR THE BATTLE.

Hooker's Suggestions Rejected by Lincoln—Hooker's Strategy Defeated
Lee's Movement to Cross the Potomac near Washington—Meade
Suddenly Called to Command—Large Emergency Force Called to the
Field—Severe Discipline of Lee's Army—Jenkins' Raid into Cham-
bersburg—Ewell's Requisition for Supplies Including Sauerkraut in
Midsummer—Lee's Headquarters at Shetter's Grove.

AFTER the defeat of Hooker at Chancellorsville the opposing armies fell back to their former positions, and remained there until the Gettysburg movement began. On the 2d of June Lee's army was encamped on the south bank of the Rappahannock, near the city of Fredericksburg, and Hooker's army was on the north bank of the same river among the Stafford Hills and nearly opposite that city. Hooker's army consisted of eight corps, commanded by Reynolds, Hancock, Sickles, Meade, Sedgwick, Howard and Slocum, with Pleasanton's cavalry corps, and Lee's army consisted of four corps, commanded by Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, with Stuart commanding the cavalry. There has been much dispute as to the strength of the two armies which met at Gettysburg, but after a careful investigation of all the varied statements on the subject, I think it safe to assume that Lee's army numbered 80,000, and that Meade's army, as stated by himself in his testimony before a committee of Congress on the conduct of the war, numbered 95,000. His precise language was that his "army numbered a little under 100,000, probably 95,000." They were nearly or quite equal in artillery and cavalry, and Lee's army, flushed with repeated

victories, was entirely confident that it could defeat the Army of the Potomac on any field where they might meet.

Hooker was reinforcing and reorganizing his army. It had become greatly demoralized by Burnside's failures, and the open quarrels forced upon him by his subordinate commanders. Hooker had reorganized the commissary and quartermaster departments, getting ample supplies, and the steady stream of reinforcements that came more than filled the places of many thousands whose term of service expired. Although he had suffered a disastrous defeat at Chancellorsville, the army had confidence in him, as he was known to be one of the best fighters among its officers. The crippled condition in which his army was left after the defeat at Chancellorsville, and by the expiration of the term of service of a large number of his troops, required that he should have time to get his army restored alike in numbers and efficiency. Lee was also largely reinforcing his army, and when he started in his campaign of invasion he commanded the largest Confederate army that ever appeared on a battlefield.

For several weeks the two opposing armies remained inactive on the opposite sides of the Rappahannock, near Fredericksburg. Lee knew that it would be some time before Hooker could take the field in an aggressive movement against him, and he had ample time to perfect his plans and complete his preparations for the Gettysburg campaign that had come to be recognized as an inexorable necessity, regardless of the fact that it had to be planned and executed in opposition to the accepted military laws which usually govern armies in the field.

The Confederacy could not survive without the recognition of foreign governments, and it was finally accepted by the Southern leaders, and doubtless in

accordance with the most reliable advices from their friends in England and France, that the transfer of the war to Northern soil, the defeat of the Union army and the capture of Baltimore and Washington would at once command the recognition of the Confederacy and end the war.

While Hooker could make no movement against Lee in Fredericksburg, he kept very close watch upon Lee's movements, and as early as the 28th of May he was fully convinced that Lee had decided upon the invasion of Maryland or Pennsylvania, and so wrote the President. His information given to the President was fully vindicated, as on the 2d of June Lee's army commenced its movement by Ewell's corps advancing to Culpeper Court House. This was followed by Longstreet's corps and General Lee himself on the 3d, and by the 8th of June all of Lee's army, excepting Hill's corps, that remained at Fredericksburg to watch Hooker, was concentrated at Culpeper Court House. Hooker was very anxious to attack Lee's rear at Fredericksburg, and suggested it to the President, who promptly disapproved of the plan as he would have to attack the enemy in entrenchments, and, to use Lincoln's own language, "so man for man worse you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward." Hooker's next suggestion takes high rank in heroic purpose, as he urged the President to permit him to let Lee move northward while he would make a forced march upon Richmond, to which Lincoln replied: "I think Lee's army and not Richmond is your sure objective point." At that time Lee's army was stretched out with its rear between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and the head of it at Martinsburg, and Lincoln made this quaint but incisive suggestion to Hooker: "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the rear of it on the

plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere; could you not break him?"

On the 5th of June Hooker began a movement to keep in touch with Lee and gradually advanced his different corps to hold the interior line between Lee and the Capital, and also between Lee and the Potomac. He had a very efficient cavalry force, and kept it constantly employed in reconnoissance to ascertain the movements of the enemy. On the 8th of June Hooker had his cavalry corps making a reconnoissance in force south of the Rappahannock. Pleasanton's cavalry crossed the river at night and, protected by a heavy fog, struck the main force of Stuart's cavalry corps, compelled it to retreat, and came into possession of Stuart's headquarters, in which Stuart's important papers were captured, including Lee's orders outlining his movement into Maryland and Pennsylvania. A heavy infantry force came to the support of the Confederate cavalry, and the purpose of the reconnoissance being fully accomplished, Pleasanton retired, but that cavalry conflict, and the information derived from General Stuart's orders received from Lee, defeated one of the most important features of Lee's plan.

Lee's purpose was to move along the east base of the Blue Ridge, cross the Potomac near Washington, where he could operate on an interior line. Hooker's army was promptly hastened forward and Lee was compelled to make his invasion by first entering the Shenandoah Valley, thus greatly lengthening his line, and making Baltimore and Washington, his objective points, twice or thrice the distance from him after he crossed the Potomac that they would have been if Hooker had not discovered his plans and compelled him to change them. If he had crossed the Potomac in the neighborhood of Poolsville and the Monocacy as was indi-

cated in his instructions to Stuart, he would have been saved long marching to the upper Potomac and back again to Gettysburg, and could have delivered his decisive battle certainly ten days sooner with less depletion of his army because of a shorter line from its base.

On the 21st of June Hooker had his army so placed that every approach to Washington south of the Potomac was completely guarded, and Lee was in the Shenandoah Valley and unable to obtain information of Hooker's movements. Hooker's strategy in meeting Lee's movements was masterly, and when he found that Lee was certain to cross the Potomac he was moving with his army in Maryland extended on a long line north and south to enable him to concentrate speedily against Lee whether he moved by the Susquehanna or the Potomac line toward Washington. He urged that Milroy, who had some 8,000 men at Winchester, should evacuate that place, retire from the valley and join his command. General Schenck, with headquarters in Baltimore, in whose department Milroy was operating, ordered Milroy to retire from the valley, but Milroy was a soldier with more courage than discretion, and begged to be permitted to remain, declaring that he would defeat any force of the enemy that could be brought against him. Schenck, unfortunately, left the question to the discretion of Milroy, and the result was that Milroy's 8,000 men were defeated, routed, several thousand of them captured, along with vast stores of guns and supplies, and that entire force was lost to the Army of the Potomac.

It became known throughout Pennsylvania early in June that Lee's movement was reasonably certain to lead to the invasion of the North, and the government at Washington created two new military departments in Pennsylvania—that of the Monongahela, with head-

quarters at Pittsburg, assigned to Major General W. T. H. Brooks, and the Department of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Harrisburg, assigned to Major General D. N. Couch. On the 12th of June Governor Curtin issued a proclamation to the people of the State warning them of the danger of invasion and calling for volunteers to meet the emergency, but as the peril was to the National cause quite as much as to Pennsylvania, President Lincoln on the 15th called upon the States of Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, New Jersey, Ohio and West Virginia to furnish 120,000 of their militia for temporary service. The Governors of the States seconded the call of the President; but there was then hardly any organized militia remaining in the States, and the response was 25,000 from Pennsylvania, 15,000 from New York, 5,000 from Maryland, 3,000 from New Jersey, 2,000 from West Virginia, making a total of 50,000. Most of them reported at Harrisburg, and General William F. Smith, better known as "Baldy" Smith, and General Dana were each given a division under General Couch. This emergency militia gave no aid to the Army of the Potomac in the battle of Gettysburg, but it is probable that the presence of General Smith's division at Harrisburg prevented General Rhodes, who occupied Carlisle and whose pickets were at one time within a few miles of Harrisburg, from capturing the State Capital. Beyond that the militia rendered no service whatever.

It was not the fault of the emergency troops, as they did all that was in their power. They were hastily thrown together, without discipline, quartermaster or commissary organizations, and when marching through the Cumberland Valley lived upon the country and were vastly more destructive foragers than were the Confederates. Lee's army was under strict discipline and also under severe orders against the need-

less destruction of private property. Ewell's corps occupied the 200-acre field on my farm, at the edge of Chambersburg. The middle fences had all been destroyed by military visitors, and more or less of his corps remained there for a week. His 22,000 men did less injury to private property in a week's occupation than did one regiment of New York militia in a single day when it made its camp in the same field.

General Jenkins, with a large cavalry force, led the advance of Lee's invasion, and he crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the evening of June 14. The people in the Cumberland Valley had notice of the approach of the enemy by the scattered fragments of the Milroy forces which covered all the highways reaching north in squads of ten, twenty or more, thoroughly demoralized, and well calculated to terrorize the community. On the 15th of June the people of the border commenced a general exodus northward with their live stock, and the wildest excitement prevailed. Merchants hurried their goods away to points in the East, banks shipped all their money and families sent their valuables, while all the roads were crowded with fleeing, terrorized people, driving their stock away from the enemy. There was no military force whatever to impede the advance of Jenkins, and early in the evening of the 15th it was known in Chambersburg that his force was rapidly advancing upon the town. He reached Chambersburg about eleven o'clock at night, took possession of the town without a conflict, passed through the main street leaving a strong guard in the town, and made his camp on my farm, as did all the armies of both sides in their valley campaigns during the war. He made his headquarters in my comfortable farmhouse, and used the large barn as a hospital, where Mrs. McClure provided the sick soldiers with all the necessaries, including medicines. I was impressively

reminded of this fact thirty years after the war, when, on a visit to Montgomery, Ala., while a guest of the hospitable Governor of the State. Notice was brought to the Governor that a man at the door specially desired to see me. The Governor did not recognize the name, but invited him to join us. When he came into the room he apologized in his awkward way for his intrusion, and said that having heard that I was visiting the city he had walked a number of miles that morning to meet me, and thank me personally for the kindness he received from my family when, as one of Jenkins' privates, he was on the sick list and was cared for in my barn. It seems like the irony of fate that this same command, under the lead of McCausland, who became its commander after Jenkins fell, burnt the town of Chambersburg only one year later, including the barn where its sick had been ministered to, and the house where Jenkins received generous hospitality while he made it his headquarters.

Jenkins' command did not destroy much property. There was little left in the country that was useful to the army, as stores were empty of goods, banks without money, and farmers generally without horses or cattle. His first order required all persons in the town possessing arms, whether guns or pistols, to bring them to the front of the court house within two hours, and the penalty for disobedience was that all who refused would expose their houses to search, and make them lawful objects of plunder. A number of guns and pistols were brought and delivered to him, but few of them were considered of sufficient value to be retained by the soldiers.

Early in the morning of the 17th of June Jenkins ordered the stores and shops to be opened for two hours to enable his men to purchase such goods as they desired, all of which were to be paid for, but, of course,

in Confederate money. The order was obeyed to the extent of opening the stores and shops, but as most of them were nearly or entirely empty, there was little traffic. There were odds and ends of valueless stock not deemed of sufficient value to ship away, but the Confederate customers cleaned out the remnants and paid liberal prices in Confederate money that was printed by the army as it moved along. Jenkins then withdrew his force and fell back to Greencastle, and spent four days in that rich portion of Franklin County, gathering in all the property that could be made useful to the army. On the 22d Jenkins' raid ended, and on that day he rejoined the advance of Lee's infantry between Greencastle and Hagerstown, when the invasion of Lee's army in force began.

About ten o'clock on the morning of the 23d, Jenkins' cavalry returned to Chambersburg as the advance of the infantry that was closely following him. Ewell's corps was in the advance, and made liberal requisitions upon Greencastle on the 23d, and on the 24th it entered the town of Chambersburg to the music of the "Bonnie Blue Flag."

Many requisitions were made by Ewell upon the citizens of Chambersburg, all of which were impossible of fulfilment, as all valuables that could be removed had been sent away. One of the most amusing features of his several requisitions was a demand for the immediate delivery of nine barrels of sauerkraut. He knew that sauerkraut was regarded as a very valuable antiscorbutic, and as some of his troop suffered from scurvy because of their unwholesome rations, he assumed that sauerkraut would be an invaluable remedy for those who were threatened with that malady. He was quite incredulous at first, when informed that sauerkraut was a commodity that could not be kept in midsummer, and that such a thing was

unknown even in the German communities where sauerkraut was one of the great staples of the table. If there had been a barrel of sauerkraut in Chambersburg in midsummer he could have scented it any place within a square, and he finally abandoned that feature of the requisition when told that it was not an article that could be concealed in hot weather.

Ewell paid me the usual compliment of all commanders of both armies who visited Chambersburg, of taking possession of my large field for his camp and of a nearby Dunkard church for his headquarters, while subordinate officers occupied my house. During the week or ten days in which a portion or the whole of his command was there encamped, the most scrupulous care was taken to prevent the destruction of any private property whatever. Lee issued a general order forbidding that any private property should be taken by the army, excepting by an authorized officer, and loose foraging was not only forbidden, but severely punished. It is due to General Lee and his army to say that the order against the wanton destruction of property was generously obeyed by his infantry.

An interesting incident occurred that showed how Lee himself was inclined to temper the sorrows and sacrifices of war. Chambersburg depended wholly upon the surrounding country for its daily supplies of flour, vegetables and meats, and as all teams had been sent away and no supplies could be brought in, it required only a very few days to bring the people of the town to a state of starvation. The mills were all in the possession of the enemy and run to their utmost capacity to furnish supplies for the army, and Mrs. William McLellan, whose husband was one of the leading members of the bar and my law partner, decided to make a personal visit to General Lee, who had his headquarters in Shetter's woods, only several

squares distant from Mrs. McLellan's residence. She was promptly admitted to his presence and appealed to him to permit supplies to be brought in to the people of the town without being seized by his army. Lee promptly arranged with her to have sufficient supplies of flour furnished to the people, and after his generous order she thanked him and asked him for his autograph, to which he replied: "Do you want the autograph of a rebel?" Mrs. McLellan said: "General Lee, I am a true Union woman and yet I ask for bread and for your autograph." His answer was: "It is to your interest to be for the Union and I hope you may be as firm in your purpose as I am in mine." He gave her the autograph and Mrs. McLellan brought bread to her starving neighbors, and among her most cherished relics during her life was her autograph of Robert E. Lee.

LXI.

LEE DEFEATED AT GETTYSBURG.

General Lee and His Leading Lieutenants in Chambersburg—Personal Description of General Lee—Why Lee Moved to Gettysburg—Remarkable Feats of Volunteer Scouts—Stephen W. Pomeroy Gave the First Word of Lee's Movement to Gettysburg—A Week of Appalling Anxiety at Harrisburg and Throughout the State—Lee's Retreat from Franklin County—Intense Passions That Denied Burial to a Confederate Soldier.

ON MONDAY, June 29, 1863, General Lee, with the largest Confederate army that ever engaged in battle, had his entire command within the limits of Pennsylvania, with his headquarters at Chambersburg, and General Meade, who had just been assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac, had his somewhat larger force on the line north and south in Maryland and Pennsylvania, with his headquarters at Frederick City, ready to concentrate against Lee whether he moved eastward by the line of the Susquehanna or on the more direct line to Baltimore and Washington. Lee himself, with his staff, entered Chambersburg on the 26th, accompanied by General A. P. Hill. When they reached the center square of the town Lee and Hill, mounted on their horses, conferred alone for some time, and they were watched with great interest by the citizens, who were intensely anxious to ascertain the line upon which Lee would advance. After the consultation it was with a measurable sense of relief that they saw Lee turn eastward on the Gettysburg pike. He proceeded to the little grove known then as Shetter's Woods, just outside of the borough, where he made his headquarters,



George G. Meade.

and remained there until he started to Gettysburg on the 31st of June.

The most careful and dispassionate observer among the people of Chambersburg of the movements of Lee's army was Mr. Jacob Hoke, a prominent merchant, and his "History of the Great Invasion of 1863," a volume of over 600 pages, is the most complete and accurate in all details of the Gettysburg campaign that has ever been presented. He witnessed the entrance of Lee and Hill into the town, and thus describes Lee on page 167 of his admirable work: "General Lee, as he sat on his horse that day in the public square of Chambersburg, looked every inch a soldier. He was at that time about fifty-two years of age, stoutly built, medium height, hair strongly mixed with gray, and a rough gray beard. He wore the usual Confederate gray, with some little ornamentation about the collar of his coat. His hat was a soft black without ornamentation other than a military cord around the crown. His whole appearance indicated dignity, composure and disregard for the gaudy trappings of war and the honor attaching to his high station."

Lee's army was then located as follows: Of Ewell's corps, Earley's division was at York, Rhodes' division at Carlisle, Johnson's around Shippensburg and Jenkins' cavalry was at Mechanicsburg, less than ten miles from the State Capital. Of Hill's corps, Heth's division was at Cashtown, with Pender's and Anderson's between Fayetteville and Greenwood, both in Franklin County and west of the South Mountain. Of Longstreet's corps, McLaws and Hood were in the neighborhood of Fayetteville, Pickett's division was near Chambersburg to cover the rear of the advancing army; Imboden's cavalry was at Mercersburg and Stuart's cavalry was in the neighborhood of Union Mills, Maryland, north of Westminster. Lee was greatly em-

barrassed for two days at Chambersburg in deciding upon what line he should move, as he had no knowledge of the movements of the Union army. Stuart, who should have been between Lee and the Union army, and giving information to Lee of its movements, was driven from his course by the Union cavalry in Maryland and Pennsylvania, and it was not until Sunday night, June 28, that a scout reached Lee's headquarters and gave him the first information that the Union army had crossed the Potomac and was concentrated, with Frederick as its center, ready to unite against Lee whether he should march by the Susquehanna or the line of the Potomac.

This information quickly decided Lee to move to Gettysburg, and orders were sent by swift messengers, as all telegraphic communication was interrupted, to Earley and Rhodes and all the other outposts to concentrate as speedily as possible at Gettysburg. The celerity with which Hooker had moved his army across the Potomac on a line that always gave the fullest protection to the Capital, and compelled Lee to cross the Potomac west of the Blue Ridge, decided Gettysburg as the great battlefield of the war. Had Lee crossed the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, as he originally intended, or had he been advised of Hooker's crossing the Potomac two days earlier, his army would have been far east of Gettysburg by the time that the battle was fought, and he would have escaped the fatal necessity of fighting the Army of the Potomac in probably the strongest natural position it could have found between Williamsport and Washington. The only opposition that Lee's advance met with in the Cumberland Valley was an occasional feeble skirmish with the undisciplined militia commanded by General Knipe, of Harrisburg, who, being unable to give battle to the overwhelming numbers of the enemy that always

confronted him, discreetly retired down the valley until he landed in Harrisburg.

Such was the attitude of the two opposing armies immediately before the battle of Gettysburg began. The entire Cumberland Valley was isolated from Harrisburg, as all communication by railway or telegraph was broken up, and every highway in the valley was covered by Lee's troops. My experience in entertaining the Confederate officers in 1862, who had orders to take me as a prisoner to Richmond, but who waived their knowledge of my personality because of the hospitality they requested and received, taught me that it would not be discreet for me to remain at home to entertain our Southern guests. I went to Harrisburg on the last train that passed through the Cumberland Valley before the battle, and remained there until Lee's retreat from the great struggle that inexorably pronounced the doom of the Confederacy.

The more active men of Chambersburg well knew how important it was for information to reach Harrisburg of the movements of Lee's army, and scouts were sent out every day and night when any movement of importance was made. It is marvelous how quickly the young men of the town and neighborhood developed into the most daring and skillful scouts. The most prominent of them were Shearer Houser, Benjamin S. Huber, J. Porter Brown, Anthony Hollar, Sellers Montgomery, T. J. Grimeson, Stephen W. Pomeroy and Mr. Kinney. The only way that they could reach Harrisburg was by getting out on the northwest toward Strasburg, and by climbing several spurs of the mountains into Tuscarora or Sherman's Valley, and reach the Pennsylvania Railroad at Newport, in Perry County, or Port Royal, in Juniata County. When the concentration toward Gettysburg began scouts were sent out generally with information written out by Judge

Kimmell on tissue paper either sewed in their garments or carried in a pocket where they could be promptly fingered into a little ball and swallowed in case of capture.

The movement of the infantry toward Gettysburg was sent out at once, but was not regarded as decisive of Lee crossing the mountain to Gettysburg until on the night of the 29th, when the wagon train of the army was hurried through Chambersburg on the way to Gettysburg. It was then accepted as conclusive that the battle center of the campaign was to be transferred from the Cumberland Valley to the line between the South Mountain and the Potomac, and it was considered of the utmost importance to have the information sent speedily to Harrisburg, as the only way to reach the Union commander. Among the young men who happened to be in the town was Stephen W. Pomeroy, of Strasburg, whose father had been an associate judge with Kimmell on the bench, and Kimmell knew that he would be one of the safest who could be trusted with such a mission. Kimmell prepared a despatch without date or signature, briefly telling of Lee's movements, and the certainty of his concentration on the Potomac line. This despatch was carefully sewed inside the lining of the buckle-strap of Pomeroy's pants, and he was hurried off on his important mission. He went on foot to his father's home in Strasburg, where he managed to find a horse, and hurried across the mountain spurs into Path Valley and to Concord at the head of the valley where the mountain gap opens into Tuscarora Valley. He secured a fresh horse there, and rode rapidly down the Tuscarora Valley, exchanged horses again with an acquaintance near Bealtown, and he reached Port Royal on the Pennsylvania Railroad, between two and three o'clock in the morning, after having walked nearly twenty miles at a rapid gait and ridden

over forty miles. He walked up to the telegraph operator and delivered his despatch, but he was in such an exhausted condition that he did not think of the necessity of signing it, or indicating in some way from whom it came.

I was one of the most anxious party in the Governor's room at Harrisburg waiting for some information of the movement of Lee's army, and not knowing at what hour Lee would swoop upon Harrisburg and hoist the Confederate flag over the Capitol. For three days we had no information, excepting that furnished by scouts, and while it was at times important, all of the reports received up to that time gave no information as to Lee's purpose to deliver battle in the Cumberland Valley or south of the South Mountain. There had been no sleep, except broken naps forced by exhaustion, and not one of the Governor's circle had been in bed for three nights. The whole State was simply paralyzed by the appalling situation, and one of the aggravating features of it was that no information could be obtained of Lee's movements or purposes. Colonel Scott was present, but rarely left the little room in which was the telegraph battery. About three o'clock in the morning of the 1st of July, Scott brought into the Executive chamber an unsigned despatch dated at Port Royal, telling that Lee's entire army was marching toward Gettysburg, and that the wagon trains rapidly followed, to which the operator had added that the messenger had left Chambersburg the day before and reached Port Royal through Path and Tuscarora Valleys, but no information was given as to his identity.

The operator at Port Royal closed his office immediately upon sending the despatch, and all efforts to get him for further explanation failed. General Couch, who was present, finding that in no way could the

account be verified by reaching the messenger, at once crossed the river and advanced a strong picket force toward Carlisle, and early in the forenoon he discovered that Rhodes had withdrawn from Carlisle, and moved directly toward Gettysburg, and he at once advanced his force up the valley that was then entirely free from the enemy and re-established telegraph and railroad communication. As soon as the unsigned despatch was received, it was repeated to Washington, and General Meade received it probably within less than an hour after it reached Harrisburg: It was the information given by this despatch that prompted General Meade to order Reynolds to make his reconnoissance in force to Gettysburg, resulting in the first day's battle disastrous to the Union army, and the death of Reynolds.

Events of overwhelming moment multiplied so rapidly upon the worn-out men at Harrisburg that the question of the author of the despatch giving the important information was forgotten, and it was not until twenty years later that Governor Curtin, or any of those about him at the time, discovered who the messenger was. The Presbyterian synod was meeting in Bellefonte, and Governor Curtin was entertaining several of the ministers. At the breakfast table one morning the Governor mentioned the remarkable circumstance of the important information received about Lee's movement to Gettysburg, and that he had never been able to learn who the scout was who brought the message. One of his guests, Rev. Stephen W. Pomeroy, a member of the synod, then told them for the first time that he was the scout, and at Curtin's request wrote out for him a detailed account of his journey.

News from the battlefield was awaited with the wildest interest, but none came until the morning of the second day, when the information of the death of Rey-

nolds and the overwhelming defeat of the two corps engaged, with the capture of some 4,000 prisoners, reached the North through Baltimore, and the first authentic account of the battle was brought by Major Rosengarten and Captain Riddle, of Reynolds' staff, who brought the body of their fallen chieftain to sleep with his kindred. During all of the second of July many bloody conflicts occurred on the Gettysburg field, and there was continued uncertainty and fearful apprehension as to the final issue of the conflict. General Meade had communication with Washington so that any important event could be ascertained. The most hopeful view that could be taken of the reports of the second day's conflict was that it was without special advantage to either side, and all of the night of the second, and the morning and day of the third passed with the most painful uncertainty prevailing at Harrisburg. Wayne MacVeagh was among the men who gave anxious days and sleepless nights to the occasion, and he spent most of his time close to the tick of the telegraph. About five or six o'clock in the afternoon he rushed into the Governor's chamber, and with a wildly tremulous voice read out Meade's despatch announcing the repulse of Pickett's charge. All knew that such a charge was the last desperate effort of Lee to win at Gettysburg, and that his defeat was almost absolutely assured. It was the first moment of relief or anything approaching repose the worn-out men at the Capitol had been able to welcome for fully a week. Some immediately sought their beds for rest, while within half an hour there were many sleepers in the chairs and on the sofas of the Capitol rooms. Curtin, because of his feeble condition, was forced home to take his bed and remain there several days with the assurance that he would be notified of any new peril that arose.

The following morning, the natal day of the Republic, the sun arose to spread its refulgence over a cloudless sky, and the first news received from the battlefield was that Lee's trains were retreating toward the Potomac, and later came the message from Grant telling of the surrender of Vicksburg. The people of Pennsylvania not only felt that they had been rescued from invasion and the desolation of war upon their own soil, but they knew that the military power of the Confederacy was broken, and the dark cloud of uncertainty verging on despair, that hung over the great State for nearly a fortnight, speedily gave way to the strengthened conviction and delightful hope that the Union could be restored by the valor of our arms.

The sudden change made by the report of Lee's defeat and the capture of Vicksburg was visible on every face, old and young. The terrible strain was ended, the invasion was repulsed, and the many thousands of people in the Cumberland Valley, scattered all through the interior and eastern part of the State, with their stock and other valuables, began a general movement homeward. Many of the farmers had left their golden wheat fields ready for the reaper, but fortunately the Confederates expected to occupy the valley and harvest it, and no destruction of the grain fields was permitted. Most of the crops were thus saved, and in a few weeks industrial operations in the shops and valleys were very generally resumed. General Couch moved his forces forward through the Cumberland Valley and rapidly repaired the railway and telegraph lines, and by the 10th of July he established his headquarters at Chambersburg. A large portion of Milroy's command had scattered off through the mountains in squads of half a dozen or more, and in the general demoralization foraged upon the country recklessly and often destructively. It required nearly two weeks to get them re-

united. They were scattered along the Juniata Valley and in the mountains as far west as Altoona. Most of the people as they returned to their homes were amazed to find their property in comparatively well-preserved condition, as Lee's orders against the wanton destruction of property were scrupulously enforced by the infantry.

The last echo of Lee's army in the Cumberland Valley came from his immense train nearly twenty miles long, that left Lee at Gettysburg on the 4th and led the advance of the retreat. To escape the dashes of the Union cavalry, this immense train recrossed the South Mountain and turned southward at Greenwood to the Potomac along the unfrequented road on the mountain base, and where only the two small villages of New Guilford and New Franklin witnessed it. The wagons of this train were largely filled with the severely wounded, and accompanying it were all the wounded who were able to travel on foot. This train was thirty-four hours in passing a given point, and General Imboden, who had charge of it, and whose cavalry command protected it, stated in an article contributed to the Annals of the War that when compactly in line the train was seventeen miles in length. The number of wounded in the wagons and walking was not less than 10,000 or 12,000, and many of those who attempted to walk with the train fell by the wayside. These were gathered up and brought to Chambersburg, where a Confederate hospital was improvised, but the intense passions inspired by civil war made the people of even so intelligent and Christianlike a community as those of Chambersburg at first withhold kind ministrations to the wounded of the enemy. Dr. Senseny, my own family physician, was in charge of this hospital, and in the multiplicity of cares that crowded upon my return to Chambersburg I had given no attention to it.

After these wounded Confederates had been in Chambersburg for a week Dr. Senseny called upon me, and made a personal appeal to inaugurate a movement to give much-needed relief to many of the suffering. It would not have been discreet for any other than a pronounced loyal citizen to take the first step toward relief for these sufferers, but my attitude was not one that could be questioned, and Mrs. McClure at once went with the doctor and visited all of the sufferers personally. That movement made an open door for all, and thereafter they had even more generous ministrations than most of them could have obtained at home. A message was brought to me by Dr. Senseny from Colonel Carter, I believe a native of Tennessee, but then a resident of Texas, who had no hope of recovery, and had appealed to the doctor to bring him some one who would give him the assurance of Christian burial. I called at once and found the sufferer, an unusually bright and handsome man, calmly watching the rapid approach of death. With beseeching eyes that would have melted the sternest enemy, he begged of me to give him the assurance that his body would receive Christian burial, and when he was told that I would personally execute his request, he reached out his trembling hand and gave most grateful acknowledgment. A few days thereafter he died, and I at once applied to the authorities of the Presbyterian church, of whose congregation I was a member, for permission to bury him in the cemetery, but it was promptly refused. A new cemetery company had been organized a short time before, of which I was an officer, and I applied to that company to sell me a lot for the burial of the Confederate soldier, but that was refused. I then announced that I would set apart a lot on the corner of my farm on the public highway, and dedicate it by deed as the resting place of Colonel Carter. The incident

caused very general discussion, and finally several prominent members of the Methodist church decided that it was un-Christian to refuse burial to a fallen foe, and they permitted his body to be interred in their cemetery. Such were the appalling estrangements caused by civil war that a community noted for its intelligence and Christian character hesitated to give even decent sepulture to one who had fallen in the battle as conscientious in his convictions as were the brave boys who vanquished him in the conflict.

LXII.

PENNSYLVANIA'S LUSTROUS RECORD.

The Declaration of Independence Proclaimed in Pennsylvania—Washington Assigned to the Command of the Army—The Constitution Framed in Carpenters' Hall with Washington Presiding—Gettysburg, the Decisive Battle of the War, Fought in the State—General Meade of Pennsylvania the Victor—Reynolds Killed and Hancock Seriously Wounded—Gregg, Another Pennsylvanian, Fought and Won the Great Cavalry Battle of the War—How Gettysburg Was Made the Battle Ground—Why Meade Did Not Pursue Lee—Lincoln Was Disappointed.

PENNSYLVANIA furnished the most lustrous chapters in the annals of the achievements of the Republic, not only in creating free government for the united colonies, but also in preserving it when it was assailed with monstrous power and deadly purpose. It was in Pennsylvania that Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence, and it was in Independence Hall that Jefferson's immortal declaration was unanimously adopted and proclaimed to the colonies and to the world on the Fourth of July, 1776. It was in Pennsylvania that Washington was called to the command of the army, and it was in Pennsylvania that the Constitution, framed by a convention that sat in Carpenters' Hall, with Washington presiding, framed what was generally accepted as the grandest fundamental law ever prepared by any country of the world. It was in Pennsylvania that sad records of Washington's winter in Valley Forge were written, when even the stoutest-hearted of the patriot leaders were trembling on the verge of despair, and it was in Pennsylvania that Washington started to cross the

ice-bound Delaware to turn the tide of battle on New Jersey plains and give renewed hope to the cause of independence.

Just three-quarters of a century after the inauguration of constitutional government the decisive battle that halted the dismemberment of the Republic was fought on the hills and plains of Gettysburg. It was the final arbitrament of the sword proclaiming the inexorable judgment that "government of the people, by the people and for the people shall not perish from the earth."

The battle of Gettysburg was not only fought on Pennsylvania soil, but in no other important battle of the war was Pennsylvania heroism so generally and so conspicuously displayed. General Meade, a Pennsylvanian, was suddenly thrust into the command of the Army of the Potomac only three days before the battle of Gettysburg began, and he was the chieftain who won the greatest of all the Union victories in the fratricidal strife. Reynolds, another Pennsylvania soldier, was charged by Meade with the responsible duty of making the reconnoissance in force that precipitated the battle on the undulating plains between Gettysburg and Cashtown, where the heroic Reynolds fell early in the action when his single corps was driving the enemy. Hancock, another Pennsylvania general, was hurried to Gettysburg by Meade after the report of the defeat and death of Reynolds, and authorized to decide whether the discomfited corps at Gettysburg should fall back upon Meade's line or whether Meade should advance the entire army. It was Hancock's command that received and repulsed Pickett's charge with the Philadelphia brigade in the Bloody Angle. Hancock lay on the field severely wounded until he was able to send the cheering report to his chief that the final charge of the enemy not only resulted in failure, but

in the almost annihilation of the charging columns. Sykes, another Pennsylvania soldier, commanded his corps and performed heroic service in the many conflicts of that memorable field. Birney, another Pennsylvania soldier, commanded Sickles' corps after Sickles had fallen in the bloody conflict in the Peach Orchard, and the last clash of arms at Gettysburg was made by part of the Pennsylvania Reserves, led by the heroic McCandless, who closely followed Pickett's retreat, and who recovered the position the enemy had won from Sickles the day before, with many prisoners and 5,000 stand of arms.

Armistead, the only officer of Pickett's command who successfully crossed the stone wall into the Union lines with a number of his followers, was struck by the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania that forced them to accept surrender or death, and it was there that Armistead, the hero of the gray, and Cushing, the hero of the blue, made the high-water mark of American heroism for the entire Civil War. Thus, four Pennsylvania soldiers—Reynolds, Hancock, Sykes and Birney—commanded corps in the great decisive battle of the war, and to these must be added the gallant Gregg, the Pennsylvania trooper, who met the attack of Stuart's whole cavalry force as more than 10,000 cavalymen made the hills tremble in the shock of battle, and won a victory quite as important to the Union cause as was the repulse of Pickett's charge. No half-dozen other States of the Union furnished such a galaxy of chieftains as did our grand old commonwealth in the desperate and bloody conflict that decreed the continued life of the greatest republic of the world's history.

George G. Meade was suddenly and entirely unexpectedly called to the command of the Army of the Potomac just on the eve of battle, and every movement of his army from that hour until Lee recrossed the

Potomac into Virginia was directed by him. He fought what is now accepted in history as the decisive battle of the Rebellion, and had he achieved such a victory for any other country in the world the highest honors and ample fortune would have been cheerfully awarded him. Had he won such a victory for England, he would have been a peer of the realm with abundant wealth to maintain his title, but the only immediate recognition he received was promotion to the rank of brigadier general in the regular army. Later he was promoted to the position of major general, when Grant was commander-in-chief, and it was Grant's suggestion that his commission as major general of the regular army should date from the battle of Gettysburg.

I have already referred in detail to the masterly strategic movements of Hooker after Lee commenced his march northward, by which he not only held the interior line between Washington and the Potomac, thus fully protecting the Capital, but forced Lee to cross the Potomac west of the Blue Ridge instead of only a short distance above Washington. Hooker was never in favor with Halleck, who was then commander-in-chief with headquarters at Washington, and when Hooker was about to cross the Potomac to give battle to Lee, he asked that General French, who then occupied Maryland Heights with 10,000 or 11,000 men, be ordered to abandon the Maryland Heights and fall back to join the Army of the Potomac. General Halleck refused to order the evacuation of Harper's Ferry. Hooker then, on June 27, sent a despatch to General Halleck, of which the following is the full text: "My original instructions required me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me in addition an enemy in my front of more than my numbers. I beg to be understood respectfully but firmly that I am unable to comply with this

condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy."

Hooker's request to be relieved of the command of the army was promptly acceded to, and on Sunday, June 28, Colonel Hardie, of the War Department, reached Frederick with the official order relieving Hooker and placing Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac. Meade had on several previous occasions peremptorily refused to permit himself to be considered for the command of that army, but he was a true soldier, and with unconcealed regret at the necessity that compelled his advancement, he accepted the gravest responsibility assigned to any Union officer from the beginning to the close of the war. No braver and no more conscientious soldier than General Meade ever wore his country's blue.

I first met Meade at the camp of the Pennsylvania Reserves on the day he first wore his brigadier's star and came to take command of a Reserve brigade. He was an unusually modest man under all ordinary conditions, but he was the fiend of battle and regarded by all as the fiercest fighter of all the corps commanders. He was not at all elated by his promotion to the command of the army, nor did he permit himself to be depressed by the terrible responsibility that had been thrust upon him. He felt that the safety of the Capital, and indeed the safety of the Republic, were committed to his keeping, and soldier-like he did not shrink from the appalling duty that had been assigned to him. He was compelled to take command of a widely-scattered army, wisely placed to be able to concentrate against Lee either on the Susquehanna or the Potomac line, nor did he even know where the different corps of his army were posted. He knew that he must meet Lee in battle, and he never thought of fighting



John F. Reynolds

any other than a defensive battle, as Lee would be compelled to attack him in his advance on Philadelphia or Baltimore.

Assuming that Lee was likely to cross the South Mountain and follow the line of the Potomac to keep in closer touch with his base of supplies, Meade ordered General Humphrey to choose a position for defensive battle in the vicinity of Emmittsburg, resulting in the selection of the general line of Pipe Creek, where Meade expected to accept battle if Lee should move toward Gettysburg. So careful was he to prevent confusion in the movements of his army that he issued an order to the several corps commanders informing them of the line chosen for defense, and defining the position each corps should assume if ordered to that position. Gettysburg was chosen by neither commander; it was controlled by inexorable events. When informed of Lee's positive movement toward Gettysburg by the dispatch sent by Governor Curtin about three or four o'clock on the morning of July 1st, he immediately ordered Reynolds to take his own and the Eleventh corps and make a reconnoissance in force, resulting in the death of Reynolds and the disastrous battle of the first day. As soon as advised of the result of the first day's battle, Meade ordered Hancock to the front to take command of all the forces there, and to advise whether the army should be concentrated at Gettysburg or fall back to Pipe Creek. In the meantime all the different corps had been ordered to make forced marches toward Emmittsburg.

Hancock arrived on Cemetery Hill during the night after the first day's battle, and after a careful examination of the position sent an urgent request to Meade to accept battle there, and Meade himself came upon the field early in the morning of the 2d. One of his first acts after deciding upon his new battle line was to issue

an order that has been very justly criticised. He knew that the issue of the battle was not free from doubt, and he exhibited the highest soldierly qualities in issuing the order that has made many underestimate his soldierly qualities. His order to the several corps commanders was practically a repetition of his order to them notifying them of the line on Pipe Creek, simply adding that if for any reason it should be deemed necessary for the army to retire from the Gettysburg field, the corps should proceed at once to the locations assigned for each. It is only the foolhardy soldier who neglects his lines of retreat under any circumstances, but General Meade carefully considered the possible enforced retirement of his army from Gettysburg and fully fortified himself against a disorderly retreat. Every corps commander, if ordered to retire from Cemetery Hill, knew precisely where he should take up his line on Pipe Creek, where Meade himself, an accomplished engineer, had chosen a favorable position.

The Army of the Potomac was severely exhausted before it engaged in the battle of Gettysburg. The corps of Reynolds and Howard, which had fought all of the first day and suffered severe loss, were illy fitted for battle on the following day, and the several corps which arrived during the night and on the following morning had come by forced marches when they should have been in bivouac and at rest. It was not until late in the evening of the 2d that Sedgwick's corps arrived on the field after a forced march of nearly thirty miles on that day. Such was the condition of Meade's army when it was plunged into the flame of battle, while Lee's army had made no forced marches and was in superb physical condition, and little or no rest was allowed during the two days in which both armies faced each other. They were fighting most of

the day, and instead of resting at night the Union troops were busily engaged in strengthening their defenses.

Meade narrowly escaped a serious disaster on the afternoon of the second day when Sickles' corps arrived with orders to take position on the left center. Whether or not the order was so indefinite because of the peculiar formation of the ground that Sickles did not understand it, he advanced his corps far beyond the prescribed lines intended by Meade, and before he could get his command even in complete position, Longstreet attacked him, and the bloodiest conflict of all the many struggles in the Gettysburg battlefield followed. Sickles' corps was overwhelmed, and Meade appeared in person and had to bring up additional corps to enable Sickles to be retired to the line. General Sickles has always earnestly defended his movement as dictated by sound military discretion, but Meade regarded it as a most unfortunate movement, and one that might have been very serious in its results. It was the one distinct defeat that any part of the Union army suffered on Cemetery Hill. Sickles fell early in the fight, having been severely wounded, and had a leg amputated on the field.

Meade was naturally in great suspense on the morning of the third day, as Lee's army was intact in front of him, and no movement was made to assail the Union army until after noon, when all of Lee's nearly 300 guns suddenly opened and continued an unbroken fire for nearly two hours. The Union guns replied for a short time, but it soon became evident that Lee's desperate artillery fire must be the prelude to an attack on some part of the Union lines, and General Hunt, chief of artillery, soon ceased firing and began to place his guns and replenish the caissons so that they could be concentrated on any line of assault.

Finally the thunders of Lee's artillery suddenly

ceased and Pickett's division emerged from the woods and formed in line for its desperate charge upon the nearest point of the Union line. A clump of small trees just behind the Bloody Angle made an objective point for the assailing forces, as the stone wall behind which the Union troops were defending at that point extended out a considerable distance, making the angle that is now known in history as the "Bloody Angle" of Gettysburg. Pickett's division was compelled to march three-quarters of a mile over an ascending plain, and the two fences which lined the Emmittsburg road. From the moment that they formed in line in the open field and commenced the advance they came under the fire of 150 Union guns, which not only struck them in front, but enfiladed both flanks, and when they crossed half the distance a hail of infantry bullets met them. There was not a single general officer in the charge who did not fall either killed or wounded, and a division of some 5,000 men retreated with the broken fragments under the command of a lieutenant colonel.

Meade reached the battle near the Bloody Angle before the final repulse of Pickett's men, and personally witnessed the strangely heroic sons of the South who had fought their way through such a hurricane of death and crossed the stone wall to die or surrender in the Union lines. Thus late in the evening of the third day of the battle Meade had repulsed what he had reason to believe was, and what proved to be, the final charge of Lee's army, and he has been criticised because he did not immediately take the aggressive and assail Lee's broken columns.

Lee's entire command was in strong position with Seminary Hill as its center, and if Meade's army had even been fresh and ready for exhaustive effort, it would have been midsummer madness for him to take the aggressive. If he had done so he would simply



David M. Gregg

have imitated the error of Lee in Pickett's charge, and the fruits of Meade's victory might have been measurably or wholly lost. Meade's entire army had been engaged in forced marches, repeated battles and severe labors to strengthen entrenchments, with nearly one-fourth of its number killed, wounded or captured, and it was not in a condition for aggressive movement, and Meade profited by the severe lesson that Lee had been taught. He held the safety of Washington and Baltimore in his hands, when the loss of either might have decided the issue of the war by the recognition of the Confederacy abroad, and I accord him the highest measure of heroic soldierly qualities in deciding to hold his defensive position of safety.

On another occasion Meade exhibited a degree of heroic soldierly qualities that not one commander in a hundred would have had the courage to exhibit. Late in the fall of 1863 he discovered that Lee's army was divided, and he made a sudden movement to Mine Run to strike Lee's forces in detail, but a mistake in the movement of one of his corps advised the enemy of the approach, and when Meade reached Mine Run he found Lee's united army entrenched in an invulnerable position. At a council of war it was decided to make an assault, and on the morning just before the assault was to be made, Meade personally inspected the position of the enemy and was brave enough to order his army to fall back without firing a gun.

If Meade could have taken position in advance of Lee's retreating army, he could have greatly impeded it and made it suffer serious loss in the many mountain gaps and ravines through which it was compelled to pass, but if Meade had attempted to pursue, there were many passes where a brigade could have held a corps at bay, and fight under every possible advantage. Knowing this, Meade moved by the more open route

to the Potomac, and at Williamsport Lee was in position where, if Meade had attacked him, Lee would have had every advantage that Meade had in Lee's attack on the hills of Gettysburg.

Lincoln was greatly disappointed that Lee left Gettysburg and crossed the Potomac without being forced to give battle again, and he never fully justified Meade's failure to take the aggressive. I saw him soon after the battle, and as Gettysburg was in my senatorial district, and I understood the highways and mountain passes, he made very minute inquiry as to the roads. I said to him that he did not seem to be entirely satisfied with what Meade had done, to which he answered in these words: "I am profoundly grateful to Meade, down to my very boots, for what he did at Gettysburg, but I think if I had been Meade I would have fought another battle." While Grant and Meade were never in open or actual discord during the campaign of 1864, I speak advisedly when I say that Meade did not approve of giving battle in the Wilderness, where the army suffered such frightful loss without seriously injuring the enemy. Some time after Grant's election to the Presidency, and before he was inaugurated, I was a guest at a dinner given to Grant by John Rice, Twenty-first and Walnut, Philadelphia. There were forty or fifty guests, and my seat happened to be by the side of General Meade, who was not very far from the guest of honor. In the course of our conversation I made some inquiry about the Wilderness campaign, and, to my utter surprise, Meade became much excited and spoke in terms of the strongest condemnation of the wanton sacrifice made by the army in that campaign. He said that if his suggestions and reports in relation to that campaign ever reached the public, the movement would be severely criticised. He spoke with so much feeling that I had to quietly remind him that he might

be heard by Grant himself. It is not surprising, therefore, that when Grant came to appoint a lieutenant general to succeed Sherman, he preferred Sheridan, whom he loved, to Meade, for whom he cherished no kindlier feeling than respect for him as a soldier.


The nation has not justly appreciated and honored the incalculable service rendered by General Meade at Gettysburg, but in Pennsylvania, the grand old Commonwealth that was his home, and where he now sleeps in the City of the Silent, his name should ever be lispd with reverence and affection.

LXIII.

THE SENATE DEADLOCK IN 1864.

General Harry White, a Republican Senator, in Libby Prison, Leaving the Senate with Sixteen Democrats and Sixteen Republicans—All Offers for White's Exchange Refused by the Confederate Government—Speaker Penny Retained the Chair—The Democratic Senators Refused Him Recognition—General White's Father Delivers the Senator's Resignation to the Governor—Dr. St. Clair Elected at a Special Election Restoring the Republicans to Authority—The Movement to Care for the Soldiers' Orphans—Curtin's Extraordinary Efforts to Give it Success—Violent Partisan Legislation Governing Elections in the Field—Jerrie McKibben, One of Curtin's Commissioners, Imprisoned by Stanton—The Story of His Release.

THE re-election of Curtin in 1863, with 75,000 disfranchised soldiers in the field, and the leading Cameron men sincerely anxious for his defeat, gave Curtin a position of apparent political omnipotence in the State that would have made almost any other than General Cameron despair of being able to wrest the control of the party from the Governor, but Cameron was not only one of the most sagacious political leaders of this or any other State, but he was a man of tireless energy and would rise up from defeat after defeat to renew his battle for the mastery. He had taken no part in the gubernatorial contest until a short time before the election, when the intensity of patriotic sentiment in the State made it necessary for him to show his hand distinctly in favor of Curtin. A Republican mass meeting was called in Harrisburg to be addressed by General Ben Butler, at which Cameron presided, and declared himself with emphasis in favor of the success of the party candidate.



Harry White

It was not then expected that Curtin was likely to live to complete his second term. Although he took little part in the campaign because of his greatly enfeebled condition, it was, nevertheless, very exhausting because of the anxiety naturally felt, and the constant pressure upon his time by political as well as official duties. He was confined to his room for a week or more after the election. Although the severe strain was over, the reaction greatly prostrated him, and his family and friends were very apprehensive of an early collapse. He frequently appeared at the Executive office, but avoided all official duties which could be transferred to any of his subordinates. With all the care that he exercised for the restoration of his health, as the time approached for the meeting of the Legislature, to be followed soon by his second inauguration, there was no perceptible improvement in his physical vigor.

I saw him at the Executive mansion on Friday, when his inauguration was to take place two weeks from the following Tuesday. He was quite feeble, and spoke about the difficulty of undertaking his inaugural address, saying that he had put it off from day to day until it had become a source of worry to him. I asked him to come to Chambersburg the next day and stay with me over Sunday, adding that I would help him out with the inaugural, to which he answered: "Well, if you will write an inaugural for me and have it ready when I come to Chambersburg to-morrow evening, I will dismiss the subject and join you to rest over Sunday." I told him I would have it ready. I returned home that evening and before retiring to bed wrote the address. I met the Governor at the depot the next evening and his first question was: "Well, is the inaugural ready?" To which I answered that it was. He seemed delighted that the inaugural was disposed

of and he never made any allusion to it, nor any inquiry as to what it contained, until Sunday evening, when I suggested that as he was to return to Harrisburg the next morning it would be well for him to look at the draft of the inaugural I had prepared, and handed him the manuscript. He read it carefully, without remark, until he was through, when he said: "That's all right." He folded it up and put it in his coat pocket. No change was made in the draft I gave him, excepting the addition of the last two paragraphs, which were added by Attorney General Meredith.

It must not be inferred from this statement that Curtin relied largely upon others for the preparation of his important State papers. If he had been enjoying a reasonable degree of health he would have prepared his second inaugural as he did his first, and all his other important State papers, excepting only such as involved legal questions, which were written by the attorney general. No Governor of the State ever was called upon to present so many important official State papers as were called for by the varied emergencies which arose during Curtin's administration, and with the few exceptions I have stated, he always prepared them himself. While Quay was his private secretary, he usually dictated and Quay would take it down in abbreviated notes, and as he was a master in the use of the best English, he always presented the copies to Curtin in faultless style. When dictating on a subject of special importance he was always on his feet, walking leisurely back and forth in the room with his snuff-box in hand, and when warmed up on his subject he was liberal in the use of the snuff. Curtin was unusually fluent in speech and when writing became irksome he soon learned to dictate with ease without impairing the vigor of his composition.

After Curtin's second inauguration it was decided

by his physicians that he must take a season of absolute rest, notwithstanding the presence of the Legislature. They declared that he could not survive a winter in Harrisburg with the constant pressure that would be upon him even with the exercise of the greatest care. His system seemed to be entirely broken and his recuperative powers exhausted. President Lincoln had Secretary Welles tender him a government vessel to take him to Havana, where it was decided that he should spend part of the winter, and I well remember how despair was pictured upon the faces of his many friends who bade him farewell in Philadelphia when he started on his cruise for the South. Not one of us believed that we would ever see him again alive, but in Cuba his health improved rapidly, and by the middle of March he was back again in the Executive chamber enjoying a degree of vigor that he had not possessed for more than a year. There was then no Lieutenant Governor and the speaker of the senate could exercise executive powers only in the event of the death or resignation of a Governor. Thus Pennsylvania was for more than a month without an executive officer, which did not embarrass legislation, excepting that it saved the Legislature from the veto power of the Executive, as all bills passed by the senate and house became laws at the expiration of ten days after received in the Executive office, without the signature of the Governor, unless within that time the Governor exercised the veto power.

It happened, however, that there was little or no legislation during the Governor's absence, as the senate had sixteen Democrats and sixteen Republicans, with Senator Harry White, of Indiana, in Libby Prison. He had been captured in Milroy's retreat from Winchester, and it became known to the Confederate authorities at Richmond that as long as White was a

prisoner the Republicans, regarded by the South as the war party of the North, could pass no legislation. Liberal offers were made for the exchange of Senator White, but they were stubbornly refused, and the deadlock was finally broken by White's resignation and the prompt election of his successor.

Many amusing incidents occurred in the senate during the deadlock. Partisan prejudice was then at its zenith and it was at times difficult for even grave senators to maintain the courtesies which were always expected in the first legislative tribunal of the State. The Constitution was silent, and there was no law as to the particular method of organizing the senate, although it had been uniformly accepted by both parties that the senate was always an organized body, as the speaker was chosen at the close of every session to serve during the recess and take the office of Governor in case of a vacancy. The uniform custom, however, had been for the speaker who served during the recess to allow the clerk of the Senate to call the body to order, instead of the speaker taking the chair himself, and call the roll of senators to elect a speaker. In point of fact, and I doubt not equally in point of law, Senator Penny, of Allegheny, who had been chosen speaker at a previous session to serve during the recess, was the speaker of the body until a successor was chosen, or his term as senator expired, but there had been no occasion for a speaker of the senate to exercise such authority, and it had never been done. The house was called to order by the clerk, because there was no other official of the body competent to exercise any authority until a speaker was chosen.

Of course, the Republicans well knew that they could not elect a speaker with sixteen Democratic and sixteen Republican senators, and the distempered condition of political affairs at that time made it impossi-

ble for the two parties to reach a compromise organization that would have been easy to accomplish under ordinary conditions, as the leaders of the two parties could have harmonized by a division of offices and committees. Such a solution of the problem, however, was unthought of on either side in January, 1864, when the Legislature met and the Republicans decided in caucus that the senate was always an organized body and that Senator Penny should take the chair and continue to preside until his successor was chosen. To the surprise of the Democrats, when the senate met, Speaker Penny took the chair and called the body to order. He was one of the ablest lawyers of the State and a man so blameless in his public career that even his bitterest political enemies found it difficult to assail him. The Democrats refused to recognize him as speaker, and exhausted their ingenuity to embarrass him in the position he assumed, but he maintained himself with unbroken dignity during the long weeks through which the deadlock continued. The Democrats assumed that the senate was not an organized body and, therefore, incapable of any legislation. No matter what proposition was presented, the Democrats uniformly voted against it on the ground that the senate was incompetent to consider the question, and as the Republicans were powerless to legislate they exhausted their ingenuity in making the Democrats vote against the divinity of the Bible, the Declaration of Independence and nearly every other vital feature of Democratic faith.

Finally the elder Judge White, the father of Senator White, brought into the Governor's office Senator White's resignation, written on tissue paper that, as the father reported it, had been concealed in the Bible of an exchanged prisoner. The genuineness of the resignation was very generally questioned by the

Democrats, while the Republicans were quite willing to accept it without inquiry. It was promptly accepted by the Governor, a writ issued for a special election to fill the vacancy at the shortest possible notice, and Dr. St. Clair, Republican, was chosen and entered the senate the morning after his certificate was received, when Senator Penny was promptly elected speaker and legitimate legislation began.

The Legislature of 1864 inaugurated the Soldiers' Orphan School system of the State, but in a most hesitating and grudging manner. When on his way to church on Thanksgiving Day, of 1862, Governor Curtin was met on the street by two children begging alms. His sympathetic nature was attracted to the children, and he stopped to inquire into their condition. The first answer that came to him touched his heart. It was in these words: "Father was killed in the war." He promptly gave them a liberal contribution and passed on to church, but he was so profoundly impressed by the pathos of the remark made to him by the begging children that he gave little attention to the Thanksgiving sermon that grated harshly on his ears as he was called upon to give thanks for the prosperity and happiness the country enjoyed when the orphan children of fallen soldiers were begging on the streets. A few weeks after the Legislature of 1864 met, and in his annual message, he said: "I commend to the prompt attention of the Legislature the subject of the relief of the poor orphans of our soldiers who have given, or shall give, their lives to the country during this crisis. In my opinion their maintenance and education should be provided for by the State. Failing other natural efforts of ability to provide for them, they should be honorably received and fostered as the children of the Commonwealth."

The Pennsylvania Railroad Company had contrib-

uted \$50,000 to be used by the State authorities in any way deemed best to aid in the prosecution of the war, and the Governor recommended that this \$50,000 be made the nucleus of a fund for the care of the orphans of our fallen soldiers, and a bill was introduced on the 8th of April, 1864, when the Governor had returned from his visit to Cuba, prepared by Professor Wickersham, at the request of the Governor, providing for the appointment of a superintendent of schools for orphans, with authority to select from any of the schools established by the Commonwealth a certain number adapted for the use of schools and homes for the orphans. The Legislature hesitated to adopt a measure that would bind the State to the probable expenditure of millions of dollars, and finally passed a substitute bill simply authorizing the Governor to accept the \$50,000 contributed by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for the education and maintenance of the soldiers' orphans in such manner as the Governor might deem best.

The Legislature of 1864 was severely criticised for its alleged want of liberality in dealing with the soldiers' orphans, but it must be remembered that in 1863 the financial condition of the State was not such as to warrant any severe extra strain upon it. The Governor was greatly disappointed at the action of the Legislature, and decided to inaugurate the system with the \$50,000 at his disposal and he appointed Thomas H. Burrowes as superintendent of soldiers' orphans, who placed a large number of children, from six to ten years of age, in the charitable institutions of the State. The first institution to accept and heartily second the movement was the Northern Home for Friendless Children, in Philadelphia, and it was the first soldiers' orphan home established in the State.

The Governor felt assured that the system once wisely inaugurated would be heartily maintained by

the people, and at the close of the year 1865 there were eight schools for the older and seventeen homes and asylums for the younger children, making a total of 1,329 pupils, but the only additional appropriation the Governor was able to obtain was \$75,000. When the Legislature met in 1866 the Governor stormed the Legislature into hearty accord with the soldiers' orphan system by inviting 345 pupils of the soldiers' orphan schools of McAllisterville, Mount Joy and Paradise, and asked permission of the house of representatives to have them appear in the hall. They came in the uniform of the schools, and Governor Curtin, in the presence of the members of both branches of the Legislature, an inspiring spectacle with the orphans clustered around him, delivered an appeal to the Legislature that silenced the opposition, and thereafter the soldiers' orphan schools were liberally supported by the State—supported, in fact, in later years to an extent that justly invited criticism. The system is still maintained under the steady enlargement of its aims until over \$12,000,000 have been expended by the Commonwealth in obedience to Governor Curtin's command that the orphans of our soldiers and sailors who fell or were disabled in military service should be made the wards of the State. No other State of the Union approached Pennsylvania in the care of the children of its fallen heroes, and with all the abuses which have crept into it long after Curtin's control had ceased, it stands to-day as one of the grandest monuments of the beneficence of a great Commonwealth.

Another very important act of the Legislature of 1864 was the final passage of the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the State authorizing the soldiers in the field to vote in their camps at all Pennsylvania elections. In order to make the amendment effective in the Presidential election of 1864, it was

necessary to call a special election to enable the people to vote on the amendment, as required by the Constitution. A special election was fixed for early in August, and the amendment was sustained by an overwhelming majority. It was well known that the amendment would be ratified by the popular vote, and the Legislature of 1864 had a most bitter struggle in the passage of an elaborate election law providing for holding elections and certifying returns by soldiers in the field. Partisan bitterness was then at what might be called high-water mark, and even the legislators who, under ordinary conditions, would have been conservative and just in framing an election law, were driven by the intensity of partisan prejudice to support an election law that practically gave the whole election into the hands of politicians, with little or nothing to restrain them in the perpetration of the most flagrant frauds. I was not then a member of the Legislature, but was requested by the Governor to join him in an earnest effort to temper the violent partisan features of the proposed measure, and secure an election law that would be accepted as at least reasonably fair to all. The bill as reported by the committee, and generally accepted as the party measure, bristled with invitations to fraud and opened the widest doors for its perpetration. I was present in the Executive chamber with Curtin when he had summoned ten or a dozen of the prominent Republicans of both senate and house and made a most earnest appeal to them to maintain the integrity of Pennsylvania elections by framing a perfectly fair bill to govern soldiers' elections in the field. All admitted the justice of the Governor's appeal, but none had the courage to brave the tidal wave of partisan passion that ruled.

The result was that the Pennsylvania statute was a dishonor to the Commonwealth. Among other pro-

visions it authorized the Governor to appoint State Commissioners to be present in the field on election day, but without power beyond the right to report irregularities or frauds. The bill was passed very late in the session, and the Governor could not withhold his approval. I urged him to appoint a number of Democrats of high standing among the State commissioners to vindicate his own sense of fairness, but his answer was: "Where can I find Democrats who will go?" I replied that we could certainly find half a dozen or more who would accept the Governor's commission, and among others I named Jerrie McKibben, of Philadelphia, and he was appointed along with several other Democrats. I notified McKibben of his appointment, and requested his acceptance, but his answer was that he couldn't accept, as Stanton would have him in Old Capitol Prison in three days. I told him that Secretary Stanton would not attempt to imprison an officer holding a commission from the State of Pennsylvania unless he committed some flagrant wrong, and that as I knew he was too discreet to undertake to interfere with the election in any way whatever, he was entirely safe from the Secretary. He did accept, and in three days after he joined the army, then around Petersburg, he telegraphed me to come to Washington at once, as he was in Old Capitol Prison. I hastened to Washington, reaching there about nine o'clock in the evening, and proceeded directly to the White House to present the matter to the President. I told him that several Democrats had been persuaded reluctantly to accept these commissions with the full knowledge that they would perform no official duties beyond delivering election papers committed to their charge, and that they had been appointed by Governor Curtin solely to give some semblance of fairness to the elections in the field. He at once sent to

the War Department for the papers on which the arrest had been made, and when he received them, in five minutes he saw that the order of arrest was made on the ground that he had delivered fraudulent election papers, although he had delivered precisely the same papers prepared by the commissioners of Philadelphia that had been delivered by the Republican commissioners. A typographical error that could not in any way affect the election had been overlooked by the commissioners, and McKibben was held responsible. Lincoln pronounced the arrest "a stupid blunder," and told me that he would at once discharge McKibben. He said he thought it was due to Stanton, who had ordered the arrest, to release McKibben on parole, to which I answered that McKibben could be at once released on parole and that I would call at the President's room at ten o'clock the next morning, where I hoped Stanton would be present, and would have McKibben absolutely discharged. The President wrote out himself the order for McKibben's release, and I hastened to Old Capitol Prison and supped with him at the hotel.

I called at the White House the next morning at the appointed hour, but Stanton had not appeared. A few minutes later he came in. He entered the room in a violent passion and his first remark to me was: "Well, McClure, what damned rebel are you now trying to get out of trouble?" I told him that he had imprisoned McKibben, whom he hated for no other reason than that McKibben's father and family had been his friends in Pittsburg when he greatly needed friends, and that if he had looked for a moment at the papers he could not have committed such an outrage as to order the imprisonment. Stanton was flagrantly offensive in all he said, and refused to order McKibben discharged from parole, but said a formal application

should be made which he would consider. I told him that I did not know what Jerrie McKibben would do, but that if Stanton committed the same outrage upon me, as there was a God above I would not leave the city until I cropped his ears. Stanton made no reply, but after rushing back and forth several times across the room, he suddenly left the Executive chamber and slammed the door violently after him. Lincoln said nothing during this belligerent interview, but after Stanton left, in his quaint way, he remarked that I had not been very successful in persuading the Secretary of War. He added, however, that the incident was closed, that McKibben was free and that his parole was a matter of no moment. I filed a formal application for McKibben's release from parole, and after a week received a formal notice, all in the bold scrawl of Stanton's handwriting, stating that the subject of the parole of McKibben had been fully considered and that the interests of the service required that it should not be granted. The result was that Jerrie McKibben died a prisoner on parole some fifteen years later, and nearly ten years after the great War Minister had gone to his final account.

LXIV

HOW LINCOLN NOMINATED JOHNSON.

The Inner Story of the Sagacious Political Movements Which Nominated Andrew Johnson for Vice-President over Hamlin—How Lincoln Managed to Unite Pennsylvania for Johnson without His Movements Being Known—Cameron First in Lincoln's Confidence to Start the Johnson Movement—A Shade of Distrust Between Lincoln and Cameron—Why Lincoln Forced the Author to Become a Delegate-at-Large to the National Convention—How Cameron and the Author were Elected without a Contest—The Delegation Finally United on Johnson.

THE political condition in Pennsylvania at the opening of 1864 was anything but serene. While the Republicans generally accepted and sincerely desired the renomination of President Lincoln, he was very earnestly and even bitterly opposed by some of the ablest leaders of the party, and among them Thaddeus Stevens, then the commoner of the House, who was violent against the policy of the President, while such distinguished leaders as Chase, Wade, Sumner, Chandler, Henry Winter Davis and others openly proclaimed their purpose to make exhaustive effort to retire Lincoln. The Republicans at that time were in the attitude toward Lincoln that the Democrats were toward Cleveland in 1892. In both cases the people of the party were absolutely and earnestly in support of the candidates, while the leaders of the party were largely against them. The Republican people had absolute faith in Lincoln as the Democrats in 1892 had in Cleveland, and Cameron saw his opportunity to gain power and prestige by taking the lead in an aggressive movement in favor of Lincoln's nomination.

Curtin and his friends were as sincerely in favor of Lincoln as was Cameron, but soon after the Legislature convened in January, Cameron made a quiet combination by which a paper strongly recommending the renomination of Lincoln was signed by every Republican senator and representative at Harrisburg. It was known that the relations between Lincoln and Cameron had been severely strained by Cameron's enforced retirement from the cabinet in the early part of 1862, and his open advocacy of Lincoln's renomination was not only in accord with the general sentiment of the Republican people, but it had all the marks of a chivalrous act on the part of Cameron. Cameron had not been forced from the cabinet by Lincoln himself, but by conditions which made it necessary for Lincoln to retire him. He was unfortunate in having a host of friends who were most importunate in demanding official plunder from him, and while his official record in the War Office was free from the stain of corruption on his part, political necessities forced him to give promotion and contracts to men who abused the trust he reposed in them and brought reproach upon his department and the government.

Cameron knew that the pressure was very strong upon the President to retire him, and whenever the movement assumed some measure of importance he notified the President that his resignation was at the disposal of the President at any time for his acceptance. The culmination came when a committee of financial men found it next to impossible to maintain the credit of the government, and one of the many grave obstacles in the way was the alleged profligacy and corruption in organizing, equipping and maintaining the army. The committee called upon the President and informed him that it would be impossible to negotiate further loans without a change in the War

Department that would emphasize the purpose of the government to have it administered in severe integrity and economy. Lincoln had Cameron's distinct authority to accept Cameron's resignation at any time, and thus retire him from the cabinet, and without consulting Cameron or Stanton, or any others, he wrote a brief letter to Secretary Cameron, simply stating that he had decided to nominate Cameron to the Senate as Minister to Russia, and Edwin M. Stanton to succeed him as Secretary of War.

This letter was given by the President to Secretary Chase with instructions to deliver it to Cameron in person, but Cameron dined with Colonel Forney that evening and Chase did not find him until ten o'clock at night. Colonel Thomas A. Scott was then Assistant Secretary of War, and I happened to be in Washington that day and spent the evening with Colonel Scott at his office in the War Department. About eleven o'clock Secretary Cameron entered Scott's office quite abruptly and betrayed a very unusual measure of excitement for one of Cameron's equable temperament. He came up to the table where Scott and I were sitting and laid down the President's letter. He spoke with great feeling and in a tremulous voice, with tears scalding his cheeks, he said that the President certainly meant to accomplish his destruction. He said to me that, while we had not been political friends, he certainly would not sanction any measure that meant my personal destruction, and he confidently expected that I would not sanction such a measure against him.

Scott, who was wonderfully fertile in invention, told Cameron to sit down and talk the matter over. He said he knew that the President did not intend to offer any personal affront to Cameron, or to destroy him personally or politically; that Lincoln had doubtless written the letter in the curt form it appeared simply

because of the terrible pressure that was upon him. He proposed that Lincoln should be seen the next morning, and he assured Cameron that Lincoln would permit Cameron to antedate a letter of resignation and Lincoln write a kind acceptance. Scott saw the President early the next morning, and Lincoln readily agreed to Scott's suggestion, resulting in the withdrawal of the original letter from Lincoln to Cameron and the substitution of the correspondence embracing Cameron's formal resignation and Lincoln's formal and very kind acceptance. Stanton had no knowledge that he was considered for the cabinet until he was notified that his nomination had been sent to the Senate for the Secretaryship of War, nor did any member of the cabinet know of the changes made. Even Chase, who delivered the letter to Cameron, had no knowledge of its contents.

It is only just to Cameron to say that when a resolution of censure on his administration of the War Department was adopted by a Republican House, President Lincoln sent a brief special message to the House stating that the censure of Cameron was not wholly just, as in many things for which he was censured the President himself was equally responsible, and a few years later the resolution of censure was rescinded by the House and expunged from its record.

While the relations between Cameron and Lincoln were somewhat strained by Lincoln's method of retiring Cameron from the cabinet, Cameron did not hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity presented in the early part of 1864 to throw himself into the breach and become the ostensible leader of the movement to sustain Lincoln in Pennsylvania. The action of the Legislature that was inspired by Cameron brought out a very hearty and generally cordial response from the Republicans of the State in favor of Lincoln, and

from that time until the meeting of the State convention there was practically no Lincoln issue in the Republican politics of the State. I was then enjoying at home a season of relief from public care, and trying to give some attention to private affairs. My devotion to Lincoln made me desirous to go as a delegate to the National convention from my own congressional district, and I was chosen by the unanimous action of the different counties without the formality of a conference. A few weeks before the meeting of the convention the President telegraphed me to come to Washington, and, notwithstanding the fact that at that time more than a majority of all the delegates to the National convention were positively instructed for him, without serious opposition to him in any of the States, I was surprised to find Lincoln apprehensive that he might not be renominated. He knew that a considerable number of very able men were earnestly against him, and when I told him that it was not possible for him to be defeated with a majority of the delegates instructed for him, and nearly all of the remainder pledged to him, his answer was: "But I don't forget that I was nominated for President in a convention that was two-thirds for the other fellow."

He surprised me by saying that he had sent for me for the purpose of having me made one of the delegates-at-large from Pennsylvania. Considering that I was already a member of the delegation, in which a man's usefulness was measured entirely by his ability and influence and not by the distinction of a delegate-at-large over a district delegate, I could not but regard the proposition as absurd, besides being, as I then believed it to be, entirely impossible. I told the President that I could not, with any decency, appeal to the State convention to elect me a delegate-at-large when I was already unanimously chosen a delegate from

my district; but Lincoln was persistent to an extent that I could not understand, and I finally asked him what he meant by asking me to attempt so ungracious and, to my mind, impossible a thing. He informed me that he had a letter from General Cameron, who said he would be a delegate-at-large from Pennsylvania, and he added that while he had no question of Cameron's fidelity, he thought it most desirable that if Cameron was a delegate-at-large I should be one with him. He was most importunate on the subject, and finally said: "I think you can accomplish it, and I want you to try.". I told him that if opportunity offered I would accomplish it, but that I had not the remotest idea that it was within the range of possibility.

I knew enough of Lincoln at that time to know that he had a settled purpose in view, but what it was I could not conceive, nor would he explain. He knew that my election as delegate-at-large could not, in any way, influence the action of Cameron, but he made it a command and I told him that I would see if it could be accomplished. On my return from Washington I stopped over at Harrisburg without any definite purpose, and dropped in to see George Bergner, who, while a warm personal friend of mine, was a devoted follower of Cameron. Cameron was anxious to be a delegate-at-large and could not have been defeated, but his great desire was to be elected by an overwhelming vote, and he knew that could be accomplished only by the concurrence of the Curtin people. After a few minutes' conversation with Bergner he remarked that we were now all for Lincoln, and there ought not to be any division in the party at the next State convention; that there was no State ticket to nominate and only electors and delegates-at-large to be chosen. He then broke the ice by stating that "the old man," meaning Cameron, wanted to be a

delegate-at-large and hoped there would be harmony in his selection. For the first time I saw a glimpse of an opening to accomplish what I had been instructed to do, and I answered Bergner by saying that certainly there should be no division in the convention as we were all for Lincoln and that Cameron and Curtin should be made delegates-at-large by a unanimous vote. I knew that Cameron would object to Curtin as they were not on speaking terms, and Bergner promptly answered that "the old man" and Curtin couldn't get along together, but he added: "We'll take you and Cameron." I asked him what assurance he had that Cameron would assent to the arrangement, and he informed me that if I would wait twenty minutes he would see Cameron in person and bring me his assurance. He was delighted, of course, at the prospect of getting Cameron the support of the Curtin element. He rushed around to Cameron's home, came back in a short time and stated that every friend of Cameron in the convention would heartily support me. I informed Curtin of the situation and he insisted that the plan should be carried out. The result was that Cameron and I were elected delegates-at-large by a practically unanimous vote on the first ballot, and John Stewart, my law partner, now justice in the supreme court, was chosen to fill the vacancy in the district delegation.

What special purpose Lincoln had in view in urging me to an effort that only by the merest accident could be accomplished, I could not understand, but three days before the meeting of the National convention that was held in Baltimore in June, the President telegraphed me to come to Washington; and then I discovered for the first time his masterly political strategy. He startled me by stating that he desired me to support Andrew Johnson for Vice-President. I had no par-

ticular affection for Hamlin, but had not thought of voting for any other, and I especially distrusted Johnson, whom I estimated as a very able and dangerous demagogue. I did not then know that Cameron had been taken into the confidence of Lincoln several months before; that Cameron was present when it was finally decided by Lincoln to make Johnson the candidate for Vice-President, and that Cameron, at Lincoln's request, had made a personal visit to General Butler, then commanding the Army of the James, to confer with him on the subject of nominating a War Democrat such as Butler, Holt, Dix, Dickinson or Johnson for the Vice-Presidency. Cameron was accompanied on that visit to Butler by William H. Armstrong, the Republican leader of the House in the early part of the war, later a member of Congress and National Commissioner of Railways, and yet living in Philadelphia. Lincoln doubtless knew that I would readily accede to his request to vote for Johnson, and as the movement required the severest discretion, he permitted no one of those to whom he confided his purpose to know of others whom he had consulted. He knew that Cameron was for Johnson at the time he insisted upon me becoming a delegate-at-large, and knowing that I would readily accept his advice, he logically argued that with Cameron and myself delegates-at-large representing the two great factions of the State, enlisted in the support of Johnson, the entire delegation would be certain to follow, and it did follow precisely as Lincoln had planned it.

So cautious was Lincoln in the movement that Cameron did not know of my position on the Vice-Presidency, nor did I know what Cameron's was. Soon after I reached Baltimore to attend the convention Cameron came to my room, where the present Judge Stewart was chatting with me. Cameron

pulled the bell, ordered a bottle of wine for the room and informed me that he had come to discuss the question of the Vice-Presidency. His first proposition was that the Pennsylvania delegation should unite and give a complimentary vote to himself, which he knew I would object to. I told him that we had a very important duty to perform and that we would settle down at once, without playing marbles, to decide what the delegation should do. Cameron said that he was very friendly to Hamlin, but was entirely satisfied that Hamlin could not be renominated, in which I concurred. He next stated that he was inclined to favor Johnson, of Tennessee, in which I also concurred. He next proposed that, as he was somewhat embarrassed by his personal relations with Hamlin in the Senate, we should line up both sides of the delegation, cast a unanimous vote for Hamlin when the State was called, and at the end of the roll call before the vote was computed, change the vote of the State to a unanimous vote for Johnson, to which I readily concurred. Then, for the first time, Cameron knew that I was to support Johnson, and I, for the first time, knew that Cameron was to do the same. The delegation lined up on our programme to a man on both sides, with the exception of Thaddeus Stevens, who sat by my side in the delegation conference. When I voted to have the delegation give a solid support to Hamlin first and next to Johnson, Stevens turned his cold, gray eye upon me with an expression of profound contempt, and said: "Can't you get a candidate for Vice-President without going down into a damned rebel province for one?" Stevens saw that he stood alone, however, and he permitted the vote of the State to be cast in accordance with the programme.

After the death of Hamlin, a score or more years later, in an editorial review of his life I referred to the

fact that Lincoln had accomplished the nomination of Johnson over him in 1864, and it was fiercely and insolently contradicted by Mr. Nicolay, who was Lincoln's private secretary, and who gave the Associated Press a statement that I had misrepresented Lincoln's attitude, as Lincoln was heartily in favor of Hamlin's renomination. Quite a controversy ensued, and I gathered the overwhelming evidence proving Lincoln's position and efforts entirely outside of my own statement. Mr. Nicolay was a very faithful secretary; but I never met or heard of him in consultation with Lincoln in any matter, political or otherwise. He honestly believed that he knew what Lincoln was doing about the Vice-Presidency, and as he had stated in his "Life of Lincoln" that Lincoln was favorable to the nomination of Hamlin, his sensitiveness led him to commit the error of assuming and declaring that I had stated a palpable falsehood, as it could be no less if I was in error in declaring that I had voted for Johnson in obedience to Lincoln's request.

Most of those who had any inner knowledge on the subject have passed away, but there are yet enough living in Pennsylvania to fully establish the fact that Lincoln nominated Johnson over Hamlin for Vice-President in 1864, outside of my own testimony. Mr. Armstrong was with Cameron on his mission to Butler, sent by Lincoln to arrange for the nomination of a War Democrat. Judge Stewart, who succeeded me as district delegate, and knew all that transpired at Baltimore, is also cognizant of the fact that both Cameron and myself obeyed Lincoln in the matter. Ex-Congressman J. Rankin Young, still living in Philadelphia, some years after the war prepared an interview from General Cameron on the subject that was carefully revised by Cameron himself, and published in the New York "Herald," telling how he had co-operated

with Lincoln in the early part of the year in a movement for the nomination of Johnson.

Lincoln was nominated on the first ballot, receiving the full vote of every State but Missouri, whose delegation was instructed for Grant, but it promptly changed to Lincoln before the vote was announced, making his nomination unanimous. On the roll call for Vice-President, Johnson received 200 votes, Hamlin 150, Dickinson 108, with 61 scattering; but before the vote was announced Pennsylvania changed from Hamlin to Johnson and other changes followed rapidly, making the final announcement of the first ballot 494 for Johnson, 17 for Dickinson and 9 for Hamlin.

Lincoln was not influenced by prejudice or resentment in opposing the nomination of Hamlin. The reasons he gave me in support of the nomination of Johnson were so logical and conclusive that I would have voted for Johnson as a matter of duty to the party and to the country, regardless of my willingness to accede to the wishes of the President. They were: First, that the nomination and election of a Vice-President from a reconstructed State in the heart of the Confederacy, who was a distinctly representative man, and had filled every office in the gift of the State, would add more strength to the friends of the Union in England and France, who were struggling against the recognition of the Confederacy, than could be accomplished in any other way, save by the complete overthrow of the Confederate military power. Second, the strong political necessity for nominating a distinctive War Democrat not then connected with the Republican party, to bring to the support of the administration the many thousands of War Democrats who were followers of men like Johnson, Dickinson, Butler, Dix, Holt and others; and, third, the nomination of Johnson, would desectionalize the Republican

party. Recognition of the Confederacy was yet a fearful peril to the Union cause, and the nomination of Johnson demonstrated that substantial progress was being made in the restoration of the Union by the accomplished reconstruction of the State in the inner circle of rebellion.

The convention met in Baltimore on the 7th of June, and I never saw a more hearty welcome given to any man in a public assembly than was given the Rev. Robert J. Breckenridge, of Kentucky; when he was made temporary president of the body. It was a brave act for any man from the South to confess himself a Republican, but when a man of the high character and intellectual and moral attitude of Dr. Breckenridge took the chair in the Republican National convention, it gave courage and hope to scores of thousands in the Southern States. Governor Dennison, of Ohio, was made permanent president, but the controlling mind of the convention was that of Henry J. Raymond, who acted in closest confidence with Lincoln. He not only withdrew his State from the support of Hamlin, but was compelled to sacrifice Dickinson, another War Democrat, whose friends felt that he should be preferred to Johnson. He wrote the platform, became chairman of the National committee, wrote the campaign life of Lincoln, and he was, in fact, the "leader of leaders" of that great contest.

There were many inharmonious elements in the convention. All felt that we were then approaching the period when the military power of the Confederacy would be overthrown, and the grave problem of reconstruction would be presented for solution. On that question there could have been no common ground of agreement in the National convention of 1864. There were many who, like Stevens, demanded the severest punishment of the officials who engaged in rebellion,

the confiscation of their property, and the absolute denial of citizenship, while a majority were in favor of various shades of generous methods to accomplish reconciliation and reunion. While there was a general feeling of confidence in the re-election of Lincoln, the more intelligent of the leaders knew that they had a severe battle before them and most careful methods were developed to guard against disaster in November.

It was known that General McClellan would be the opposing candidate; that he had many sincere supporters in the army and that the conservative elements of the country had absolute confidence in him, while all the shades of the entire anti-war elements would be certain to support any candidate nominated by the Democrats. The Republican leaders did not assume that their victory was assured, and many grave conferences were held on the various subjects which might have a bearing on the conflict. It was a convention of great force, and it was most judiciously guided by wise leadership to place the party in the best attitude for a desperate conflict. The student of to-day, who looks over the history of that campaign, will naturally assume that Lincoln was re-elected without a struggle, as the vote appears to be overwhelming; but all who were at the Baltimore convention, and all who actively participated in the struggle, will remember the gloom that hung over the Republican party during the summer months, and how triumph was finally decided by the victories of Sherman in Atlanta and Sheridan in the Valley.

LXV.

LINCOLN RE-ELECTED PRESIDENT.

Pennsylvania Republicans Heartily United in Support of Lincoln—Cameron Made Chairman of the State Committee—Severe Republican Depression During the Summer of 1864 Because of the Failure to Achieve Victory in the Field—Lincoln Predicts His Own Defeat on the Twenty-third of August in a Note Sealed and Delivered to Secretary Welles—Pennsylvania Faltered in Her Republicanism at the October Election—The Author Called to Co-operate with Cameron in the November Battle—How Pennsylvania Was Made to Vote for Lincoln on the Home Vote.

WHEN the Republican State convention met at Harrisburg in the early spring of 1864 there was a very general feeling of confidence that the Republicans would have little more than a picnic in the struggle for the Pennsylvania Presidential electors. Curtin had carried the State the year before by over 15,000, with 75,000 soldiers disfranchised in the field, and as the army vote was certain to be added in 1864, by a special amendment of the Constitution, the State was accepted as anchored in the Republican column without any special effort. I was not a member of the convention and had no thought of being in any way responsibly involved in the contest, as I shared the belief that the State was entirely safe for Lincoln. Entirely without my knowledge, a paper was prepared by some members of the convention asking the president of the body to appoint me chairman of the Republican State committee, and it was signed by two-thirds or more of the delegates. There were no State offices to fill that year, and the selection of the chairman of the State committee naturally

devolved upon the president of the convention. The paper was presented to the chair by Representative Olmsted, since senator and president judge of the Potter district.

George V. Lawrence, who had served in the house and two terms in the senate, was president of the convention and a close friend of Cameron. He received the paper and announced that it would be given due consideration. When I was advised of the movement I refused to take any part in the struggle for the place, as every consideration of personal interest made it undesirable. Lawrence held the matter ostensibly under advisement a few days, and then announced the appointment of General Cameron to the position. No man in the State was better equipped for the management of a campaign than was Cameron, and as there were no factional divisions in the State, with only National candidates and interests before the party, there was no disposition on the part of Curtin's friends to complain of the appointment. Cameron saw what he believed to be an opportunity to achieve a great victory for the party without any serious effort or sacrifice on his own part, and he committed the error of assuming that the campaign would manage itself and gave little thought or labor to the important task he had accepted.

When Lincoln was renominated in June the Republican leaders had just begun to realize that they might have a desperate contest before them, as Grant had fought desperate battles with fearful sacrifice of men without attaining any material victories, and Sherman was struggling with Johnson in the Atlanta campaign, and grave apprehensions were felt that as he approached Atlanta and lengthened his line, and necessarily weakened his forces, he might fail in his movement for the capture of the city that was the gateway of the Con-

federacy. Nor did political conditions improve during the summer months, and I well remember that during August the gravest apprehensions were cherished by the Republican leaders as to the National verdict, but none had any doubt about Republican success in Pennsylvania. Lincoln, who was a close observer of the campaign, finally became discouraged to the verge of despair. On the 23d of August he wrote the following memorandum:

"This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to co-operate with the President-elect so as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterward."

Lincoln sealed this paper and delivered it to Secretary Welles, with notice that it was to be opened only when the result of the election was known. I saw him about the middle of the same month and he was greatly depressed. He was human, as are all men, differing only in degree, and was naturally most solicitous for re-election to the highest civil trust of the world, but I believe that his anxiety for success in the contest was even greater for the preservation of the Union than for a mere individual triumph. It was then that he first startled me with the proposition to pay \$400,000,000 to the South as compensation for their slaves if they would accept emancipation and return to the Union. Of course, the suggestion was made in the strictest confidence, because if it had been made public in the then high-water mark of sectional and partisan passion, even Vermont and Massachusetts might have been made doubtful; but his reasons in support of the proposition were absolutely unanswerable. He said that the war was then costing about \$4,000,000 a day; that none

could hope to close it by battle within the next hundred days during which period the war itself would cost the full sum he proposed for compensated emancipation. He did not doubt that the military power of the Confederacy would be broken, but he feared that with the generally impoverished condition of the South the Confederate soldiers would not return to their desolated fields and breadless homes, but would precipitate anarchy in that section. After his election and after his conference with Confederate Vice-President Stephens, he prepared a message to Congress urging that \$400,000,000 be offered to the South for compensation if emancipation and reunion were accepted. He read it to the members of the cabinet, by whom it was nearly or quite unanimously disapproved, and Lincoln folded the paper and endorsed on the back of it that it had been presented to the cabinet and disapproved.

The burning of Chambersburg on the 30th of July, by General McCausland's force, precipitated new conditions in my section of the State. Most of the residents in the town were entirely homeless and business was suspended. An extra session of the Legislature was promptly called by Governor Curtin and \$100,000 appropriated that was apportioned among the most needy. While nearly all the property destroyed was insured, the insurance was lost, as the destruction was caused by a public enemy. The people of Chambersburg were, therefore, largely without capital or credit to resume their varied occupations, and despair very generally prevailed in all business and industrial circles.

J. McDowell Sharpe, the leading Democratic member of the Chambersburg bar, was then a member of the house, and after various conferences on the subject, it was decided that I should accept the Republican nomination for the house, with the general expectation that both of us would be elected, to have an active Demo-

crat and Republican in the next Legislature to secure a liberal appropriation from the State. The district was composed of Franklin and Perry counties, and a Democrat and Republican were nominated in each county. The district was naturally Democratic and the people of the smaller county of Perry were not greatly enthused by the undeclared but generally well understood purpose that Franklin would elect both the members of the house. It was a demand that I could not hesitate to obey, and as the National battle could be well fought between the October and November elections, I remained at home and devoted my entire time to the care of the suffering people of the town and to the contest in the district; but I was in constant communication with the leading men of the State, and before the October election I was well convinced that there was danger of the State being close or lost in October. Three weeks before the election I was in Washington and gave the President a statement of the unfavorable condition, and urged him to have Cameron appreciate the peril and make an aggressive campaign. He conferred with Cameron on the subject and Cameron assured him that the State would be Republican by a large majority. The result was practically a Republican disaster. There were no State officers to lose, but a number of Republican Congressmen fell in the race who should have been successful. Sharpe and I were elected by the common interest felt by both parties in Chambersburg and generally throughout the county in favor of State aid to those who suffered from the destruction of the town, and the Republican Congressmen in several districts were saved only by the army vote.

The Presidential contest in Pennsylvania in 1864 presented some peculiar features which gave the Democrats positive advantage. McClellan was not only

the choice of the Democrats for the Presidency, but they were generally and enthusiastically earnest in his support and hopeful of his election. He was a native of Pennsylvania, and strong appeals were made not only to Pennsylvania pride, but to the soldiers of the State, most of whom held McClellan in high respect. The Democrats had delayed their nomination of a National ticket until the 29th of August, when they assembled at Chicago, and they were most unfortunate in not having delayed their convention at least a week longer. When Horatio Seymour arose as presiding officer to call that convention to order, he addressed one of the ablest representative political bodies that ever met in the country, and every member was entirely confident of the success of their candidate for President. The campaigns of Grant and Sherman up to that time had brought nothing in return but reports of desperate battles and appalling sacrifice, and the feeling was very general among Democrats and largely shared by Republicans that the Union could not be restored at the point of the bayonet.

It was this political condition of fore-shadowed Republican disaster that Lincoln recorded in the private memorandum only a week before the convention met, that made the Democratic National convention commit the fatal error of declaring the war a failure and demanding the cessation of hostilities. The text of that portion of the platform was as follows:

“That after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretense of military necessity or war-power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired—justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand that immediate

efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities with a view to an ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal union of the States."

That momentous declaration at the time of its deliverance honestly reflected the views of nearly the entire Democratic people of the country, and very many Republicans were profoundly apprehensive that the declaration was only too true, but just when the convention had concluded its labors, the trained lightning flashed the news to Washington from Sherman saying: "Atlanta is ours, and fairly won." The loyal sentiment of the country was at once inspired, and the Democrats' delegates returning to their homes found every center of population illuminated at night and full of waving flags by day, as the people hurled back upon them their fierce resentment at the declaration of the failure of the war and at the demand for peace by compromise with rebellion. Sherman's victory at Atlanta was supplemented by Sheridan's victories in the Valley, and Sherman and Sheridan, and they alone, were the great campaigners who gave victory to Lincoln and to the Republican party in the great struggle of 1864.

On the morning after the October election the President telegraphed me to come to Washington, as the result in the State was humiliating in the extreme, when Ohio and Indiana, the other October States, had large Republican majorities. As my personal contest for the Legislature was ended, Lincoln asked me to join Cameron and co-operate with him in getting the State into position for the November election. He realized the fact that the friends of McClellan were greatly encouraged, and entirely confident that they would give the electoral vote of Pennsylvania to the one they



William D. Kelley.

esteemed as Pennsylvania's great soldier. I reminded Lincoln that I could not make such a proposition to Cameron, but that if Cameron desired it, I would be very glad to join him and give my entire time to the struggle. The day after my return home I received a letter from Cameron requesting me to join him, that had evidently been inspired by Lincoln himself, and I hastened to Cameron's headquarters at the Girard House, in Philadelphia, where I found Wayne MacVeagh, who had been Republican chairman the year before, and had also been sent for by Cameron, and whose political relations at that time with Cameron were about the same as my own.

Cameron was greatly distressed as he realized that he was to blame for having assumed that the battle would win itself. An address to the people of the State, that was written chiefly by MacVeagh, was signed by Cameron and sent out before the first conference ended, and I informed Cameron that I would remain in the city until the election and would be subject to his orders at any time to aid him in the contest. I took a room at the Continental, as it was necessary that everything should be done in open and frank recognition of Cameron as the head of the organization, and I advised Lincoln every night by letter of any changes in the situation. His election was not at that time in any degree doubtful, but the two most important States of the Union were admittedly trembling in the balance. New York had Seymour as Governor, and was so desperately contested by the Democrats that Lincoln carried the State only by 6,000 majority in a vote of 1,000,000. There was a reasonable possibility that McClellan might carry both Pennsylvania and New York, and although he could not even then approach an election, the failure of the two greatest of the Northern States to sustain the administration

would have seriously weakened the power of Lincoln in prosecuting the war and attaining peace.

It was of the utmost moment, therefore, that Pennsylvania should be saved and by the home vote, as the vote in the army would be decried as a bayonet vote and would not carry the moral effect of a victory attained independently of the army. It was an absolute necessity, alike in the interest of war and peace, that Lincoln should carry Pennsylvania on the home vote as New York was considered more than doubtful. So anxious was Lincoln about the vote of Pennsylvania that he sent Postmaster General Dennison to see me privately at the Continental and go over the situation. He came and spent several hours with me and then returned to Washington the same night, without having seen any other person in the city. Abundant means had been supplied to Cameron to organize the party in view of the adverse current presented, and he doubtless made the best possible use of it, but I had to tell Dennison that I saw no perceptible advantage that had been gained, as the Democrats were as earnest and active as we were, and had concentrated all their efforts to carry Pennsylvania for McClellan. I told him to say to the President that if matters did not materially improve in the next few days, I would visit him in Washington to confer on the subject.

Two days thereafter I telegraphed the President that I would see him that evening, and reached the White House about nine o'clock. I told him that I saw no reasonable prospect of carrying the State on the home vote. While the army vote would be reasonably certain to give the electoral vote of the State to Lincoln, the moral force of the victory would be seriously impaired. Lincoln was greatly distressed. He then expected to lose New York, and he felt that if Pennsylvania's home vote was in his favor, the power of his

administration would not be seriously impaired even with New York adverse to him. I told him that Pennsylvania could be saved by the home vote if he was prepared to do it, and that he could do it without any serious interference with army movements. By furloughing 5,000 Pennsylvania soldiers home from the Army of the Potomac, then besieging Petersburg, and 5,000 soldiers from Sheridan's forces in the Valley, where fighting had been ended by the repeated defeats of Earley, he would be certain to have a home majority in the State. I knew that he had saved Grant when Congress and the country demanded that Grant should be crucified for the battle of Shiloh, and suggested to him that of course Grant would be glad to furlough the soldiers upon any expression of the President's that he desired it done, but Lincoln, for some reason, hesitated to make such a communication to Grant. I then said to him that Meade was commander of the Army of the Potomac, a soldier and a gentleman, and that he certainly could send an order to him with the request that it be returned, and that the order would be obeyed. He did send a subordinate of the War Department that night to General Meade, who furloughed the 5,000 Pennsylvania soldiers home for the election, and permitted the order to be returned to the President. I asked him how it was with Sheridan, and Lincoln's face brightened up at once as he said: "Oh, Phil, he's all right." A like order went to Sheridan and 5,000 or more of his Pennsylvania soldiers came home to vote. The result was that Lincoln carried the State by 5,712 majority on the home vote, and that, with over 14,000 majority in the army, gave him the State by over 20,000.

Never was a State more earnestly contested than was Pennsylvania between the October and November elections; in 1864. McClellan was personally popular,

was a man of the loveliest attributes and was universally respected and generally beloved by all who knew him, while a large portion of the Democrats regarded him as the ideal soldier of the war. But for one grave political error that he committed the year before in the Curtin-Woodward campaign for Governor, I doubt whether he could have been defeated in the State by the home vote. Curtin had been his sincere friend, stood by him long after most of the Republicans had deserted him, and he had made earnest effort to have McClellan restored to the command of the Army of the Potomac when it was marching to Gettysburg, in which the leading business men of Philadelphia actively joined.

McClellan was then at his home in Orange, New Jersey, awaiting orders where he had been since he was relieved from the command of the army in the fall of 1862. He was doubtless sorely pressed to make a declaration in favor of Woodward and against Curtin, and he hesitated long about acceding to the demand, but finally, just on the eve of the election of 1863, he wrote to a prominent Democrat in Pennsylvania for publication a brief letter urging the election of Woodward. That certainly lost him more than enough votes in the State to have given him the home majority. McClellan was then in politics without political training, and his judgment and inclinations were overruled when he gave the deliverance against Curtin. Grant, who was then at the head of the army and owed his position entirely to Lincoln, was severely discreet, and never gave an utterance during the contest bearing in any degree on the Presidential issue, but when Lincoln was re-elected he promptly sent him a generous congratulation. Lincoln was somewhat grieved at Grant because he had given no utterance at all during the contest, and that was his reason for not sending to Grant

his order or request for the furlough of Pennsylvania troops at the October election.

I was much prejudiced against Grant when I found that Lincoln was unwilling to communicate his wishes to Grant while he did communicate with Meade. Some time after Grant's retirement from the Presidency I lunched with him at the invitation of Mr. Drexel and Mr. Childs, at Mr. Drexel's office, and in the course of conversation I led him back to that conflict and referred to the fact that he had been discreetly silent. Grant's answer, which was doubtless the honest truth, was that he certainly could not inject himself into a political contest between the President, who had assigned him to the command of the army, and the general whom he had succeeded in the army. There never was a candidate nominated for President by so enthusiastic and confident a party as that which nominated McClellan in Chicago, in 1864, who finally fell in such overwhelming and humiliating defeat, with a popular majority against him of nearly half a million, and receiving only twenty-one of the 233 electoral votes, from the States of Delaware, Kentucky and New Jersey.

LXVI.

THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG.

Chambersburg Destroyed by the Brutal Vandalism of Hunter in the Lynchburg Campaign—Its Destruction Made Possible by Hunter's Military Incompetency—Reports of McCausland's Movement from Mercersburg to Chambersburg—The Vandalism of Many Intoxicated Confederates While the Town Was Burning—A Heroic Woman Saves One of the Author's Houses and Barn—Chambersburg Could Have Been Fully Protected by the State Force Organized by Governor Curtin, but It Was Sent to the Potomac to Save Hunter.

NEXT to the battle of Gettysburg, the echoes of the most thrilling event of the Civil War in the North come from the burning of Chambersburg on the 30th of July, 1864, by a Confederate cavalry force under the command of General McCausland, and it is only in vindication of the truth of history that I state that the destruction of Chambersburg was chiefly, or wholly, provoked by the brutal vandalism of General Hunter in the Lynchburg campaign, and its execution was made possible by his military incompetency.

Hunter succeeded Sigel in command of the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1864, and was ordered by General Grant, then battling with Lee south of Spottsylvania, to advance upon Lynchburg and destroy the enemy's lines of communication and resources at that point. On the 5th of June General Hunter met a comparatively small force of the enemy at Piedmont, and defeated it, and after its retreat he formed a junction with Crook and Averill at Staunton and marched toward Lynchburg by way of Lexington, where he arrived on the 10th. Hunter lost his opportunity to

capture Lynchburg by his delay at Lexington, where he was guilty of many brutal acts of vandalism, such as the burning of the private residence of Governor Letcher, the Military Institute, and taking away or destroying memorable statues connected with the university founded by Washington and bearing his name. When Hunter arrived in front of Lynchburg, he found that General Earley had been ordered by Lee to make a forced march to meet him, and Earley occupied a position of such strength that Hunter declined to give battle. He explained that his failure to engage Earley for the capture of Lynchburg was his want of adequate ammunition, but if the statement is to be accepted as the true one, it simply proved the incompetency of a commander going into an enemy's country, so far from his base, with an army helpless for want of ammunition.

Hunter retreated along the Gauley and Kanawha Rivers to the Ohio, and returned to his base at Harper's Ferry by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. His circuitous retreat uncovered the valley, and enabled Earley not only to take possession of it, but to advance upon Washington, defeat General Lew Wallace at the Monocacy on the 9th of July, and compelled Grant to send Wright's corps from the Army of the Potomac to save the Capital. When Earley reached the outer defenses of Washington he found that General Wright was there with his corps, and that it was impossible for him to make a hopeful assault upon the Capital. He hastily fell back and reached Martinsburg with a vast train of supplies that had been gathered in his march. Hunter had arrived from the West when Earley reached Martinsburg, and he crossed the river and gave battle to Earley, but was defeated and compelled to recross the river and place his command in a defensive position between Hancock and Harper's Ferry. General

McCausland's cavalry brigade was on Earley's left, and General Averill's Union cavalry brigade on Hunter's right.

On the 28th of July General Earley directed McCausland to take his own mounted brigade and the cavalry brigade of General Bradley T. Johnson, numbering in all nearly 3,000 men, and proceed to Chambersburg, where he was ordered to levy a tribute of \$100,000 in gold or \$500,000 in United States currency, and to burn the town if the requisition was not responded to. On the 29th McCausland crossed the Potomac at Cherry Run and McCoy's Ford, and advanced by way of Clear Springs and Mercersburg upon Chambersburg. The people of the town were advised by telegrams from Mercersburg of the advance of McCausland's command, and a scene of indescribable confusion ensued. The money in banks and as much of the property in stores as could be gotten away were hurriedly shipped to distant points, but it was known that General Averill's command was somewhere near Hagerstown with railway communication, and General Couch, who was in command of the department with his headquarters at Chambersburg, confidently expected to have General Averill's force there before McCausland could arrive, if he continued his advance toward the town.

When McCausland started on his raid the enemy's division of Rhodes and Ramsler, and the cavalry brigade of Vaughan, crossed the river at Williamsport. Vaughan moved on as far as Hagerstown, Md. Averill was thus threatened on both flanks, and fell back into Pennsylvania, reaching Greencastle, only twelve miles from Chambersburg, by sundown of the day that McCausland marched from Mercersburg to Chambersburg. Averill's command could easily have been brought to Chambersburg in two or three hours.

When General Couch found that McCausland was continuing his march to Chambersburg, having passed through Mercersburg to the Pittsburg pike, he sent three urgent despatches to Averill, at Greencastle, which were given to Averill's own orderlies for immediate transmission to him, but to these Couch received no reply, and near daylight, when McCausland had his command in line on Federal Hill, where his guns commanded the town, Couch was compelled to hurry away in the last train held for the purpose, with his staff and a few orderlies, they being the only force he had in the place. He had a home guard in the town, of which I was a member, and we were sent out to picket the road along which McCausland was supposed to be advancing. As we were expected to hide in fence corners, I changed my dress for an old suit that could not be damaged by any amount of exposure, and left my watch, pocket-book, etc., in the bureau drawer at home. We remained out on the picket line for two or three hours, when General Couch sent word for us to return, as the enemy was approaching, and we should not be exposed to danger, as we could accomplish nothing.

I went directly to the headquarters of General Couch, and remained with him until early the next morning, when McCausland's command was within a few miles of Chambersburg. Couch had no force at Chambersburg beyond a little squad of less than twenty men under the command of an Irish corporal. They were sent out early in the day, and they advanced until they saw the signs of the enemy's approach, but they did not permit themselves to be seen, nor their presence made known to the enemy until after dark, when the gallant corporal so maneuvered his handful of men that McCausland supposed he was confronted by a regiment, and so stated in his official

report. The corporal knew the roads perfectly, and he had his men scattered, and every now and then fired as the enemy appeared to be approaching. So admirably did he manage his little force that McCausland was not able to advance between Mercersburg and Chambersburg any faster than two miles an hour. Toward daylight the corporal returned to headquarters and reported that the enemy's force was about 3,000, and was then within two miles of the town. As Couch could get no communication from General Averill, he was entirely helpless and notified his staff and the little band of men who had been fighting all night, that the train he had had in readiness for some time would leave in half an hour.

I had left my home the year before, when Lee's army came, because of reliable admonitions that I should avoid capture, but as this was only a raid that could, at the most, last for a few hours, as we hoped to have Averill come to our aid at any time, I refused General Couch's earnest appeal to accompany him, and started out to my home, only to find my wife and family much more concerned about getting me away than about the advance of the enemy. Couch sent a staff officer to my house renewing the appeal for me to leave, and just then a close friend drove up in front of my house in a buggy, stopped and insisted upon me going with him. I accepted his invitation, as I hoped to be able to return to Chambersburg the following day, and we drove to Shippensburg, but before noon we had the first reports from Chambersburg that the town was in flames and vandalism running riot. In the evening my wife and family joined me at Shippensburg and reported that only the family Bible had been saved from the house, as it was picked up by Mrs. McClure's mother as she took her departure, and an oil portrait of myself that hung in the parlor had

been hastily torn from the hook by Miss Reilley, who escaped with it through the back door.

The Rev. Dr. Niccolls, then pastor of the Chambersburg Presbyterian church, resided quite close to my home, and when he found the squad enter it he hastened to the house and gathered up a number of my clothes, but they were rudely taken from him and thrown into the fire. The work of burning the town was performed in the most hurried and brutal manner. Many of the command became wildly intoxicated from the liquors they found in the saloons and cellars, and while a large portion of the command revolted at the vandalism exhibited by many, they were powerless to prevent it, and for several hours the command was engaged in plundering and firing all the buildings in the center of the town. Bradley Johnson was the active commander, and he was most vindictive and merciless. He had left his home at Frederick, where he was a lawyer in good practice, to join the Confederacy, and when Lee's army marched through Frederick two years later, by Johnson's order his own home was burned, as he never expected to be able to occupy it again, and his lot was cast with the people who regarded all in the North as implacable foes.

Fortunately, this burning of Chambersburg occurred in daylight of a sunny midsummer day, and the sick and feeble were all removed from the peril of the flames. When the work of the destruction of the town had been well under way, two squads were ordered out to destroy the property that belonged to me on a farm at the edge of the town. Captain Smith, son of ex-Governor Smith, of Virginia, headed the squad that burned my residence and barn. Mrs. McClure was ill, but able to be about in her room; and Captain Smith himself entered her chamber and notified her that she must be out of the house within ten minutes. She asked

permission to take some valuable mementoes from the home, but it was rudely denied. She then reminded him that the same command, or part of it, had camped on the place under General Jenkins, who commanded the advance of Lee's army in the Gettysburg campaign, that the barn was their hospital, and that she herself ministered to them, and handed him a letter written to her by one of the sufferers when they moved toward Gettysburg; but in ten minutes both barn and house were enveloped in flames—the barn containing the entire crops from the large farm. Mrs. McClure and those with her walked several miles in the country, where they were finally taken charge of by a neighbor and driven to Shippensburg.

On the southern end of the farm there was a brick residence and small barn, and Colonel Gilmore, of Baltimore, commanded the squad that was ordered to destroy the buildings. He rushed into the house and found Mrs. Boyd and her two children at breakfast. They were rudely and peremptorily ordered to leave the house at once, as he had orders to burn it and could not delay for a minute. She asked permission to finish her breakfast, but it was refused. She was a woman of heroic mold, and the wife of one of the most gallant troopers of the border, Colonel Boyd, later known in Philadelphia as connected with the publication of our "City Directory." She arose from the table, bidding her children to prepare at once to leave, and while they were gathering their little belongings, she said to Colonel Gilmore: "Do you know whose house this is?" To which he answered: "Certainly, it is Colonel McClure's," and Mrs. Boyd replied: "The house belongs to him, but it is now the home of myself and children, and of my husband, Captain Boyd, of the Pennsylvania cavalry," to which she added that Colonel Gilmore could now proceed

to the destruction of the property. He at once lifted his hat and answered that he would not burn the home of so gallant a soldier, and he made a hurried retreat from the place.

Captain Boyd was the most notorious scouting trooper on the border, and his name was as familiar in Virginia as Moseby's was in Pennsylvania. Gilmore well knew that if he burned the home of Captain Boyd, a score or more of Virginia homes would pay the penalty. Fifty suburban houses were passed on the outskirts of the town by the squad of burners to reach my home and destroy it, and a like number of suburban houses were not disturbed by the Gilmore party that went to destroy the improvement at the southern end of the farm. At eleven o'clock in the morning McCausland received word from the scouts that Averill was approaching, and he gathered up his force hastily, and moved rapidly across the North Mountain into Fulton County. Averill reached Chambersburg a few hours after McCausland had left the town, and he pursued McCausland, finally brought him to bay after three days of pursuit and defeated and scattered his command. He found in the enemy's camp many of the valuables which had been taken from the homes of Chambersburg.

The actual losses sustained by the people of Chambersburg in the destruction of personal and real property were finally adjudicated by a State commission that gave \$1,628,431.58 as the aggregate value of individual property destroyed. Such a loss in a town of 4,000 population made up entirely of residences and business places, without any large manufacturing establishments, plunged the entire community into the starless midnight of despair. Many were at once hopelessly bankrupted, many more struggled to rebuild their homes and places of business at a time when

everything commanded inflated prices, and struggled for years to save themselves, but finally had to yield, as property depreciated while debts accumulated. The few who had wealth in country farms or securities could afford to rebuild their homes, but that number made up a very small percentage of the sufferers of the town.

The burning of Chambersburg would have been utterly impossible if the steps the State had taken, under Governor Curtin's earnest efforts to protect the border, had been allowed to serve their purpose. The Governor had a number of regiments organized solely for border defense within the State, but they were accepted in the military service of the government only on the very proper condition that in any emergency they should be subject to the orders of the government. More than enough of these regiments than would have been needed to defeat McCausland in Chambersburg passed through the town within a few days before its destruction to reinforce Hunter on the Potomac, as he was then threatened by Earley, and Averill, whose force alone would have been sufficient to protect the town, was not at his headquarters near Greencastle when the despatches reached there, but was finally found, when too late to be of any service, sleeping alone in a fence corner some distance from his command, and his orderlies did not know where to find him. He was a gallant soldier, had been making forced marches to save his own command that he supposed was threatened on one flank by Vaughan, and on the other by McCausland, and he never dreamed of McCausland making the raid by Mercersburg to Chambersburg. He was doubtless exhausted, and thought that the only duty he could have for immediate performance was to save his command from destruction.

I stated at the outset of this chapter that the destruc-

tion of Chambersburg was chiefly or wholly provoked by the vandalism of Hunter in his Lynchburg campaign, and that its execution was possible because of his incapacity. Already sufficient facts have been given in this statement to show that he was utterly incompetent to handle his army, not only up to the time when McCausland started on his raid, but if he had been equal to his important trust McCausland never would have been permitted to escape on any such mission. In his march through the Valley from Lexington to Lynchburg he had been guilty of the most flagrant violation of the rules of civilized warfare. He had burned the homes of Senator Hunter, of Charlestown, his own first cousin, and bearing the name of General Hunter's father; of Confederate Congressman A. R. Boteler, whose wife was a cousin of General Hunter; of Governor Letcher, then Governor of the State; of J. T. Anderson, connected with the great Tredegar Iron Works, in Richmond; of E. I. Lee, a leading private citizen of the State, and the Virginia Military Institute. All of these were grand old colonial homes, and they were destroyed without any warrant or even decent excuse whatever. In addition to these, many private homes were gutted by his troops, their contents wantonly destroyed, and the historic statues at Lexington were broken or taken away. Of course, he destroyed all the mills and factories on the line, as is common when a movement is made to impair the resources of an enemy, but from the time he started on his campaign until he was driven into retreat by a circuitous route, there were unmistakable marks of the most brutal vandalism along his entire track.

Early had driven Hunter from Lynchburg, where he retreated without accepting battle. With Lee's crippled condition in front of Grant, it was not possible

for Earley to remain on the Potomac, and he gave the order to McCausland to proceed to Chambersburg and demand a ransom sufficient to cover the private property wantonly destroyed by Hunter in his raid, or failing in that to inflict a like punishment upon Chambersburg.

General Earley, in a pamphlet published some time after the war, entitled "A Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independence by the Confederate States of America," speaking of the burning of Chambersburg, said: "For this act I alone am responsible, as the officers engaged in it were simply executing my orders and had no discretion left to them."

In the same paper he recites in detail many acts of vandalism committed by Hunter in Virginia without excuse or provocation, and adds that it was necessary to carry the same method of warfare into the North to insure the safety of homes and properties in the South.

While Earley does not give any special reasons for selecting Chambersburg on which to inflict this retribution, it was well known then that throughout the South it was believed that John Brown made his base in Chambersburg, where he planned his wild raid on Harper's Ferry in 1859, solely because the people of Chambersburg were in sympathy with him. It was a natural supposition, but entirely untrue. There was not a single citizen of Chambersburg who knew John Brown as John Brown, during the six weeks or two months he made that town his residence. He was known only as Dr. Smith, and not a single resident of the place had any suspicion of his real purpose, as he announced to all that he was planning important mineral developments in Virginia. I saw John Brown a score of times or more during his stay there, conversed with him on several occasions, and never doubted that

he was the man he represented himself to be; but the fact that Chambersburg was made his base created deep-seated prejudice in the South against the town, and it is more than probable that, but for the John Brown raid, Chambersburg might not have been decreed to crucifixion for General Hunter's vandalism and incompetency.

General Earley doubtless believed that he would halt the destruction of property in the South by the burning of Chambersburg, but from the 30th of July, 1864, until the close of the war, not a single State in the South, where our armies penetrated, entirely escaped fearful retribution for the destruction of the old Cumberland Valley town. On the slightest pretext the Union soldiers, then scattered all through the South, were urged to deeds of vandalism when some desperate leaders would give out the cry: "Remember Chambersburg." I met a Southern lady in Columbia five years after the war, whose home and all it contained were burned by Sherman's army. She told that the squad rushed into her home, ordered her to leave it, and to the cry: "Remember Chambersburg," applied the torch and left it in ashes; and a hundred Southern homes were destroyed for every half-score that were destroyed in Chambersburg. It was a costly retribution to Chambersburg, but it was a twenty-fold more costly retribution to the South. Fortunately, before another year had passed away peace came at Appomattox, and the inmates of Southern homes no longer shuddered at the cry: "Remember Chambersburg."

LXVII.

THE BORDER WAR CLAIMS.

James McDowell Sharpe and the Author Elected to the House to Secure Appropriation for the Desolated Town—How William H. Kemble Became State Treasurer—Debate on the Amendment to the Constitution Abolishing Slavery Forced Sharpe and the Author to Participate —Sharpe's Admirable Speech—Why the Relief Bill Failed—How the Appropriation of Half a Million Dollars Was Passed a Year Later.

THE McCausland raid that destroyed the beautiful town of Chambersburg was the last visitation the people of that section had from the opposing armies of our civil war. General Patterson's army, the first to march against the South in the Shenandoah Valley, in the early spring of 1861, encamped on my farm at Chambersburg, and made that his base for a week or more. That occupation saved me the trouble of harvesting luxuriant fields of clover and timothy, as all the fields in grass were occupied by the army and the crops destroyed. In 1862 General Stuart made the first great raid of the war around McClellan's army after the battle of Antietam, and spent the night in Chambersburg, as I have already fully described, leaving me minus ten horses. His raid was followed by what were always the most destructive military movements in our valley, with the single exception of the burning of Chambersburg, the invasion of the militia or emergency men, suddenly called out to protect the border, pitched together into companies and regiments without discipline, and hurriedly marched away without quartermaster or commissary resources. They practically lived on

the country, and they were necessarily very costly visitors.

In 1863 two-thirds of Lee's army had its base in Chambersburg for nearly a week, and Ewell's corps of over 20,000 men followed all previous military forces by camping on some 200 acres of level ground on my farm, with railroad on one side and water on the other. Lee's army, however, was under the strictest discipline, and Ewell's entire corps, or most of it, was on the farm for a week; and the officers occupied my residence, but they did much less damage than a single regiment of New York volunteers encamped on the same place, who were the first to reach Chambersburg after the battle of Gettysburg. The middle fences had then been destroyed by both armies, and the only crop that I was enabled to gather from the farm during the war was a bountiful harvest in 1864, that was entirely destroyed in the barn a few weeks after its harvesting.

The people of Chambersburg were left in a most destitute condition by the destruction of the town on the 30th of July, 1864. Nearly or quite two-thirds of the population were entirely homeless, without means and without the occupations which afforded them a livelihood. The people of the State responded very generously in sending supplies, but with more than 2,000 people entirely homeless and breadless there was often want in many family circles. I had a large corn and potato crop that had escaped the vengeance of McCausland, and as rapidly as these crops matured sufficiently for family use they were delivered from day to day to the sufferers until the last pound had gone, beyond a scant allowance for my own household. Unfortunately, we were then in the high tide of war inflation, when a dollar of current money bought no more than two-thirds its face value in labor or neces-

saries of life, but the business men who had means or credit hastily began the reconstruction of their homes and business places, costing them quite double what the properties commanded when many were forced to sell by the revulsion that followed.

The people were inspired by the hope that the Legislature would come to their relief to a very generous extent, and, as I have explained in a former chapter, J. McDowell Sharpe, who stood at the front of the Chambersburg bar, and myself had been elected to the house and charged with the responsible duty of obtaining relief for our people who were struggling in the ashes of their desolated homes. Sharpe and I, of course, had but a single purpose in shaping our legislative actions, and that was to successfully perform the paramount duty of obtaining relief for our neighbors. At the meeting of the Legislature on the first Tuesday of January, 1865, we agreed that we must subordinate all political efforts to the exceptionally grave duty imposed upon us; that we would take no part in political disputation; that our attitude on all legislative questions should be governed by the advantage we could command for the passage of the relief bill. The house was largely Republican, and of course Sharpe, being the leading Democrat of the body, was voiceless in shaping its organization; but Olmsted, of Potter, was made speaker without a contest by the Republican friends of the border claim giving him a united support. He was a man of the highest character, and all we asked of him was an entirely fair committee to pass upon our important measure, to which he readily assented and fulfilled his promise. He was not asked to pledge himself to support the bill, as such a proposition would have been offensive to one of his delicate appreciation of official pride, but we had the assurance of absolute fairness, and hoped to have him with us

when the struggle came, although his constituents were very generally against us.

Before the Legislature met distant portions of the State, which were at no time imperiled by the Civil War, were inflamed to a considerable degree against our relief bill by the united efforts of demagogues and lobbyists. It must be remembered that at that day the sum of \$500,000 to be taken from the treasury for appropriation outside of the ordinary expenses of the State was a startling proposition, and candidates for the Legislature in very many of the districts openly pledged themselves against what they called the border raid bill, to secure their election in doubtful districts, or to assure their renominations where elections were not doubtful. The entire northern tier of counties, then almost wholly agricultural, and where extreme frugality was the rule of the every-day lives of the people, were appalled by the proposition to take half a million dollars from the treasury of the State. Their farms were then taxed to support the Commonwealth, and \$500,000 at that time seemed to be a vastly greater sum than \$5,000,000 would seem to-day.

Pittsburg was then in the violent throes of the railroad repudiation struggle that convulsed the people of Allegheny for many years, and their legislators had little sympathy with their brethren from the southern border, because their revolutionary movement had commanded little sympathy or support from any portion of the State east of the Alleghenies. Thus, a large portion of the members of the Legislature appeared at Harrisburg strongly prejudiced against any important border relief bill because of political or local interests, and the professional lobbyists of the State, who then embraced a number of able and unscrupulous men, aided systematically in prejudicing legislators against our measure, hoping to obtain a large

corruption fund to be used by them in securing votes for the bill, with large profits to the lobbyists themselves. When we appeared at Harrisburg to inaugurate the struggle for the relief of Chambersburg, we were amazed to learn that a decided majority of the house was not only not in sympathy with us, but positively against us, and many of the members very aggressively so.


It was this condition that brought into political prominence William H. Kemble, as he was made State treasurer by a combination between his Philadelphia friends and the organized supporters of the relief bill. I had known Kemble in a casual way for several years, but never had opportunity to know him beyond the flippant surface that he so often maintained, hiding his very strong natural abilities from all but those who knew him most intimately. We had some twenty Republican members of the house who immediately represented the border people, or who were sufficiently interested in the work of furnishing relief, to make them cordially co-operate with any movement deemed necessary to promote the passage of a liberal appropriation. Philadelphia representatives were nearly all Republican, and they had been thoroughly organized to make battle for the election of Kemble as State treasurer. His competitor was Dr. Gross, of Allegheny, who had served several sessions in the house, was a man of the highest character, of admitted ability, and universally respected by all who knew him. Under ordinary circumstances he would have been nominated for State treasurer, and would have filled the office with great credit, but the proposition came to us to give the support of the Republican representatives of Philadelphia for the border relief bill if we would unite with them to make Kemble State treasurer.

The proposition was first made to me by ex-Representative Thorne, with whom I had served in the house some years, and who was a devoted personal friend. He came to Chambersburg and made the proposition that a combination be made between the border and Philadelphia Republicans to make Kemble treasurer and to pass the relief bill. I was greatly surprised when he named Kemble as his candidate, as I had only the merest superficial knowledge of the man, and when he first told me that the Philadelphians were unitedly and earnestly for him, and that we could not expect a general or cordial support for our relief bill from Philadelphia without the border people supporting him, my answer was: "Well, if you people can stand it, I can," and the combination was made and carried out with absolute fidelity on both sides. But for this alliance with Philadelphia the Chambersburg relief bill never would have been permitted to appear even on the house calendar.

I learned to know Kemble better after he came into the office of State treasurer, and to appreciate his exceptionally great qualities. He was at times impulsive and indiscreet, but he discharged his official duties with great fidelity, and he started the important tax reform relieving the farmers of the State entirely from taxation for State purposes and imposing it upon the then rapidly developing corporations. He became a recognized leader not only in State politics, but in finance, and was the chief author of the pecuniary success attained by our various city passenger railways. He was the best equipped man in passenger railway business not only in Philadelphia, but in any other section of the country, and he was unfaltering in his fidelity to personal or political friendships. He was twice re-elected State treasurer by the Legislature, and left the office at the expiration of three years with the

credit of the State fully restored, and our general financial condition immeasurably improved.

Never did two men more earnestly struggle for the relief of their constituents than did Sharpe and myself at that session of the Legislature, but before a month of the session had passed it became obvious to us that success was not within the range of possibility. The measure was assailed by a large number of the rural newspapers, and the powerfully organized lobbyists who then clustered about legislative sessions were aggressively hostile because there was nothing in it for them. Sharpe and I made every combination within range to aid or hinder legislation if thereby there was a promise made for our single cause. Political disputation ran high in both senate and house, but we were stubbornly silent. As Sharpe was altogether the ablest member of the Democratic minority, his political friends complained somewhat that he was never heard in the political scraps that so often happened in which he would have been their ablest champion. Finally we reached the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States for the abolishment of slavery, and the debate on it was altogether the most embittered of the session. Just when it was at the high-water mark of partisan frenzy, the Democrats demanded that Sharpe should be heard, and I had been also urged to participate in the debate on the other side. I saw that the Democrats, where we had our largest support for the relief bill outside of Philadelphia members, were determined to have Sharpe speak, and I passed over to his seat and proposed that I would take the floor in support of the anti-slavery amendment, and that he should follow; that we would both deliver dignified addresses which would not be likely to call out violent interruption or criticism, and that after the delivery of the speeches we would then



J. McDouall Sharp

resume our attitude of absolute refusal to participate in political discussion. It soon became known that Sharpe and I had taken a temporary release from our bondage on political discussion, and, as the subject had already crowded the house with interested spectators, the senate soon adjourned for want of a quorum, and the Governor and heads of departments and senators crowded into the hail. Sharpe's speech, although entirely spontaneous, was the ablest political address I ever heard him deliver, and his friends were greatly gratified. He was thoroughly familiar with the subject, as he had discussed the question very fully time and again on the stump, and he rose to the highest measure of his great ability on the sudden inspiration of a party call that he knew demanded of him an argument fully worthy of himself. He was one of the few members of the bar who presented the uncommon quality of perfectly blending all the attributes of a great lawyer with all the attributes of a brilliant advocate, and he was one of the gentlest and most lovable of men.

Hopeless as was the position of the Chambersburg measure, we could only struggle to the end, although it was during the last month of the session, simply the struggle of despair, and the Legislature finally adjourned without any appropriation whatever for the relief of the impoverished people of the burned town. While the leading men of Chambersburg were fully advised of the progress of the battle, and knew that the defeat of the bill was inevitable, the majority of the people in their extreme necessities, struggling like the drowning man grasping at the straw, hoped even against hope that they would not be entirely abandoned by the State, and when the Legislature finally adjourned without even seriously considering the relief measure their disappointment was as terrible as it was

general. Sharpe and I were in constant intercourse with the leading men of the town, and they knew long before the session ended that \$500,000 could not be taken from the treasury of the State, even for the most deserving charity, without passing through the slimy embrace of a powerful and unscrupulous lobby. There were many conferences after the adjournment of the Legislature between the active citizens of the town, which Sharpe and I attended, and we both stated frankly that the appropriation that was absolutely indispensable to Chambersburg could not be obtained by any combination of personal or political interests, and that it could be accomplished only by yielding to corruption that was then largely asserting its mastery in Pennsylvania politics, and especially in legislation; and it was finally definitely decided to organize a movement at once to obtain the appropriation from the succeeding Legislature, and a dozen or more of those who had sustained the heaviest losses, and who, as a rule, could best afford to dispense with relief, should give their entire portion of the appropriation to promote its passage. The result was that new men were sent to the Legislature, and the battle for the relief of Chambersburg was made outside of the legislative halls. The measure passed both branches of the Legislature and was approved by Governor Curtin, and thus half a million came at last to the relief of the long-despairing sufferers of Chambersburg, less a considerable sum that was filched from them by lobby extortion and Legislative venality.

A number of the heaviest losers did not receive one dollar, and I not only received no part of mine, which was the largest claim in the entire list, but in a severe emergency in the progress of the conflict I gave \$2,500 in addition, not a dollar of which was ever repaid, or expected to be repaid; but with all these resources,

we were unable to meet the ever-increasing demand of organized corruption. Finally I presented the matter to Colonel Scott, then vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, who was a native of Franklin County, and had great affection for the people of the desolated town. He understood the situation at a glance, knew the forces which surrounded and the obstacles which confronted it, and he gave a peremptory order to his representative at Harrisburg to pass the Chambersburg relief bill under any and all circumstances. But for his timely and most generous interposition and substantial aid, the relief bill would not have reached final passage. Beyond half a dozen men, who participated in the inner movements of the struggle, the people of Chambersburg received the liberal appropriation of the State without ever having heard the name of Colonel Scott mentioned as their chief benefactor.

I should not have given any part of the inner story of the passage of the Chambersburg relief bill, but for the fact that it seems to be a necessity to maintain the truth of history, and in some future chapter I must discuss the question of corruption in Pennsylvania politics, especially in Pennsylvania legislation. I have given the facts in relation to the relief bill because it was an imperious necessity that the relief should be obtained, and a like imperious necessity that some should assume the responsibility of submitting to the demands of corruptionists to give success to a measure that was a naked charity. I served in nine sessions of the two branches of the Legislature, covering a period of sixteen years, and during the time that Legislative venality reached its high-water mark. I do not mean that Pennsylvania politics are any less corrupt now than they were then, but I think it is due to truth to say that the general individual venality in legislation these days does not approach the measure of venality

that obtained during a portion of the time in which I served in the Legislature.

There was then no such thing known as the power of party leaders to pass or defeat measures of legislation which were not political, and venality became so general because of the vast power of the Legislature to promote individual and corrupt interests by special legislation under the old Constitution. Private legislation was practically ended by the Constitution of 1874, and petty venality that had become so general under the former Constitution was largely dethroned. Now, measures of individual profit are scaled on an immense basis; they are passed or defeated in our Pennsylvania Legislature largely or wholly as party leaders command, and the petty Legislative speculations of a few hundreds of dollars which were common in early times have now given way to colossal speculations by political leaders, and a small portion of the profits is gradually filtered down to the followers to enable them to keep their positions. It is a sorry chapter to appear in the annals of our great Commonwealth, but the history of our political, industrial and financial achievements would be incomplete with its omission.

LXVIII.

THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF 1865.

Chambersburg's Midnight Jubilee over the Surrender of Lee—The Long Strained Border People Had Peace at Last—Peculiar Political Conditions—How Cameron Lost His Candidate for Auditor General by His Struggle to Obtain Control of the Party Organization—Senator Heistand Defeated When He Expected a Unanimous Nomination—Hartranft Suddenly Forced to the Front—The Organization for Chairmanship of the Republican State Committee Taken from the President of the Convention by Resolution of Stevens—A Sluggish Battle Resulting in the Success of the Republican Ticket.

THE darkest hour is sometimes just before the break of day, and the people of smitten Chambersburg realized the truth of the adage within a week or ten days after the adjournment of the Legislature that had refused them any measure of relief, leaving them to struggle with despair. About midnight on the 9th of April, 1865, when the sorely-depressed people of Chambersburg were at rest, many of them in hastily-improvised homes, the bell of the courthouse that had been hastily rebuilt awaked the community from its slumbers as it rang out its loudest tones. The ringing was continued for a considerable time, and in a little while the bells of churches, which had escaped the torch of the vandal, joined in the welcome music. It was known to all that there was then no immediate danger of a raid from the enemy, and all understood that some cheerful news had come to the desolated town.

I was waked from sleep in the little cottage formerly occupied by a colored house servant, that Captain Smith, in his haste, had neglected to burn. My first

impression was that shared by nearly all when the first toll of the bell was heard, that some new danger threatened, but very little reflection made me understand that there could be no immediate peril to the community, and that the bells were ringing out the proclamation of some achievement toward peace. After a hurried and imperfect toilet I hastened toward the town and first heard the echo of cheers from the center of the village, and as I approached nearer I was finally enabled to distinguish the shouts which mingled with the cheers of the people, announcing that Lee had surrendered. The trained lightning had flashed the same message from Eastern to Western sea, and there was universal rejoicing throughout the entire loyal brotherhood of people, but in no one community was the news so profoundly appreciated, or so wildly welcomed, as in Chambersburg and its beautiful and bountiful surroundings on the border.

— For four long years the people of Franklin County had been under the severe strain of border warfare. They had been raided in 1862 by Stuart, in 1863 by Jenkins, in 1864 by McCausland, who had levelled Chambersburg to ashes, and in addition Lee's army occupied the county for some days before the battle of Gettysburg. There was no time during those four years when Moseby, or any like commander of Southern raiders, could not have penetrated even as far north as Chambersburg in a single night, excepting only in the dead of winter. The people had not only suffered from actual raids, but by the appropriation of property alike by Union and Southern soldiers, and there was rarely a month during any of the four summers when they were not under the exhausting strain of apprehension of raids or invasion from the South. To these long-suffering people, who had not only given their full quota of their fathers and sons to join in the flame of

battle for the Union, but had suffered constant waste and terrible anxiety, the surrender of Lee meant more than peace to the nation, and the final triumph of the Union cause; it meant to them peace in their homes, protection against robbery, and safety in the pursuit of their daily avocations.

I have many times seen aggregations of people express enthusiastic delight, but never before nor since have I witnessed a mass of people express such whole-souled gratification. Not only those who rent the air with their cheers, and the many enthusiasts who shook hands and embraced each other in the fervor of their joy, but there were other hundreds of men and women whose mute but expressive eloquence told the story that at last relief had come to the long-fretted and plundered people. To them it was not only peace to State and Nation, but it was rest in the homes which had long been racked by constant apprehension. All who were able to leave their beds were on the street, and remained there until the light of another day broke in the east as the sun arose to shine upon the liberated people.

The surrender of Lee that was soon followed by the surrender of Johnston, and later by every organized Confederate command in the field, at once brought the people of the North to face the new grave problems which confronted them. The North had overthrown the military power of the Confederacy, and the Confederacy itself was hopelessly destroyed, with its chief executive a prisoner at Fortress Monroe. General Grant, with all his heroic record, exhibited the highest heroism of his life when he dictated the generous terms on which the surrender of Lee's army was accepted. He was severely criticised by the more radical element of the Republican party, but the people of the country very soon learned to appreciate how grandly Grant had

vindicated himself, and how, in defiance of well-known views of the cabinet, he had opened the door wide for the return of peace by paroling General Lee and all the officers of his army, under the solemn assurance that they could return to their homes and remain unmolested as long as they obeyed the laws of the government in force in their respective localities.

This condition, for which Grant was alone responsible, made it impossible for the government, without violating its solemnly plighted faith, to persecute or punish any of the officers in Lee's army; and some months later, when President Johnson, in the floodtide of his vindictive assaults upon the South after he became President, decided to inflict some punishment upon Lee and other officers, Grant, then the General of the army, notified the President that he would be guilty of an act of dishonor in violating any of the terms of Lee's surrender, and stated distinctly that if the President attempted it the General could no longer, with self-respect, hold a commission in the army of the United States. That position assumed by General Grant, and that alone, saved Johnson from adding to his many other follies the prosecution of Lee's paroled officers and other Confederate generals. While all in the North had been for several years discussing the basis of peace with little agreement of public sentiment, Grant solved the problem himself by teaching the Nation that the way to peace was by the highest measure of magnanimity to the vanquished. I honor Grant more for what he did at Appomattox than for any military achievement of his life. He not only heroically blazed the way to peace, but his first thought after signing the surrender with Lee, and voluntarily issuing an order for all of Lee's exhausted heroes to be bountifully fed from the Union commissary stores, made him hurriedly start to Washington to take the promptest



John Cessna

measures for the reduction of the army to halt the appalling expenses of the war.

With all the enormous taxes gathered from the people to support the war; with the lavish expenditure for bounties that loaded not only cities and counties but townships with enormous debt, the debt of the nation was over two billions, and there were few, indeed, at that day who were hopeful that the National credit could be maintained. The government bonds were payable in coin, and silver was at a premium over gold, while in all the transactions of every-day life among the people the currency of the nation was accepted as a legal tender enforced by law, when a dollar of the lawful money of the country did not purchase two-thirds of its face value in the necessaries of life. Had President Johnson at once planted himself on a peace platform with Grant after he had waded into the Presidency through the tears of a bereaved nation, there would have been less disturbance and uncertainty in the North, but he started out to pursue the leading men of the South most vindictively. He proclaimed Davis and others as assassins of President Lincoln, and his whole policy seemed to have but one aim and that to plunge the two sections, at the close of the war, into an aftermath of even more fiendish hatred and brutality than war itself had given. Fortunately, he changed his attitude before the summer ended, but, like the violently-swung pendulum that had gone beyond its normal point, the swing of vengeance naturally exceeded the normal point of generous peace in its rebound.

These conditions brought the Republican leaders of Pennsylvania to a sober realization of the new duties which had come upon the party. We had a National administration that was ostensibly Republican, and yet the new President had already taken two positions

on the question of adjustment with the South so violently extreme and so violently opposing each other that the party was placed in a very embarrassing condition when the State convention of 1865 met at Harrisburg to nominate candidates for auditor general and surveyor general. The incumbents of those offices were Democrats, having been elected in the Republican break of 1862, caused chiefly by the Emancipation Proclamation, but neither Auditor General Slenker nor Surveyor General Barr was a candidate for renomination. The Democrats were greatly encouraged by the varying radical policies of the President, and at the time their convention met they were hopeful, and with good reason, that Johnson would gradually, and at an early day, develop into a full-fledged Democratic President. They placed at the head of their ticket for auditor general the gallant Democratic soldier, General Davis, of Doylestown, who was not only distinguished as a soldier, but a gentleman of the highest character and admirable personal qualities. For surveyor general they nominated John Linton, of Cambria, who had been a Whig in the earlier days, and unusually strong in the interior of the State, and they made an earnest battle; but public sentiment was easily aroused against placing the Democrats in power to make peace after four years of war, whose policy they had so generally opposed, and General Davis was defeated by over 20,000.

The Republicans had every indication of a very peaceful convention. John A. Heistand, of Lancaster, then editor of one of the leading inland Republican papers of the State, who had served in both house and senate, was a candidate for auditor general. He was ranked as a supporter of General Cameron, but while he faithfully followed Cameron in every emergency that called for a rally of Cameron's friends, he maintained

very friendly relations with Governor Curtin, and nearly or quite all the men around him. He knew that the friends of Curtin would be likely to control the convention, and he personally visited Curtin and others closely connected with him and appealed to them to assent to his nomination for auditor general and have the party with a united front and a candidate who would not be presented to the people by a faction. He was a jolly, genial fellow, was personally liked by all who knew him, and some time before the meeting of the convention Curtin and his people had all assented to the nomination of Heistand for auditor general.

The convention was composed of a number of the ablest of the Republican leaders, including Thaddeus Stevens, who had consented to come as a delegate for Heistand; General Todd, of Carlisle, who was one of the ablest and boldest of leaders in the fight; John Cessna, of Bedford, ex-Democratic speaker, with many others of much more than ordinary ability and influence. The convention was known to have a decided majority of delegates who were friends of Curtin, but as there was to be no contest on the nomination of Heistand, a follower of Cameron, for auditor general, it was accepted all around that there was little or nothing to do beyond the formality of making nominations. The morning session of the convention was devoted to the appointment of committees for permanent organization, resolutions, etc., and after a brief session adjourned to meet in the afternoon.

Before the meeting of the afternoon session it became whispered around that Cameron, not content with getting the head of the ticket from the Curtin convention, had manipulated the committee on permanent organization by compelling Heistand to give his two members of the committee from Lancaster County to the Cameron side, and thus nominate Johnson, a

prominent and aggressive friend of Cameron, for president of the convention. Inquiry was at once made, and we ascertained that Cameron had forced Heistand to transfer the committeemen from his own county against their wishes to the Cameron candidate for president, and a murmur of indignation swelled up at once throughout the whole Curtin ranks, as Cessna was expected to be named without a contest. A hasty conference was called in which Stevens participated, as he felt that the transfer of the committeemen from his own county under Cameron's order was an outrage not to be pardoned, and we decided that instead of defeating the Cameron candidate for president of the convention, as we could have done, we would give him a unanimous election, and then when he entered the chair, and was presumably in possession of the power of the convention, we would publicly impale him.

When Heistand was reproached for his perfidy to the Curtin people, he could do no more nor less than to admit that Cameron had demanded it of him, and in less than an hour the convention that was to nominate Heistand for auditor general unanimously, organized to defeat him, and then to strip the president of the convention of his power to appoint the chairman of the State committee. Stevens said that he would obey his instructions and vote for the nomination of Heistand, but insisted that he had committed an outrage that should be resented, and he participated in the conference that decided who should be presented to defeat Heistand, and how it should be done. Cameron's purpose in forcing Heistand to betray his Curtin friends in the selection of the president of the convention was to be able to name the chairman of the State committee, either for himself or for some one who would be distinctly in his interest, and with a Cameron man at the head of the ticket, a Cameron man president of

the convention, and a Cameron man chairman of the State committee, he would present the appearance of omnipotence in the State.

I was one of three men assigned to the duty of conferring with General Hartranft, who was present at the convention, but not a delegate, to ask him to accept a nomination for auditor general. I might here say that at that time General Hartranft was regarded by Curtin and his friends as their candidate for Governor the following year, 1866, and Hartranft, of course, had no thought of being auditor general, and reluctantly accepted it; but as the men who urged him to accept were the men upon whom he depended for the gubernatorial nomination, he finally yielded to their importunities, and agreed that his name should be presented to the convention if we thought it best to do so.

It was known that the Democrats would present General Davis, a distinguished soldier, for the office, and it was arranged that General Todd, who had a good military record, and who was a most eloquent champion of any cause he supported, should present the name of Hartranft to the convention, and demand his nomination as a matter of justice to the gallant soldiers of Pennsylvania. John Cessna, who had been a Democrat, legislator and speaker of the house, and who had been slaughtered by Heistand, followed Todd in support of the soldier candidate, and several other able like appeals were made; and when the first ballot was footed up, Heistand was dumfounded to discover that he was largely defeated by Hartranft, who had been sprung upon the convention just on the spur of the moment. The convention made its record consistent by nominating General J. M. Campbell, another gallant soldier, for surveyor general, thus presenting a solid soldier ticket of candidates exceptionally strong.

After the nominations had been made the work of

the convention was about to conclude, and Stevens rose in his place and offered a resolution that John Cessna be appointed chairman of the Republican State committee. The Cameron leaders at once saw that they had not only defeated themselves in the convention for auditor general, but that their control of the president of the body was to bring them nothing but humiliation. They vainly urged that it was the immemorial custom of the party to have the president of the convention appoint the chairman of the State committee in consultation with the candidates on the State ticket, but it was answered that the president of the convention of 1864 had appointed the chairman of the State committee against the expressed wishes of nearly three-fourths of the members of the body. It was a hopeless fight for the already-defeated supporters of Cameron, and the resolution was carried by a decided majority. Cameron not only thus lost his candidate for auditor general, who would have been accepted by the Curtin people, but he had an aggressive anti-Cameron man placed at the head of the organization, instead of one reasonably acceptable to both sides, as would have been done if Heistand had not been compelled to violate his faith with his Curtin friends and defeat himself.

It was a most unexpected and humiliating defeat for Heistand, but he realized that he had been forced wantonly to provoke the battle that unhorsed him. He was popular with his people, who later sent him to Congress for two terms, and closed his official career as naval officer of Philadelphia, a position with liberal salary and little or nothing to do. He enjoyed the navy office immensely, and frequently gave high encomiums to the genius of Alexander Hamilton, who had created one honorable and lucrative office with limited duties, which could be performed wholly by

assistants. Like many others, as age grew upon him he did not appreciate the celerity with which business conditions were advancing about him, and that journalism was a most exacting mistress, and he went on in the good old quiet way until others outstripped him in his calling. Then broken health came; his life-work was finished, and green memories come back to many in the gentle whispers from the tomb.

LXIX.

GEARY NOMINATED FOR GOVERNOR.

Cameron's First Complete Control of the Republican Organization of the State—Geary Bitterly Opposed by Prominent Republicans Because He Had Been Willing to Accept the Democratic Nomination—Quay and Tom Marshall Among the Foremost Belligerents—Geary Visits the Author After His Nomination—All Personal and Factional Interests Forgotten to Elect Geary to Rebuke President Johnson's Apostacy—Clymer, the Democratic Candidate, Made a Gallant Struggle and Fell in the Race—Interesting Sequel to Geary's Pledges to the Author.

WHILE the Republican victory of 1865 appeared to anchor Pennsylvania safely in the Republican column, the new political conditions which suddenly confronted the Republicans in 1866 threw a serious element of doubt into the important battle of that year that involved the election of a Governor. President Johnson had adopted a reconstruction policy of his own, and attempted to enforce it by the most violent and proscriptive political methods. Had it been merely a liberal reconstruction policy the Republicans could have been brought into its support, but his reconstructed Southern States, many of which elected governors, senators, congressmen and legislatures, adopted such harsh measures in the treatment of the emancipated slaves that Republican sentiment generally revolted against the whole scheme.

As Johnson had been in the Presidential office for a year or more with nearly three years to wield the enormous power and patronage of the Government, he was an important political factor. The list of Federal officials in the State had been largely increased by the



A very faint, light-colored portrait of a man, likely Thomas M. Marshall, is visible in the upper half of the page. The image is a sketch or a very light print, showing the man's head and shoulders. He has dark hair and is wearing a suit jacket and a tie. The portrait is centered horizontally.

Thomas M. Marshall

necessities of war, and while all of them were originally Republicans, most of them were tempered into submission to the policy of the administration or passive approval. Johnson's policy appealed rather forcefully to the old war Democrats, who, while they ardently supported the Government on the question of defeating rebellion by military power, as a rule they had little sympathy with radical Republican views and aims. This political confusion presented an inviting field for the consummate political genius and energy of General Cameron. He kept himself in close touch with President Johnson and soon became known as an important power in disposing of the President's patronage in the State. This power enabled him to wield considerable influence outside of his own formidable personal strength, in his struggle for the control of the State convention, and he won out completely.

I was a delegate to the convention, as were Colonel Mann, Colonel Quay, Tom Marshall, Senator Finney, Senator Ketchum and a number of other active Curtin men, and we were greatly surprised to learn, when the convention met, that it was absolutely a Cameron assembly. He had, for the first time, won absolute mastery of the Republican State convention and the organization, and his candidate for Governor was General Geary, who was specially objectionable to the men I have named and many others, because, within three months of the meeting of the convention, he had written a letter to Mr. Maguire that was given to the public, assenting to the use of his name as a Democratic candidate for the same office.

The Curtin men had no special candidate for Governor. General Hartranft, whom they had expected to make their candidate in 1866, had been forced to accept the nomination for auditor general in 1865, and he was more than willing to remain in the auditor gen-

eral's office instead of taking the chances of the gubernatorial nomination and election. So general was the confusion in Republican circles throughout the State, because of the friction between the President and the party, that grave apprehensions were entertained as to party success, and Cameron alone understood the exact character of the convention before it convened. He had not only won the convention and named the candidate for Governor, who was nominated and elected, but his purpose was for the convention to give either a direct or a quasi endorsement of the Johnson administration. Cameron believed that the party could be held intact even on such a platform and that he would thus have all the influence and patronage of the President to aid in his struggle for re-election to the Senate.

Many conferences were held to form a combination by which a candidate for Governor could be presented with sufficient strength to defeat Geary, but the Cameron lines were invincible. The proposition to give some form of endorsement to the administration of President Johnson was not developed until the convention met, and it had not been previously discussed in any section of the State. It startled the active men of the convention who were opposed to Cameron, and the final conference was held in my room the night before the convention met, attended by some thirty prominent members of the body, and after very careful review of the situation we decided that formal notice should be given to General Cameron early the next morning that if the convention in any degree endorsed the administration of President Johnson a large minority of the delegates would immediately retire, organize a Republican convention and nominate a Republican candidate for Governor.

One of the most active and earnest of the men in this

movement was Colonel Quay, and he and Ketchum, of Luzerne, were charged with the mission of calling upon Cameron and informing him of the action taken at the conference. They waited upon Cameron early the next morning, notified him of the action of the conference, and Cameron at once abandoned any endorsement of Johnson, and gave the assurance that it would not be attempted, although he believed that it would be good policy for the convention to do so.

When the convention met the proceedings at once exhibited unusual bitterness on the part of the minority, and at every stage of the two sessions of the body the discussions were quite acrimonious. Tom Marshall was irrepressible, and he sent his pungent broadsides into the majority with all his grand eloquence and vehemence. I was suffering from chills and fever, and I do not recall many very amiable expressions from me in the various spats we had as the work of the convention progressed. I followed Marshall, who had poured out a torrent of protest against nominating as the Republican candidate for Governor one who had a few weeks before declared his willingness to accept the Democratic nomination for the same office, and I did not conceal my distrust of a candidate whose political opinions were so loosely worn.

Geary was evidently much disturbed by the aggressive attitude of those who opposed his nomination. He called at my room at nine o'clock the next morning, where I was detained in bed by a chill, to set himself right on the question of fidelity to the party. He gave the most positive assurances that if elected Governor he would not only make a straightforward Republican administration, but that it should be free from the influence of faction. I told him frankly that I did not have abiding faith in his fidelity to the Republican cause, but that he need give himself no concern as to

the action of the minority members of the convention, as they would heartily support him, because his election was an absolute necessity to secure to the country the legitimate fruits of the civil war that had been fought for the maintenance of the Union.

I did not tell him that at the conference held in my room the night before there was a strong disposition exhibited by a number of the parties present to openly revolt against the nomination. The question had been considered very fully, and Quay took the lead in declaring that the party could not survive the domination that Geary's election would bring, and he was most urgent in favoring revolutionary action; but better counsels prevailed, which finally decided that it was necessary for the Republicans to carry the State regardless of the candidate for Governor, and of any personal domination that might rule, as if the Democrats carried the State the reconstruction policy of President Johnson would be greatly strengthened and might be finally accomplished. Geary and I parted with our attitudes toward each other very well understood. He knew that I would heartily support him for reasons in no way relating to the candidate, and with that he was quite satisfied. He also knew that I distrusted his assurances that he would make a Republican administration and administer it on a plane above all factional interests, and as he never intended to give such an administration both of us knew that nobody was cheated.

Although the election of Geary meant a State administration with which I was likely to have little sympathy and no influence whatever, I gave nearly my whole time to the campaign, speaking with Geary at the opening of the battle at Shippensburg and responding to the request of the State committee to go to different sections of the State until the conflict was

ended. I regarded it as a most important political contest that was to settle, once for all, whether the logical fruits of the war for which so much blood and treasure had been given should be realized by the North. It is probable that the Republican Congress would have had the same conflict with Johnson if Pennsylvania had voted Democratic in 1866, but that struggle was the crucial test of the willingness of the loyal States of the North to accept a policy of reconstruction that restored to full authority in the rebellious States those who had battled to destroy the Union, and who, in their efforts at reconstruction, had made the condition of the emancipated slaves even worse than it was in the state of slavery.

As the campaign progressed the people who had supported the war and who had given the lives of their fathers, sons and brothers with countless treasure to save the Union, were brought to a very sober appreciation of the great issue involved, and next to the campaign of 1863, when Curtin was re-elected, it was the most sober and earnest contest I have ever witnessed in the State. Geary, Cameron and Curtin and every personal interest were practically forgotten as the Republican people came face to face with what they regarded as the final verdict to be given by the great State for gathering the fruits which ripened at Appomattox. I had no personal interest in political affairs, having peremptorily declined to be a candidate for Congress, and confidently expecting not again to be a candidate for any political office, as broken fortune and an impoverished community that justly claimed my sympathy and aid made me most desirous to devote my whole time and efforts to private business affairs.

The Democrats nominated Heister Clymer, of Berks, as their candidate for Governor, and he made a very

able and aggressive campaign. He was an accomplished and impressive popular speaker, with graceful manners, and one of the most genial and generally delightful of the many men I have met in legislative duties. We had served together in the senate, and while always on opposing political lines our personal friendship was never even strained in the many impassioned conflicts we had during the war. I would gladly have welcomed him as the Governor of the State had it been possible to do so without a sacrifice that could not be measured in its far-reaching results in shaping the reconstruction of the dismembered States. He fought his battle boldly in support of the reconstruction policy of President Johnson, and until within a few weeks of the election he was confident that the Republican ranks would be sufficiently broken by the power of the National administration to enable him to succeed. He was heard in every section of the State, and certainly much to his advantage, and as the time for action came and the people of Pennsylvania were to decide on the question of the full fruition of the issue settled by the arbitrament of the sword, all individual, factional and partisan interests were entirely effaced by the paramount question that was squarely before the people, and demanded solemn and final judgment. Geary was elected by 17,178 majority, being some 5,000 less than the Republican majority of the previous year.

Clymer was highly appreciated by the Democracy of Berks, and after his defeat for Governor he was chosen, practically without opposition, to four consecutive terms in Congress, where he stood in the front of the leaders of his party. He came into the State senate just as the Civil War began, when partisan and sectional passions were greatly intensified. He and Welsh, of York, were the accepted leaders of the Democratic minority of the body, numbering only six of the

thirty-three, when Clymer first appeared. The Republicans of the body decided that the utmost courtesy should be shown to the little handful of Democrats, and an agreement was reached between Finney and myself on one side and Clymer and Welsh on the other, by which the previous question should never be called in the senate. The agreement obviated all necessity for calling the previous question, if accepted in good faith on both sides. The proposition made by the majority was that while in the extreme necessities of war it might be necessary at times to legislate with great promptness on most important subjects, there would be the fullest opportunity given to the minority to be heard in discussion of the question before the body. If the Democrats desired protracted discussion, afternoon and night sessions would be held, without limit as to time, so that there should be the fullest expression by the minority. That agreement was scrupulously maintained by both sides, and the previous question was never called in the senate of Pennsylvania during the two terms in which I served as a member, although I had seen it called seventeen times in one night session when I was a member of the house. On my return to the senate from Philadelphia, in 1872, the leaders of both sides readily agreed to the same condition as to the discussion of the passage of all important measures, and thus the necessity for the previous question was entirely obviated. There was no reason why a body of thirty-three men, regarded as the first legislative tribunal of the State, should summon the previous question to enable it to perform its legitimate duties.

Clymer was a very ready debater, as was his associate leader, Welsh, of York, but neither of them was equal to the duty of realizing that old-time Democracy had expended its power, had exhausted its policy in sixty years of domination, and that it must accept new con-

ditions in the wonderful progress of events to enable it to maintain its mastery. They were both resolute in their opposition to the great industrial and commercial development that began with our fratricidal conflict. It was a new era, an entirely new epoch, with absolutely new conditions, new aims and new duties. The Republican party, being new, was born to the mission of the new departure, but it was hard for old Democratic leaders to understand that they must advance their standard or be passed in the race and left to lag in the rear of progress. It was a hard lesson for any man to learn who had been trained to the settled methods and boasted policy of Democracy that had triumphed with Jefferson sixty years before; that had extended the flag first to Louisiana, thence to Florida, thence to Texas and then to the Rio Grande and the Pacific Coast.

It was deemed the oracle of destiny, and it seemed to have proved its right to the title, but mutation is indelibly stamped upon the political affairs of all the peoples of the world, and when new and revolutionary advance became a necessity to Democratic leaders, they were unequal to the duty and the opportunity and they and their party fell in the race. The defeat of Clymer in Pennsylvania practically decided that the Democrats should be voiceless in the reconstruction of the dis-severed States.

I did not meet Geary again until after the election, when he happened to enter a car at Harrisburg in which I was seated on my way to Philadelphia. He was most effusive in his expressions of thanks for the earnest efforts I had made to aid in his election and insisted that I should name one of his cabinet officers. I did not doubt then that, however sincere he might have been at the time he made the proffer, no man I would be likely to name for the cabinet would be appointed. I knew how strong Cameron was in the advantageous

position he then occupied and how thoroughly he was skilled in all the methods of gathering the fullest harvest, and that fact precluded the possibility of Cameron's assent to any one I would have preferred for a cabinet position. Geary was persistent, however, and claimed that I did not appreciate his gratitude for the services I had rendered to him. It occurred to me, however, that a man who lived in my county, poor in fortune, with a large family dependent upon him, then held the position of messenger in the office of the secretary of the commonwealth that I had secured for him. The opportunity seemed to be at hand to save my messenger, and I said to the Governor-elect that I would appreciate it as a favor if he would have this man continued in his place, to which he replied that I should notify the man at once that his continuance in office was absolutely assured.

I did not personally meet the Governor until long after he had been inaugurated, but I had a special reminder that he was Governor and in authority soon after he entered the office by the prompt dismissal of my messenger without any complaint whatever of want of fidelity to his duty. The cabinet was made by Cameron, whose close friend, Senator Louis W. Hall, of Blair, brought Cameron to favor the appointment of Francis Jordan, of Bedford, to the secretaryship of the commonwealth, and Benjamin Harris Brewster, of Philadelphia, was made attorney general. Jordan was one of the most competent and faithful men who ever filled this position. He was in the senate in 1855, was among the leaders in opposition to Cameron for senator, and most aggressive in his warfare upon Cameron politics. He was able, painstaking, thoroughly honest, and filled the position for six years without a blemish upon his record.

Brewster was one of the most brilliant members of the

Philadelphia bar, but an entire novice in politics. He had important professional relations with Cameron, was ardently devoted to Cameron interests, but he knew little about the public men of the State, and, unfortunately, because of his inexperience or want of familiarity and general intercourse with men, he accepted Cameron's friendships and hatreds to a very large extent in estimating the men of the State. In an interview that he gave to the public soon after he became attorney general he criticised me personally and politically in the keen invective he so readily commanded, although it was entirely without provocation so far as I have any knowledge. I had met him only casually on several occasions, and he had no opportunity whatever to estimate me from personal knowledge. How this conflict culminated in his removal from office two years and a half later and how we became devoted friends will embellish a later chapter.

LXX.

CAMERON-CURTIN SENATORIAL
BATTLE.

A Majority of Republican Senators and Representatives Pledged or Instructed for Curtin—Cameron Adroitly Combined the Candidates to Defeat Quay, Curtin's Candidate for Speaker—Stevens, Moorehead, Grow and Forney in the Field with Cameron—Governor Geary, Aggressively for Cameron—Cameron Finally Controlled the Majority—Quay, After a Conference with the Younger Cameron and Curtin, Decided to Move the Unanimous Nomination of Cameron After He Attained a Majority—Quay's First Step Toward Affiliation with the Camerons—Republicans Lose the State in 1867.

WHEN the smoke of the contest of 1866 had cleared away, the leaders of both factions in the Republican party well understood the situation. Cowan's term in the United States Senate was about to expire, and his successor to be chosen. There was no misunderstanding as to who would lock horns in the contest for the Senatorship, as Cameron and Curtin, the leaders of the two factions, were by general consent accepted as the men who were to make the struggle. Curtin had the advantage of a much larger measure of strength with the Republican people of the State, and a clear majority of the Republican senators and representatives elected to the Legislature were either instructed or distinctly pledged to support him for Senator. The Legislature had thirty-three Republican majority on joint ballot—nine in the senate and twenty-four in the house, and Curtin's friends were confident that they could hold the majority they had undoubtedly chosen.

Cameron, however, in addition to his consummate

skill as a political manager, had greatly strengthened himself by having the new Republican Governor, with his cabinet, and all the power of his administration, ready to give the most aggressive support to Cameron in his battle against Curtin, and the power of the Geary administration was sensibly felt in the Curtin lines before the inauguration. As an illustration of the earnestness with which Geary supported Cameron, the case of James W. Fuller, of Catasauqua, may be cited. He had long represented at Harrisburg large iron, railroad and other corporate interests in the Lehigh region, which employed him simply to keep them thoroughly posted as to all legislative movements which affected their interests. His stated salaries at that time from these various corporations for his services at Harrisburg amounted to \$17,000, and he had, by his long acquaintance with legislators and experience in legislative business, become one of the most important factors in all legislation. He was an earnest friend of Curtin, and would have been one of the most useful men in the State to Curtin in the struggle with Cameron, as Fuller thoroughly understood Cameron's methods, and knew better than any other how to counter against them.

It was necessary for Fuller to have intimate friendly, if not confidential, relations with the authorities of the State to render the best service to the corporate interests he represented, and he was notified before the inauguration of Geary that if he wished to maintain his old relations with the State authorities he must withdraw from the Curtin forces and aid in the Cameron contest. He presented the case frankly to Curtin, who told him that as it involved his usefulness to his friends and his means of livelihood, he could do no less than join the Cameron forces. He did so, and, while he was entirely faithful in all that he assumed to

perform for Cameron, he promptly notified Curtin of every Curtin legislator who had been wrested from the Curtin ranks, and just how, when and where it had been done. Curtin was thus advised promptly and accurately of the defection that began soon after the election of Geary, by which Cameron, with his own ability as a political manager and the power of the administration, was strengthening himself at the expense of Curtin. In this contest, that was one of the most memorable in the history of the State, J. Donald Cameron for the first time came to the front as a political factor. He had doubtless been an important aid to his father in many previous struggles, but when the Legislature met the younger Cameron openly assumed the leadership and managed the struggle for his father from start to finish. He had been little known or felt in politics, as he always avoided ostentatious participation in anything, but he very soon exhibited the most skillful and heroic methods of manipulating the Legislature, and thus laid the foundation for his future triumphs when he succeeded his father in the Senate ten years later.

Colonel Quay was Curtin's leader in the house and was then serving his third term in that body. He was the logical Curtin candidate for speaker and as he had two years' experience in the house, and was intimately acquainted with all the leading members of the body and of the party in the State, his election as speaker was regarded by Curtin's friends as absolutely assured. He entered into the contest in Quay's usual heroic way visited prominent men in every section of the State, and had a clear majority of the Republicans of the house positively pledged to his election. Cameron saw that with Curtin gaining the speaker of the house in a man so able and skillful as Quay, it would be a serious if not a fatal blow to his Senatorial aspirations. He

could not have defeated Quay single-handed. No one of the Republican members of the house ventured to make an earnest battle against Quay for the nomination, but Cameron made the outside candidates for Senator, including Stevens, Moorehead, Grow and several others, agree to a combination to control the speakership of the house, and thus open the way for the defeat of Curtin.

As Curtin was altogether the strongest candidate in the Legislature, the field naturally was ready to join in any movement to weaken him, each hoping that if Curtin was shorn of the power of the speaker, he might not be able to control a majority of the caucus, and that in the bitter fight that would follow he would be accepted to harmonize the party. This combination was made in which Stevens played an important part. He had no love for either Curtin or Cameron, but cherished the hope that he would be finally united upon for the Senatorship. He visited Chambersburg a short time before the meeting of the Legislature and made an earnest personal appeal to me to aid in what he said was the great ambition of his life. The grand old Commoner was then in feeble health, and his death occurred some eighteen months later. He sent for me to come to his room at the hotel in Chambersburg, where I found him lying on the bed, too weary to sit up while pleading for a six years' term in the Senate that all knew he could not live to finish.

I was very warmly attached to Stevens personally, and would have made great sacrifice if it had been in my power to serve him. He knew my relations with Curtin; said that he did not expect me to favor him as against Curtin, but he believed that Curtin could not be elected as he knew the combination was then made to take the control of the house from Curtin's friends, and wanted the assurance that if anything approaching

a deadlock came about, he should be made the compromise candidate. I appealed to him to dismiss the thought of being Senator; reminded him that any ordinary Congressman might reasonably be ambitious to reach the highest legislative tribunal of the nation, but for a man who was the confessed Commoner of the nation during the greatest period of its history, and who was undisputed and absolute leader, to accept a seat in the Senate, would be to give up the highest honors the nation can accord to any one, and descend to the position of a Senator, where he would be no greater than most of his fellows. I said that the position of Commoner was the only one ever attained by an American statesman that could be won solely by universally conceded ability and merit; that while all other great positions from President down were often filled by accident or fortuitous circumstance, the Commoner of the nation could reach his pre-eminence only by his confessed omnipotence in leadership. I had hoped thus to break the fall of Stevens in the Senatorial struggle, but the Senatorship was his dream by night and his thought by day, and candor compelled me to say to him that I did not have a ray of hope of his success.

Stevens co-operated with Cameron to wrest the control of the house from Curtin, as he would have co-operated with Curtin to wrest it from Cameron had Cameron been the stronger of the two candidates for Senator, and the combination finally decided on Glass, of Allegheny, for speaker. Quay fought his battle with all the skill and courage that he ever exhibited when engaged in political conflict, but the combination was too strong for him and he was defeated. While the outside candidates for Senator supposed that they had won something in the skirmish for themselves, Cameron well understood that the speaker was

his own man, although taken from Moorehead's county, and when Glass was elected to preside over the house, with the power of appointing committees, and the general control of the legislation, the victory was a clean cut triumph for Cameron alone.

The representative from my own county, although instructed to support Curtin by the Republican county convention with but three dissenting votes, and they were given to Grow, became an open supporter of Cameron before the caucus was held. Stevens confidently expected his vote, as he had large interests in the county in his Caledonia Iron Works, and had greatly aided our representative in his election, and he as confidently counted on the support of the senator from our district, a resident of Gettysburg, who was a son of one of Stevens' early and most devoted friends, but he, too, was one of the earliest converts to Cameron's interests. Stevens was keenly wounded by the defection of the senator from his old home, and his comment, made in the grim bitterness that only Stevens could exhibit, was: "He must be a changeling; his father was an honest man." While he had no sympathy with Curtin he was profoundly grieved that he had been misled into a combination on the speakership that had been planned wholly by Cameron and for Cameron, and that brought its fruits only to Cameron.

The Senatorial contest convulsed the State for several weeks before the Legislature met, and during the two weeks between the meeting of the Legislature and the Senatorial election the struggle at Harrisburg was one of the most bitter and desperate I have ever witnessed. Curtin had able and efficient managers, but they were decidedly outclassed and were no match for the Cameron organization with Cameron and his son accepting the struggle as one of life or death. Cameron's methods and resources vastly exceeded those

of Curtin. During the entire contest, that I watched day and night with intense interest, and was well advised of every change made in the lines, we did not succeed in making a single break in Cameron's thoroughly organized forces, and each day would bring to us confidential reports of some defection in our own ranks. Several days before the meeting of the caucus Curtin and those who thoroughly understood the inside situation realized that Curtin was beaten, and beaten by Legislators who were openly violating their solemn pledge or positive instructions.

It was this stage of the Senatorial battle of 1867 that led to the parting of the ways between Curtin and Quay. Quay was young, able, tireless and ambitious, and the younger Cameron appreciated his possible future. I have already stated in a former chapter the details of Cameron's invitation to Quay to confer on the subject of the Senatorial election, resulting in Quay's agreement, with others, to move to make the nomination of Cameron unanimous after he had obtained a majority of the caucus. He decided to take this action after a conference with Curtin and his closest friends, who informed him that he could not render further service to Curtin beyond voting for him, and that he should decide for himself what his course should be after the nomination was made.

Quay's decision to move to make the nomination of Cameron unanimous was not inspired in any degree by the desire or purpose to separate himself from Curtin or his friends, but it placed him in close friendly relations with the younger Cameron, and political events entirely beyond the control of Quay himself logically led him into closer relations with Cameron. Very early in the first Grant administration it became evident that all who hoped for political power or preferment in Pennsylvania could command it only by co-

operation with the Cameron power of the State. One of the first acts of President Grant was to send Curtin to Russia as Minister Plenipotentiary, where he remained for more than three years, and with Cameron in the Senate and omnipotent with the Grant administration, the young Republicans of the State of prominence had to decide between moving along with the Cameron procession and accepting absolute retirement.

It was thus that the way was opened for Quay to become one of Cameron's chief lieutenants within a very few years, resulting finally in Quay acquiring the legitimate succession to the Cameron power of the State, which he wielded with often severely challenged but unbroken omnipotence until his death. As Curtin joined the Liberal Republican forces against Grant in 1872, he practically severed his relations with the Republican organization of the State, and Quay, whose interests were bound up in the regular Republican organization, followed the party flag. While he and Curtin were thus led into opposition lines in politics, Quay ever maintained his personal affection for Curtin, and when Curtin became the Democratic candidate for Congress in his district, Quay, who was then leading the party organization, scrupulously avoided any conflict with the interests of Curtin in his district, and when Curtin contested the election after his first battle for Congress, Quay made earnest efforts, under cover, to have him admitted to the House. There was no element of apostacy or perfidy to Curtin in the action taken by Quay. The mastery of Cameron in Pennsylvania was proclaimed by the absolute control of the State administration, and his election to the Senate by a Republican Legislature commanding the united Republican support. He had patiently, tirelessly and always most sagaciously, struggled during the ten years of his connection with the Republican party to obtain the

control of its organization and win the Senatorship. His struggle for political power stands single and alone in the annals of Pennsylvania politics, starting with little popular support and violent opposition, and suffering defeat after defeat, only to rise up ready for another battle. He had twice wrested the United States Senatorship from a Democratic Legislature, and now, after many humiliating discomfitures, he asserted his omnipotence in Republican leadership, and adorned himself with the jewel that had inspired him in every conflict.

To say that Cameron's successes were the result of accidents which so often appear to control great political results, would be simply to confess ignorance of the truth or unwillingness to accept it. Only a great master could have achieved as Cameron did, and his plans were carried out successfully, not only in his own triumphs, but in making his son his successor. Many men who were accorded more ability in public affairs, and with a larger popular following, one by one fell in the race before him. Defeat would bring them despair, while to Cameron it only brought fresh inspiration for the struggle. He was re-elected six years later without a contest, and, after having served four years of his last term he resigned his high position and named his son, J. Donald Cameron, as his successor without a visible ripple on the political surface. Not only was Cameron four times elected to the Senate by the Pennsylvania Legislature, but his son, who succeeded him, was also four times elected to the same position, and the mastery that Cameron established in the Senatorial struggle of 1867 has never been broken in its omnipotence until the present day. That such political achievement could not be attained by any other than a master of masters in politics will hardly be questioned by any of ordinary intelligence. His

aims and his methods were ever legitimate subjects of criticism, but history records the fact that he not only won the position for himself and his successors, but commanded the support of the people of one of the most intelligent States of the Union.

The Republican people of Pennsylvania were not at once prepared to accept Cameron's leadership, and in the contest of 1867 that followed the election of Cameron to the Senate the party was listless and refused to respond to the appeals of leaders to save the organization from disaster. There was only one State officer to elect in 1867, that of supreme judge, and Henry W. Williams, of Allegheny, who was then serving by appointment to fill a vacancy, was unanimously nominated by the Republicans without any exhibition of factional feeling in the convention. Although not disturbed by factional strife, it was listless and perfunctory in its proceedings, and the Democrats strengthened themselves by nominating Judge Sharswood, of Philadelphia, who stood in the forefront of the great jurists of the State, and the Republicans suffered defeat by a small majority, although they saved the Legislature. It was believed generally by the Democrats and by many Republicans that the turning point of Republican power in Pennsylvania had been reached, and that Cameron and the party he then controlled would be relegated back to the minority power of the State. The Republicans were disturbed, and to some extent disintegrated, by the reconstruction policy of Congress that led several of the Republican Senators to desert the party, including Senator Cowan, of Pennsylvania. The party was finally saved by General Grant consenting to become its candidate for President, and the war of factions was forgotten in Pennsylvania, as the people rallied to honor the Great Captain of our Civil War.

LXXI.

CURTIN MINISTER TO RUSSIA.

Republican State Convention of 1868 Overwhelmingly Anti-Cameron—
Curtin Presented as Pennsylvania's Candidate for Vice-President—
The Author Chairman of the Delegation to the National Convention
—How Grant Became Republican Candidate for President—Colfax
Nominated for Vice-President—Why Wade Lost the Nomination—
Curtin Pressed for the Cabinet—The Author's Interview with Grant
on the Subject—Curtin Made Minister to Russia.

CURTIN was greatly grieved and humiliated by his defeat for Senator in the Legislature of 1867, but he maintained himself with great dignity and submitted in silence to the wrong he believed he had suffered. He received Governor Geary as his successor in the Executive mansion with generous hospitality, although he knew that Geary was one of the important factors in accomplishing his defeat, and he retired to Bellefonte, where for a year or more he lived in the quiet enjoyment of his home and friends. Curtin possessed a most affectionate and sympathetic nature, and the people in whose midst he had been born and grown up to reach the highest honors of the State were those with whom he loved to dwell. He was offered important business positions, but, unlike most of the ex-Governors of the State, he could not be tempted from the home of his kindred and friends. He and his brothers had inherited what in those days were regarded as large iron interests at his home, which had long been a source of embarrassment, but during the war they had become largely profitable; and he gave a portion of his time to business with his brothers in the man-

agement of their works. He took no part in the contest of 1867, as little interest was felt by the party generally, and few even of the most active leaders were heard on the stump. He realized, as did all of those well informed as to the political situation, that there was great danger of the Republican party being wrecked in the Presidential contest of 1868. Pennsylvania had been lost to the Republicans in 1867 by the election of the Democratic State ticket, and the recovery of the Republican mastery depended wholly upon the unshaped conditions of the future.

The Republican party was saved in 1868 by the quarrel between President Johnson and General Grant. General Grant was not a Republican; he had never voted the Republican ticket, and his last vote for President in 1860 was for Breckenridge, the radical slavery Democratic candidate, although he was a resident of Illinois, the home of Douglas. He had never given any expression of his acceptance of the Republican faith, nor of his desire or purpose to act in harmony with it. He was stubbornly silent in politics, and the Democrats shrewdly decided to make him their candidate for President, feeling confident that with him as their standard bearer they could certainly win, and there is little reason to doubt that if Grant had accepted the Democratic nomination, as was at one time more than possible, he would have been elected and the Republican party overthrown. I do not suppose that he would have made a radical Democratic President, but he would have carried out the policy of reconstruction on the generous and chivalrous lines that he first taught the country in his terms accorded to Lee at Appomattox. He had decided, as he then believed irrevocably, never to accept a political position. He had no taste for civil duties, and little acquaintance with them. He held the highest posi-

tion ever held by any one in the army, a rank at that time accorded only to Washington and himself, with the right to retire without diminution of salary; but Grant, like all other men, was human, and when the Presidency appeared to be clearly within his reach, even with all his general stability of purpose, he was unequal to the task of refusing the highest civil trust of the world. Had he done so he would have been the only man in the history of the Republic of whom such a story could be told.

When Johnson decided to remove Stanton from the War Office in disregard of the tenure-of-office law, he called Grant to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, fully confiding in Grant as Democratic in sympathy, and as certain to co-operate with the President. The President claimed that when Grant accepted the position he gave the assurance that if the Senate refused to assent to the removal of Stanton he would not surrender the office, but would require Stanton to fight his battle to regain the position from the outside; but when Grant was officially notified that the Senate had refused to concur in the removal of Stanton and Stanton appeared to claim the office, Grant at once quietly gave him possession and returned to his army headquarters. The President was greatly inflamed at the action of Grant, and publicly denounced him as having been guilty of perfidy in surrendering the office to Stanton, to which Grant made answer that he had given no such pledge, and that it was his duty as a soldier to obey the law. The controversy became exceedingly bitter, and the entire cabinet joined in a statement over their signatures sustaining the President, thus practically proclaiming Grant as guilty not only of violating his solemnly plighted faith to the President, but also of falsehood.

The Republicans at once came to the support of

Grant in the most aggressive manner, and it was during this tempestuous season, in which Grant was vindictively assailed by the administration and the Democrats, that he first entertained the proposition to accept the Presidency. He hesitated long before he gave his final consent. Many leading Republicans called upon him personally and urged his acceptance of the Republican nomination, but the man who finally succeeded in obtaining his consent to accept the Republican nomination for President was Colonel Forney. He had many conferences with Grant on the subject, but he finally obtained from Grant the positive assurance that he would not decline the Republican nomination if tendered to him, making the condition, however, that, as he was giving up one of the most lucrative positions under the government that lasted for life, he should be accorded two terms of the Presidency. I had the details of these conferences from Colonel Forney himself, and he was greatly amused at Grant's appearance as a complete novice in politics by asking from Colonel Forney the assurance that he should have two terms of the Presidency—an assurance that no man or combination of men could reasonably give to a Presidential candidate under any conditions.

From the day that Grant's acceptance of the Presidential nomination was announced, no other name was discussed in Republican circles, and the Republican leaders of the country at once organized the party, confident that with Grant they could surely win and restore Republican power in the Nation. Curtin was one of the first to come to the front in Pennsylvania to reinspire the party for a successful battle, and at an informal conference of a number of his friends held in Philadelphia early in the spring of 1868, it was decided to bring him out as Pennsylvania's candidate

for the Vice-Presidency. Grant, the candidate for President, was from the West, from Illinois, and it was reasonable to assume that the second place on the ticket would be given to the East. The announcement of Curtin's name as a candidate for Vice-President called out the old-time earnestness and enthusiasm that he had inspired in his previous contests, and Cameron was also aroused to active hostility, as the presentation of Curtin for Vice-President would be a measurable vindication of him after his defeat for Senator the year before. The contest for the control of the State convention was most animated. Curtin's friends rallied to his support in the most aggressive manner, and soon had a tidal wave in Curtin's favor that defied all the efforts of Cameron to control. The Republicans generally felt that the State had been lost in 1867 solely by the fact that Cameron had become absolute master of the party organization, and with Grant as a candidate for President, whose election could hardly be doubted, they were earnest and enthusiastic in the effort to regain Republican supremacy in the State, and to give the most complete vindication to Curtin.

The State convention was held in Philadelphia in the Academy of Music, and was largely attended, outside of the full complement of delegates. It was the last political State convention in which I served as a delegate. The opponents of Curtin were few in number but desperate in purpose. They exhausted their efforts to weaken in some degree the completeness of Curtin's nomination, but they were met defiantly and unhorsed at every step, resulting in a practically solid delegation to support Curtin for Vice-President. The opposition to Curtin did not present a Cameron man as his competitor, but gave their support to Galusha A. Grow, who was not a Cameron partisan

and who afterward, by the action of the Curtin forces which controlled the convention, was made chairman of the Republican State committee. When it is stated that I was unanimously elected chairman of the Pennsylvania delegation to the National convention, it need hardly be said that Cameron's influence was not then seriously felt at home, but he was in a position of great power and doubtless did much to prevent the support of Curtin by delegations from other States. He had been Senator and cabinet officer; had close relations with many of the Republican Senators who could readily influence their States against Curtin; and when we reached Chicago and entered the struggle for the nomination of our candidate for the second place, we soon discovered that we were involved in a hopeless battle.

The impeachment trial of President Johnson was in progress for some weeks before the convention met; and the judgment of the Senate acquitting him for want of a single vote to make two-thirds favorable to his conviction was announced to the Pennsylvania delegation when on its way to Chicago, and within a few hours of that place. It was confidently expected when the impeachment trial began that the President would be convicted and removed from office, and that Senator Wade, President *pro tem.* of the Senate, would become President for the period of eight months. Wade had lost his re-election to the Senate by the Democrats carrying his State the year before, and he at once became a candidate for Vice-President. He was a man of great individual strength in the Republican party, and as it was believed that he would control the entire patronage of the government for eight months before the new Republican President would come in, his nomination for Vice-President was accepted as certain. Had the Senate delayed its final judg-

ment in the impeachment case a week longer, Wade would undoubtedly have been nominated for Vice-President, solely because of the power he was expected to wield for eight months as President.

When the acquittal of Johnson was announced, Wade's candidacy suddenly became absolutely hopeless. He was not personally popular because of his brusque and often offensive methods of expression, and a large majority of those who supported him for Vice-President did it solely because he was expected to succeed Johnson as President. His friends made a gallant struggle for him, however, but his defeat was known to all as inevitable. He received 147 votes on the first ballot and rose to 206, but on the last ballot he fell to 38, when Colfax received 549. Curtin had little chance for gathering any strength from the surrounding States, as Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts; Senator Fenton, of New York; Speaker Colfax, of Indiana, with Wade, of Ohio, held all the States surrounding Pennsylvania as their local candidates. Curtin received 51 votes on the first ballot and fell to 40 on the third, when his name was withdrawn and his supporters generally went to Colfax.

Colfax was in a fortunate position to be the second choice of a large majority of the delegates. He represented the younger and more vital element of the party, and was one of the most genial and delightful of men and an eloquent and impressive speaker. His State was regarded as one of the debatable pivotal States of the Union, and he was entirely free from the opposition of faction at home or elsewhere. The nomination of Grant was made unanimously, of course, every vote in the convention being recorded for him when the roll was called, and when the result was announced a curtain was raised on the rear of the platform exhibiting an immense full-length portrait of the great

chieftain, which brought the convention and the large audience attending it at once to their feet cheering it to the echo.

Curtin at once came to the front, and was conspicuous in the battle from the opening of the campaign to its close. He spoke in different sections of Pennsylvania, and was called to Indiana and other States where special effort was needed, and Grant was known to cherish a very high appreciation of Curtin's services.

Pennsylvania, Indiana and Ohio were yet States which held their State elections in October, and the Presidential battle was fought in Pennsylvania and Indiana, as it always had been, on the State ticket in October, as the result at the State election decided the electoral vote of the State in November. General Hartranft, who was then auditor general of the State, was unanimously nominated by the Republicans for re-election. The Democrats nominated Charles E. Boyle, one of the ablest of their State leaders, as his competitor. The October States were earnestly contested by the Democrats. Their triumph in Pennsylvania the year before, and the nomination of Horatio Seymour as their candidate for President, who was admittedly one of their ablest and strongest men, made them hopeful that with the aid of the Johnson administration they could defeat Grant. Pennsylvania was contested with desperation, and the largest Democratic vote brought out that had ever been polled, but Hartranft was re-elected by nearly 10,000 majority. In Indiana the Democrats had their strongest leader, Thomas A. Hendricks, at the head of their ticket, for Governor, a man who always could command more than the distinct Democratic vote of the State. They confidently expected to carry Pennsylvania and Indiana in October, and thus forecast the election of Seymour in November, but with all the con-

fidence and well-directed and enthusiastic efforts that were made for Hendricks in Indiana, he was beaten for Governor by a little less than a thousand votes.

Thus the pivotal October States, after the Democrats had exhausted their resources for the contest, declared for the Republicans, and there was practically little or no contest for the Presidency thereafter. The Democrats of New York determined to vindicate Seymour. He was their greatest and most beloved leader, and they gave him just even 10,000 majority in the State by an immensely developed majority in the city of New York. At the November election Pennsylvania gave nearly 30,000 for Grant, and Indiana came up with nearly 7,000 Republican majority, giving Grant a very large majority alike in the Electoral College and in the popular vote.

Immediately after the election of Grant it was decided by a number of Curtin's friends to propose his appointment for a cabinet position. Curtin did not regard the movement with special favor, as he knew that if he entered the cabinet with Cameron in the Senate there would be a most unfortunate and continuous conflict to vex the administration in the disposal of Pennsylvania patronage; but without any concerted movement a number of the leading Republicans of the State strongly urged Grant to appoint Curtin as one of his cabinet advisers. Among them was Judge Read, of our supreme court, who called at my office in Philadelphia, where I had become a resident in the latter part of 1868, and handed me a letter addressed to General Grant, requesting me to deliver it in person as soon as I could visit Washington. He did not state its contents, and a few days thereafter I was in Washington and called upon General Grant at army headquarters and delivered the letter. He received me very kindly, and, after a brief conversa-

tion, without any reference to politics, I rose to take my leave.

By the time I reached the door he had opened the letter, and saw that it related to Curtin's appointment as a cabinet officer, and he called me back. He informed me that the letter urged him to appoint Curtin to his cabinet, and he desired to say to me as one of Curtin's close friends, that, while he had a very high appreciation of Curtin's ability and character, he meant to appoint his cabinet officers entirely in conformity with his own personal wishes, as it was his official family, and he felt that he should be free to select men chiefly with reference to their acceptability to himself. I had heard that he meant to appoint Mr. Borie, of Philadelphia, to the cabinet, who was a most estimable gentleman, but an entire novice in political or official affairs, and would be practically valueless to the administration because of his want of knowledge of public men and public duties. I answered the General by saying that he certainly had the right to appoint a cabinet entirely acceptable to himself, but that he should remember that cabinet officers were representative public men, and that the success of his administration depended very largely upon their strength before the country. Grant then clearly had the idea that a political administration could be run like an army, by regulation orders, and I saw that he did not receive kindly the suggestion I made as to the necessity of strengthening his administration by cabinet appointments, as he replied with evident feeling on the subject.

I was greatly disappointed at this feature of Grant's idea of statesmanship, and with careful courtesy said to him that if I were suddenly called to the head of the army without military experience, I would realize that my first great need would be generals, and that

it was no discredit to him when called to the highest civil position of the country without experience in civil affairs, to say that his great need would be statesmen. Grant suddenly closed the discussion in evident irritation, and I never again visited him during his eight years of the Presidency.

I had been compelled to change my residence from Chambersburg, where lingered the warmest affections and sympathies of my life, to Philadelphia, because I was utterly bankrupted by the destruction of the town, and I meant to devote myself strictly to my profession and take no further part in politics after the election of Grant. I had no political aspirations whatever, and as I felt that I could not afford to struggle for political promotion even if I desired it, I left the President-elect with no regret that I had offended him by telling him the truth that he was unwilling to accept, but would be compelled to accept sooner or later. Curtin felt no disappointment when the cabinet was announced without his name being in its list; and he was confident from expressions received not only from Grant himself, between the period of his election and inauguration, but especially from assurances given by Representative Elihu B. Washburne, who was early announced as the premier of the new cabinet, that Grant would, in some way, emphasize his regard for Curtin, which he did among his first official acts after his inauguration, by nominating Curtin as Minister to Russia.


LXXII.

JOHN SCOTT ELECTED SENATOR.

The Senatorial Contest Shrewdly Managed by Colonel Thomas A. Scott—When the Legislature Met No Contest for Senator Developed—John Scott Unanimously Nominated—Elected by the Solid Vote of His Party—Scott's Creditable Record in the Senate—Keeping within Party Lines He Followed His Own Convictions—Curtin Went to Russia Knowing that It was Political Banishment—Honors Showered upon Curtin before His Departure.

IN the State contest of 1868 the Republicans carried both branches of the Legislature, but by somewhat reduced majorities. The senate stood 18 Republicans to 15 Democrats, and the Republicans had 24 majority in the house, giving them 27 on joint ballot. The term of Buckalew as United States Senator was about to expire, and there was very general surprise that the half dozen or more men who had so earnestly struggled for the coveted position two years before in the celebrated Cameron-Curtin contest, did not enter the race. True, Thaddeus Stevens, the ablest of them all, had crossed the dark river, and while a number were more than willing to make a contest for the Senatorship if they could have met with any encouragement in doing so, it was very early discovered by all that the position was irrevocably disposed of before the Legislature met.

Colonel Thomas A. Scott had then become an important factor in both State and National politics, and was greatly interested in our transcontinental railway system. He had been for a period president of the Northern Pacific, and later had undertaken the Herculean task of constructing the Texas Pacific,



John Scott

expecting the aid of a government subsidy such as had been given to the Central and Northern lines. He wanted a man of the highest character, ability and integrity to represent Pennsylvania in the Senate, and one who would take an active interest in the development of the country. He, and he alone, accomplished the election of John Scott, of Huntingdon, by the Republican Legislature of 1869. Although bearing the same name, there was no blood relationship between the families.

John Scott was then confessedly the leader of the bar in interior Pennsylvania, and was connected professionally with the great railway line of the State. He was a man of admitted ability, tireless energy and unblemished reputation. He was not in any sense a politician, and knew little or nothing about the political methods by which men advance themselves to political distinction. He had been prominent in Pennsylvania politics as a Democrat, and was a delegate to the Democratic State convention of 1852, where he led the opposition to Buchanan's nomination for President and was the author of the formal protest presented to the convention by nearly or quite one-third of the delegates, declaring against Buchanan's availability as the Democratic candidate for President. When the Civil War came he was a pronounced loyalist, and he accepted the Republican or Union nomination for the Legislature in Huntingdon County, in 1861, and was one of the half dozen War Democrats of the body who held the balance of power in the house during that session, and co-operated very cordially with the Republicans in support of the war. He did not, however, separate himself from his Democratic affiliations, and he was the unsuccessful candidate of that party for State senator in 1863; but in 1864 he joined ex-Speaker Cessna, of Bedford, the Rowes,

of Franklin, General Hartranft, of Montgomery, and a number of other War Democrats in support of Lincoln, and thereafter acted with the Republican party.

Colonel Scott then understood the politics of the State of Pennsylvania better than any other one man in the Commonwealth. His great trunk line, was extending its tributaries into almost every approachable section of the State, with the very hearty co-operation of the prominent men of all parties where important local improvements were to be made, and his relations with the controlling men of the State in both parties were such that it was not difficult for him to make John Scott the candidate for Senator and have his election assured before the Legislature met. John Scott was nominated by a practically unanimous vote, and there was not even the semblance of a battle against him. Fortunately, he possessed every quality essential for a man to fill a seat in the highest legislative tribunal of the nation, and while many of the more active politicians were greatly disappointed to find a man unanimously nominated for Senator who would have been easily defeated if left to his own political resources, none could question the fitness of the selection, and I cannot recall another instance in which the party electing a United States Senator created and welcomed its candidate with such entire unanimity and cordiality as welcomed John Scott, and his career in the Senate brought no disappointment to his many friends.

He was politician enough to know that party interests had to be respected, and at times something yielded to political necessities, but no man ever served a term in the United States Senate with a cleaner record than that made by John Scott. When issues arose which appealed to his sense of justice, no political influence whatever could swerve him from his duty.

I heard him deliver his first speech in the Senate a very short time after his admission to the body, and it was a sore disappointment to some of the leaders of his party, who believed that the end always justifies the means in politics. A young Pennsylvania clerk had gone westward some years before to grow up with the country, and was successful in acquiring position and fortune. He wielded his power without regard to the lawfulness of his methods, and elected himself to the United States Senate, where he had served for one or more sessions.

The Senate was petitioned to inquire into the integrity of his commission, but it was generally expected that it would be disposed of in some one of the regulation ways which had usually been adopted to avoid the expulsion of a Senator for improper methods in securing his election. It was this question that called out Senator Scott to make his first deliverance in the body, and although powerful influences had been employed to restrain him from aggressive attack upon the assailed Senator, he delivered an argument that was absolutely unanswerable, and was presented with such dignity and manliness that none attempted to dispute it. The result was that the assailed Senator, who until then confidently expected that the investigation into his case would be merely perfunctory, and that he would not be disturbed in his seat, resigned shortly thereafter and never again appeared in public life.

General Cameron was then the senior Senator from the State, and he had very cordially co-operated with Colonel Scott in the election of Senator Scott. Cameron knew that Scott would not permit himself to be vexed about the patronage of the National administration in Pennsylvania, as Scott had little acquaintance with the politicians or their respective merits, and had even less inclination to assume responsibility in the

struggles of contending applicants for Federal positions. Scott's election to the Senate gave Pennsylvania an able, brave, conscientious and faithful Senator, and left the patronage of the Grant administration, that was then, as now, indispensable to maintain a party organization, entirely to Cameron.

When Curtin's nomination was sent by President Grant to the Senate for Minister to Russia, Cameron was anxious to defeat his confirmation, but while Scott knew that he was to some extent at least indebted to Cameron for his election, and was in no measure indebted to Curtin, who had simply been unfelt in the contest, he at once declared that a man of Curtin's ability and services rendered to the State should not be stricken down by a Republican Senate, and expressed his purpose to make an earnest battle for Curtin's confirmation if opposition developed. The result was that Cameron yielded to Scott and Curtin was unanimously confirmed. Notwithstanding Senator Scott's service was during a period of unusual political activity, he never exhibited any interest in political management and never sought to shape political affairs in his State. He knew that it was a lesson he could not learn sufficiently to make him a leader in the rough-and-tumble struggle for mastery in State politics, and he was wisely content to perform his Senatorial duties with unbroken dignity and scrupulous fidelity.

His disregard of political affairs and independent action on all occasions did not commend him to the politicians of his party in the State, and at the expiration of his six-year term, when the Democrats had possession of the Legislature and chose William A. Wallace as his successor, the State leaders denied him the empty compliment of a renomination, although no man who had served Pennsylvania in the Senate for many years was more justly entitled to it. It was

decided, however, that such men were not wanted in the political management that then prevailed, and Quay and the younger Cameron who then had absolute control of the organization, gave ex-Congressman John Allison, of Beaver, the honor of being nominated for United States Senator, only to be defeated by the Democratic candidate. Soon after Senator Scott retired from the Senate he located in Philadelphia and became general solicitor of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, a position that he held and filled with great credit until his death.

The Democrats of the Legislature nominated William A. Wallace for Senator, although Buckalew had served six years with very general acceptability to the party, and he and his friends naturally expected him to receive the only endorsement that could be given to him in 1869, by casting the Democratic vote for him. Wallace had entered the senate in 1863, and soon became the confessed leader of the party in the Legislature. He was the most accomplished organizer the Democratic party developed in his day, and he decided to take the nomination for himself in 1869 to blaze the way for his election to the Senate some time in the future, when the Democrats might gain a majority of the Legislature. Buckalew and his immediate friends were not only greatly humiliated by this action of Wallace, but it caused a bitter estrangement that nearly accomplished Wallace's defeat in 1875, when the Democrats had the Legislature and Wallace was its nominated candidate for the United States Senatorship. Buckalew appeared at Harrisburg and attempted to fight out the battle even by revolutionary methods to accomplish Wallace's defeat, but Buckalew was a novice in political management when forced to size up with Wallace in a struggle, and Wallace finally secured enough of the Buckalew men to accomplish

his election. The estrangement between Buckalew and Wallace remained unreconciled until the grave extinguished their resentments.

When Curtin accepted the position of Minister to Russia, he well understood all that it implied. He did not wish to go to Russia, although it was one of the only three first-class missions of the government. He understood that it was intended by the President to be a compliment for the services he had rendered the State and country and his support of Grant in the Presidential contest, but he well knew also that it was meant by others to retire him from the factional conflicts of the party in the State. He knew that with Cameron in the Senate serving a term that would not expire until the end of the first term of the new President, he could not hope to make a successful battle for the support of his friends with the President when every nomination of a friend of Curtin was certain to bring threatened and probable rejection in the Senate. For him to remain at home and battle against such fearful odds was simply to invite fretful struggles and repeated defeats, and to accept the position was the practical disintegration of the political organization he had in the State, and the elimination of himself and friends from mastery in the Republican organization. He was greatly gratified at Grant's courage in nominating him in the face of Cameron's protest, and after mature reflection he felt that it was his duty to accept the position and practically abandon all attempt to control the Republican organization of the State.

His friends very generally approved of his decision, and when a large number of them accompanied him to New York and bade him good-bye on board the vessel when he was about to sail for St. Petersburg, all felt that they were no longer important factors in

Pennsylvania politics. Most of them were not of the place-hunting class, and could do quite as well, or better, for themselves in private pursuits than in seeking or even gaining political honors, but they all felt keenly the turn in political affairs that had practically made Curtin and themselves voiceless in the great party they had earnestly and so successfully struggled to create, and whose earliest victories they had won following the tall plume of their beloved chief. Just before sailing for Russia he was, by the unanimous vote of both branches of councils, tendered a public reception in Independence Hall, and that was attended by many thousands, and a public dinner was given to him in the Academy of Music, with the largest attendance of prominent men ever witnessed at any public dinner in Philadelphia. The ablest Republicans from every section of the State were largely represented. Judge Thayer presided, and the career of the great War Governor was told in eloquent story by half a score or more of the leaders who had battled by his side, but a strain of sadness pervaded the many fervent tributes paid to the man who was the greatest of all the popular leaders of the State, and whose record as the great War Governor stood out in matchless grandeur.

The position of Minister to Russia was practically a sinecure. Our relations with that Power were of the most friendly nature, and during his more than three years of service as Minister to the Court of the Czar, he never had a single grave diplomatic problem to solve. His sunny, genial ways made him a great favorite at the Russian court, and he was accorded a degree of confidence in Russian royalty and diplomacy that probably no other Minister to the Czar ever enjoyed. He was a special favorite with Czar Alexander, the grandfather of the present Czar Nicholas,

and the Czar commanded not only the earnest sympathy of Curtin, but the most sincere and earnest approbation of his freedom of serfs of Russia. So highly did the Czar appreciate Curtin as Minister that he specially sat to one of the great artists of Russia for a life-size portrait that was finished in the highest style of art, and personally presented to Curtin by the Czar himself. It yet adorns the Curtin home in Bellefonte.

I was in constant correspondence with Curtin during his stay in London, and was one of the few to whom he expressed his views without restraint. He, of course, had many letters from his numerous friends throughout the State, and was fully advised of the progress of political events, and the gradual complete mastery of the factional power of the State that was implacably hostile to himself and his friends. He was greatly fretted as he learned from time to time that the open friends of Curtin, who entered the field for political preferment either in the State or in the National administration, speedily crossed the dead line and was mercilessly crucified, but he was powerless to aid them, and could only sit in the grandeur of Russian royalty and bow in sorrow to the sacrifice of those to whom he was so ardently devoted. At the end of the first year he decided to return home and share the struggle of his friends, but they with one accord advised him that it would be a hopeless conflict, and that every consideration of political expediency dictated that he should remain. He was offered very large pecuniary compensation to become connected with business enterprises of Americans in Russia, which would have required his resignation as Minister, but he felt that as long as he remained abroad he would continue as Minister to the Russian Court.

LXXIII.

THE INFAMOUS REGISTRATION LAW.

The Defeat of City of Philadelphia Candidates in 1868 Made Mann Enforce the Enactment of the Registry Law—Wide Open Doors for Fraud under Color of Law—The Author's Earnest Protest Against the Movement—Mann Regained the District Attorneyship Under It—Interesting Incidents in Halting Fraud at a Special Senatorial Election.

THE political conditions developed in Philadelphia by the election of 1868 were well calculated to alarm the Republican leaders. With all the personal strength that General Grant brought to the party, the Democrats elected a majority of their ticket in the city, including mayor and district attorney, by majorities ranging from 1,000 to 1,900. Daniel M. Fox was the Democratic candidate for mayor, and General Tyndale his Republican opponent.

Tyndale was opposed by severe churchmen, on the ground that he was not entirely orthodox in faith, and the official returns showed about 1,900 majority in favor of Fox, and Furman Sheppard was returned as elected district attorney by a smaller majority. Such a disaster coming in a Presidential year, when the full vote of the party was polled and the organization supposed to be complete, gave little promise of future Republican mastery in the city that was claimed to be the great loyal city of the nation.

Colonel Mann had been nominated for district attorney by the midsummer convention of 1868, but a fraction of probably one-fourth of the delegates in the convention bolted, organized a separate convention, and nominated Isaac Hazlehurst, a prominent Republican

of the city, with the declared purpose of defeating Mann by revolutionary action. Mann had been assistant district attorney for two terms under William B. Reed. He was the Republican candidate in 1856 to succeed Reed, but the return was given in favor of Lewis C. Cassidy.

Mann contested the return, and was awarded the position by the court. In 1859 he was re-elected without serious contest, and won out for re-election again in 1862 and 1865. From the time that he succeeded in entrenching himself in the office of district attorney he became the leader of the party in the city, and during his reign no one ever ruled with more complete omnipotence, but all such political power is certain to provoke factional hostility, alike from personal disappointments and from those who sincerely protest against the autocratic political methods by which political masters are often compelled to execute their decrees.

Mann was one of the most liberal and generous of political leaders, but the fact that he was omnipotent awakened formidable jealousies, and the additional fact that his political methods were at times necessarily arbitrary and unscrupulous aroused bitter antagonism, and when he was nominated for the fifth consecutive term, although the party organization was strengthened by a Presidential contest, it became evident that he would be defeated. The Democrats nominated Furman Sheppard, who was confessedly their strongest man. He was not only a man of great ability, but commanded the respect of the entire community, whether friends or foes in politics. After the nomination of Sheppard, the Republican leaders saw that they were inviting a terrible disaster by permitting two candidates of their party to be in the field for district attorney, and Mann was finally induced to decline, as I have stated in detail in a former chapter.

The disputing factions had agreed upon Charles Gibbons as the man upon whom all the Republican belligerents could be harmonized. Gibbons was one of the most brilliant of the old Whig leaders in Philadelphia, and was elected from the city to the senate as early as 1844, where he stood confessedly as the ablest of the Whig leaders in the body, although then quite a young man. His fidelity to his own convictions led him to antagonize Philadelphia in the contest between the Baltimore & Ohio and the Pennsylvania Railroad.

He did not oppose the Pennsylvania enterprise, but he insisted that if the Baltimore & Ohio, that had first offered to construct the line through Pennsylvania to Pittsburg, was willing to complete a second road to the West, it should have the right to do so. It was then generally believed that two such lines could not be sustained in the State, and for his refusal to deny the franchise to the Baltimore & Ohio, that he had previously earnestly supported when it was the only organization that promised to construct such a line, he was bitterly denounced at home and practically retired from politics for nearly a quarter of a century. He had not been involved in factional strife, as he took little interest in local politics, although an active member of the Union League and an ardent supporter of the war. He was not a man who had mingled with the people, and lacked in the important elements of personal popularity, although his clean record commended him very generally to the voting public.

A very earnest effort was made by the reunited party to elect Gibbons, but the majority was against him, and he proceeded to contest the return. The case was heard by Judge Brewster, a sincere Republican, and one of the ablest of our common pleas judges. After hearing the case very patiently he awarded the

office to Gibbons by a small majority, and Sheppard retired, but upon a careful examination of the elaborate opinion given by Judge Brewster, by which he figured out a majority in favor of Gibbons, Sheppard discovered that the judge had committed an error in his complicated computation, and that, figuring the result out upon the basis accepted by the court, Sheppard was really elected. He petitioned Judge Brewster for a review of the case, and upon rehearing Judge Brewster reversed his own judgment and awarded the office to Sheppard.

I had taken up my permanent residence in Philadelphia in the summer of 1868, and in connection with Colonel Mann opened a suite of offices on Sixth Street near Walnut. While we occupied the same offices, there was no partnership in our professional engagements. We were naturally closely associated in politics and general affairs, as we had been for more than a decade of the past. The one position that he coveted was that of district attorney, and he immediately devoted himself to the task of accomplishing his return to that position.

We had many and very earnest discussions on the subject. I believed that the Republican party could be restored to unity and success only by making its record command the approval of the intelligent and fair-minded people of Republican faith in the city, but he believed that the only way to defeat the Democrats in Philadelphia was to adopt Democratic methods, and improve on them. The portion of the city along the Delaware had long been a running sore of political debauchery, and at that time McMullen was in the zenith of his power and could make his own Fourth Ward and the adjoining wards return majorities for him to his own wishes with little regard to the votes cast.

The old-time Anti-Masons and Whigs, under the

lead of Charley Naylor and others, had made the uptown wharf wards equally corrupt, and their majorities at times depended wholly upon the interests of corrupt leaders in defiance of the ballots cast by the people. There was then no colored vote to stimulate commercial politics, nor did we have the low grade foreign element that has now become formidable in the city, and that is interested in politics only as voting to command cash or its equivalent, but the political debauchery of that day was at times even more boldly defiant of law than are the more modern and more colossal exhibitions of political debauchery which now stain the city of Philadelphia.

It was this threatening political condition that made Colonel Mann and his close friends decide to enact a new election law that would give the Republican leaders not only the absolute control of every election board in the city, but that would also greatly eliminate the restraining power of the courts to prevent the consummation of fraud. It was known as the "registry law," as it provided for registration entirely under the control of the Republican organization, and only those registered with their approval could vote. By this method thousands who were opponents of the Machine organization were practically disfranchised, and in order to control the returns in the event of failure to command a popular majority, the selection of even the minority members of the election board was made by the same power that appointed the majority. Thus in every election district in the city the Republican machine had the majority of the board and a minority of its own choice.

In some instances the minority judges were chosen because of their utter ignorance, men who could be cheated before their eyes without understanding it, and in other cases Democrats were selected who could

be corrupted by the majority. As an instance of the kind of minority election officers who were chosen, I recall the testimony of two such Democratic officers who testified in the contest I had for a seat in the senate in 1872. The registry law required that the vote of each hour should be proclaimed publicly from the window, ostensibly for the purpose of detecting fraud, but, in point of fact, to give the leaders hourly information of the progress of the election and advise them in time of the necessity of resorting to desperate measures to create or increase a majority.

These two Democratic election officers had voted for me at the special election for senator between one and two o'clock of the day, and the return of that hour, which they themselves had certified, did not give me a single vote. When they were questioned by the committee that was hearing the case as to why they had signed an election return that they knew to be false, they both stated that they knew it was wrong, but that they were informed that it was their duty to sign it along with the other officers.

This registry law, after repeated consultations in Colonel Mann's office, at some of which I was present, was framed by Mr. Gibbons, who was smarting under his defeat for district attorney, and who doubtless expected that he would be allowed another opportunity to make a contest for the place. Colonel Mann demanded the law solely to restore himself to that position, but did not deem it necessary to advise Gibbons of his purpose. I was at the first reading of the bill and very earnestly protested against it. I declared that no man who respected his own position in the party and who ever hoped to command its confidence and favor by deserving it, could have any inspiration in future struggles under such an election law.

Mann insisted that it was the only way by which

Democratic fraud could be defeated, and the leaders were finally brought together and decided that the bill should be unitedly supported in the Legislature and made the election law of the city. When the registry law was passed by the Legislature I openly denounced it, and appealed to Governor Geary to veto it, but he was a candidate for re-election, and did not have the courage to withhold his approval.

Under the law the Democrats had simply no chance at all to succeed in any of the local contests, and the power thus given to the ward leaders, who never take pause to think of the retribution they must invite, stimulated them to the enactment of most appalling frauds. It was this registry law, and the startling debauchery of the ballot under it, that in a few years plunged Philadelphia into the throes of political revolution; and when a senator, chosen in the revolutionary tide against the registry law, I passed through the senate by a unanimous vote, and finally forced its passage in the house, a new election law that tore up by the roots the corrupt features of the registry law, and made honest elections again possible in Philadelphia.

Mann succeeded in regaining the district attorneyship under the registry law in 1871, although the revolt against the debauchery of the ballot had taken formidable shape, but in 1874, when the revolution was in progress and the Committee of One Hundred was asserting its power, he was nominated for another term, but Sheppard defeated him by some 4,000 majority, and Mr. Ashe, who had been a member of the Legislature and was active in securing the passage of the registry law, was defeated by a like majority for coroner by Dr. Goddard.

Under the registry law the Republican leaders became accustomed to rely entirely upon their power over the registration of voters and over the returns to

win victory for the party. To avoid the necessity of falsifying returns that was always attended with some measure of danger, the custom was to swarm the city with repeaters on election day, and have them vote on the thousands of fictitious names put upon the list of registered voters. As a rule, election officers made little inquiry as to the vote of any man who was brought to the window by the Republican window-book man.

I recall a very interesting illustration of the operations of the registry law and of the political methods in vogue at the time. A vacancy occurred in a down-town senatorial district in 1871 and a special election was called. Curtin was then absent in Russia, and his friends made little or no effort to maintain organized opposition to Cameron's supremacy. One of Cameron's shrewd methods was to present old-time followers of Curtin for local offices in close districts, who were privately pledged to follow his fortunes when elected. There was every temptation for ambitious men to do so, as it was their only chance of advancement.

The district was naturally Democratic, but under the registry law the Republican leaders had controlled it. Cameron quietly selected a business man of excellent standing in the district, who was known only as a consistent friend of Curtin, as his candidate for the place, as he was specially desirous to control the Republican members of the Legislature for his reelection the following year.

The candidate was well known to both Mann and myself, as he had co-operated with us in the battles of the past, and he called at our offices, got us together, and informed us that he was going to be a candidate for senator, and that he had been assured of the nomination. We had good reason to believe that he was Cameron's candidate, and meant simply to decoy the

Curtin people into his support, and after a brief conference I put the question directly to him, whether he was not pledged to support Cameron if elected. He insisted that he ought not to be called upon to make any declaration on the subject, as it would weaken him in the campaign, but claimed that Mann and I should support him earnestly because of our old associations. We exhibited no hostility to him, and allowed him to depart hoping that he would be supported by the Curtin people.

As soon as he had gone Mann and I conferred on the subject and decided that he should be beaten. If he had been openly and consistently for Cameron we should not have taken any action in the matter, but we were both greatly vexed at the fraud he evidently expected to practise upon us. The intimation was given to a trusted leader of the Democracy that if they nominated a clean man, especially if they nominated a soldier of good record, they might confidently rely upon his selection.

They had an early conference, and decided to present Colonel Dechert, who, in point of ability, character and gallantry in war, filled the bill completely. The Republicans admitted that he would be a very strong candidate, but as they had all the machinery in their hands with ample means, they did not doubt their ability to win. A large amount of money was appropriated by the committee to cover the cost of the election, and most of it was applied to the payment of repeaters.

Mann knew by whom the repeaters were to be organized and handled, and brought him to our office for conference. I knew him well, and our relations had been very friendly, as I had on a former occasion aided him to one of the most lucrative city offices. When he was informed that we wanted the candidate for senator defeated, he at once said that he would do whatever we advised, but he made the pertinent

inquiry: "What am I to do with the boys?" He then informed us of the two or three scores of gangs of repeaters, all of whom were already employed, many of them from the city outside of the district and some from Delaware. A captain was assigned to each gang, and he had his route mapped out for him, indicating every election place at which he should stop and have his men vote. They were all to vote at from twenty to thirty different places, and as each gang contained from eight to twelve men, it can readily be seen that the repeaters alone were expected to add from two to three thousand to the vote for the Republican candidate for senator.

All these captains were under the command of the man who was conferring with us on the subject, and received their orders directly from him. We instructed him to go on and carry out his programme and assured him that they would not be permitted to vote, but that they would not be arrested or troubled in any way unless they were guilty of riotous conduct. The arrangement was completed, and it was carried out to the letter. After this arrangement was made I immediately called upon Mayor Fox, and gave him all the facts, with the names of the captains and the route that each gang was to take from morning until night. It was necessary in order to checkmate this fraud that these gangs should not have reason to suspect that their plan had been discovered and that they would be halted in their work. The mayor selected sixty of his most reliable and discreet policemen to cover the lines where the repeaters were to do their work, with positive instructions that the gang should not be interfered with beyond the policemen going up to the captain when he reached a poll, quietly informing him that his mission was understood, that none of his men could vote at that poll without being arrested, and

that if they would move on without disturbance they would not be further interfered with.

Mayor Fox gave the subject the most careful attention, and in every instance when a gang appeared at a poll a policeman quietly stepped to the head man, told him that his business there was well known to the police, that if he attempted to poll any of the votes of his gang they would be promptly arrested, but that if they would quietly leave that poll he would permit them to pass without further interference. The result was a very quiet election, and the gangs of repeaters traveled their routes during most of the day, but found themselves stopped and forced to move quietly away from every poll. The leaders thus had no information of how their plan had been defeated, and believing that their candidate was certain to succeed, they patiently waited for the returns that they confidently expected would give them a decided majority.

They expected the Democrats to poll a considerable fraudulent vote in the Fourth Ward and vicinity, and they decided not to attempt to interfere with them, as the policemen were all Democrats, but they had planned such a stupendous system of repeating in the other wards of the district, that then embraced all of Philadelphia south of Walnut and between the rivers, that they felt entirely able to overcome anything the Democrats might do. The result was that the Republican frauds failed entirely without a suspicion of the failure on the part of the leaders until too late to correct it, and the Democrats under the lead of McMullen ran his end of the district in his own regulation way, and the Republican leaders were dumfounded when the returns came in, giving Dechert nearly 1,500 majority. This chapter of Philadelphia politics more than a generation ago is necessary to make these papers a correct history of old-time political methods.

LXXIV.

THE REIGN OF SHODDY.

Sudden Acquisition of Wealth Brought a Tidal Wave of Shoddy Ostentation—Precious Stones Flashed from Gaudily Dressed Shoddyites—Bewildering Extravagance Became Common in Hospitality—Ladies of Culture Abandoned the Display of Jewels—The Gorgeous and Vulgar Exhibition of Shoddy at the Great Ball Given to Grand Duke Alexis, Son of the Czar—The Saturday Evening Club Organized to Halt the Shoddy Display of Profligacy in Entertainments—Political Demoralization Followed the New Social Eruption—The Inevitable Revolution Came, and Many Shoddyites Died in Poverty.

WAR is the fruitful parent of demoralization, and of all such strifes civil wars are the most disturbing in all the important relations of life. They breed corruption in business and politics, and stamp their stain more or less even upon social and religious life. One of the most memorable of all the developments of our civil war was exhibited in what was long remembered, and is still remembered by many of the older residents of the city, as the reign of shoddy.

When the war began in 1861, Philadelphia was suffering from very severe and protracted industrial, commercial and financial revulsion. The suspension of the banks in 1857, and the general depression that followed in all channels of industry, were not only felt very generally in every community, but fell with special force upon Philadelphia, that was then the great commercial metropolis of the Nation, and commanded a vast preponderance of the entire Southern trade. Labor was unemployed or very inadequately required. Our manufacturers were fortunate if able to pay their

operating expenses, and our large commercial houses were greatly demoralized and simply struggling to tide over the severe strain that was upon them. I well remember in the early part of 1861, standing with several friends in front of the Continental Hotel for a considerable time, discussing the question of purchasing the Girard House for \$10,000, subject to a mortgage of \$100,000. Real estate values had reached the lowest ebb of more than a score of years, and the prospect of civil war spread the gloom of despair over the entire commercial, industrial and financial interests of the city.

When the first loan of \$50,000,000 was called for by the government to prosecute the war, the financial men of the country regarded it as a task that would exhaust the financial resources of the nation, and I recall more than one instance in which I purchased the 7-30 bonds of the government below par. The vast resources of the country were unappreciated and unknown to the people themselves. If they had then believed that a great civil war, costing many billions of dollars, was to follow the election of Lincoln, he would have been defeated by an overwhelming vote, or if they had dreamed at the beginning of the war that such enormous sacrifice of life and treasure would be necessary to maintain the unity of the States, the war would have been summarily abandoned in despair; but before the close of the first year of the war new conditions appeared, and the people of Philadelphia saw that vast fortunes were to be gathered in legitimate enterprise by the continuance of the war. Our currency was cheapened by the entire suspension of specie payments, and the increased demands of government were logically followed by increased demands for consumption by the people. As money became abundant it speedily brought a tide of apparent

prosperity that surpassed the wildest dreams of those who had hoped for fortunes.

I remember hearing Mr. Borie, of Grant's cabinet, discussing the wonderful advances in prices in the early part of the war. He cited instances in which a cargo of goods he had purchased for importation had advanced to more than double their cost before they came into his possession. All our mills and factories which had been maintained in fairly good condition were soon called upon to employ the utmost of their resources in the production of their wares or fabrics, and finally new and colossal establishments had to be created to meet the wants of the government and the public. Wealth came suddenly, and in large measure, to a class of our industrial people who had never dreamed of gaining more than a generous competence in their business. Many of them possessed little or no culture themselves, and they and their children, with rare exceptions, plunged into the most extravagant display in efforts not merely to imitate, but to surpass the hospitality and social distinction of the cultured families of the city.

During the later years of the war, and for some time after it ended, there were more precious stones and costly jewels sold in Philadelphia than have ever been sold in any like period during the last forty years, which have presented repeated tides of prosperity vastly more substantial than was shown by the flashing inflation of war.

I remember Mr. Caldwell, the founder of the present great jewelry house in Philadelphia, telling me of the extraordinary sales of precious stones and jewels made by his house, then occupying a comparatively small building below the Girard House. He said that the demand for diamonds at any price was so great that it was difficult to fill orders, and he added that the

peculiar feature of that trade was that the purchasers as a rule were often entirely unknown to him. He gave as an illustration of the class that was then indulging in very costly jewels, that a lady gaudily dressed had entered his store, purchased a \$5,000 diamond necklace, paid for it, coolly fastened it about her neck and wore it on her way home. A regular reign of shoddy dominated the city, and at the theatres, churches and other public places a profusion of diamonds flashed from the hands and necks of women whose general demeanor indicated entire ignorance of the proper use of such decorations. So generally and profusely were the precious stones of the new shoddy leaders and followers flashed upon the public without regard to the fitness of the occasion, that the women of culture in Philadelphia absolutely abandoned the use of their jewels and generally appeared on all important social occasions in the simplest elegance.

Entertainments became so lavish in expenditure and so gaudy in awkward decoration that only a very few of those who had been leaders in hospitality in the social circle of the city were able to approach their shoddy rivals in hospitable grandeur. Wealth was acquired with such marvelous haste that many of those who had been favored by fortune were utterly bewildered, and the inherent love of distinction that pervades all classes and conditions of mankind brought a flood tide of shoddy extravagance that absolutely unsettled the whole social system of the city.

I witnessed the crowning exhibition of this reign of shoddy a few years after the war, before the revulsion that began in 1873 and ended in the most fearful business and industrial revulsions in 1877, when anarchy asserted its mastery from the Eastern to the Western sea. It was the occasion of the great ball given to the Grand Duke Alexis, son of Alexander II, then

Czar of Russia. Russia had endeared the American people to her emperor and government by the bold attitude assumed during our civil war, when we were threatened with the intervention of England and France, and most generous welcome was given to the son of the Czar, who is yet living as the highest honorary naval commander of the empire. He was young, bright, spirited, handsome and genial, and he had fallen in love with the wrong woman. To divert him from a boyish love affair he was sent by his father, with a magnificent suite of Russian naval officers, on a cruise around the world.

Curtin was then our Minister to Russia, enjoying the most friendly sympathy of the Czar, and he had taken pains to pave the way for an overwhelmingly generous reception to the young duke in the chief city of Curtin's home State. The result was the greatest social event in the history of Philadelphia. It was intended as a popular tribute to the distinguished visitor, and, of course, social class distinctions were effaced. The society leaders of the city heartily entered into the movement and bore their part with becoming dignity, while mingling freely with the host of over-dressed and jewel-spangled women who crowded in every part of the vast assembly. The Academy of Music, with the parquet floored to give ample scope for the dancing, was jammed, and never before or since has there been such a gorgeous display of costly apparel and jewels.

I studied the picture for several hours, and it was one of the most impressive of the many like social events I can recall. Two well-known ladies of the city were long remembered for their appearance on that occasion in all the sweet simplicity of perfect elegance, as they were confessedly in the forefront of the many beautiful women who appeared on that occasion.

They were Mrs. Colonel Scott and Miss Schaumberg. Both were highly cultured, perfect in all the graces, courteous to all, but grandly displaying the highest dignity of American womanhood. They were elegantly dressed, of course, but in the quietest possible manner, and with each a single diamond solitaire completed the list of jewels, while most of the women around them were overladen with the most expensive laces and trimmings, and their heads, necks, waists, arms and fingers flashing the refulgence of a pitched together medley of diamonds and rubies.

Of course, so costly and bewildering a reign as that given us by shoddy in the sweeping inflation of war could not last. It brought new conditions to the homes of many hundreds of our people, and opened the doors for the refinement and culture which command universal respect, and while the mere vulgarians ran their course in the shoddy race until bankruptcy ended their career, education and refinement speedily found their way to the homes of many, and gave us a new generation of substantial people with business intelligence and social culture. When the revulsion of 1873 began its terrible reaction, extravagance was speedily checked, and as wealth had ceased to come almost unbidden to a large portion of the shoddyites, the pawnbroker finally took the last inventory of their precious stones and jewels.

This shoddy condition when at its zenith in extravagance in social and hospitable life prompted the more intelligent and cultured business and professional men of the city to confront it by a counter-movement, and it resulted in the organization of what was long known as the Saturday Evening Club, for which many yet living in Philadelphia have most grateful memories.

The club had a large membership, and it was made up entirely of representative men of the best business

and professional circles of the city, many of whom were able to keep more than abreast with the shoddyites in reckless extravagance if they had chosen to do so. They organized the club with peremptory rules forbidding even the semblance of extravagance in the entertainments. The suppers given were substantial and elegant, but all the more costly dishes were excluded, and no member was permitted to exceed the rules in a display of hospitality under penalty of dismissal.

I attended very many of these Saturday Evening Club meetings, and I am sure that those who can recall them will agree that they were the most enjoyable of all the social entertainments ever given in Philadelphia. There was no departure from the ordinary rules of gentility, and all appeared in the regulation evening dress, but there was an absence of conventional suppression at all these assemblies that opened wide the door for the most generous intercourse between the guests. It was not uncommon for several hundred of the leading men of Philadelphia to attend the Saturday Evening Club. Chairs were taken from the rooms, leaving here and there a sofa to furnish rest to the weary, as the crowded condition of the rooms required the guests to remain standing during the evening.

In one corner of the dining-room at all the meetings of the club was a special table with chairs to accommodate ten or a dozen men. It was known as the old men's corner, and they were allowed exemption from the standing rule, and were permitted to sit down to their supper and enjoy it in their own way. In the corner could be seen almost any evening the venerable General Patterson, the still more venerable William D. Lewis, with Lewis A. Godey, Joseph R. Chandler, General Cameron, General Cadwallader and others, and the brilliant Morton McMichael occasionally joined them exploiting himself as a kid, as he was not then

deemed quite venerable enough to be one of the veteran circle.

At these gatherings you could meet the representative men not only of the city but of the State, for distinguished men from any section of the Commonwealth who happened to be visiting the city were always invited guests, and no social gatherings that I have ever attended were so rich alike in entertainment and instruction. The moral effect of this movement was speedily felt throughout the shoddy circles, and brought to many an early appreciation of the fact that they were simply indulging in vulgar and costly display that offended the good taste of the public, and brought to themselves only contempt and shame. This club continued until the reign of shoddy perished, and it ended its good work when its purpose was completely and grandly accomplished.

Not only did the reign of shoddy assert itself with conspicuous offensiveness in social life, but it also asserted itself to an alarming degree in the politics of the city. The Philadelphia Row offices had been cultivated to the limit in extortionate abuses, and a term in one of them was an ample fortune for any incumbent who knew how to husband his money. The overshadowing interest in the war, and the general prevalence of extravagance and display, made the people indifferent to equal extravagant jobbery in political life. Offices were created in the city furnishing what would have been considered fortunes before the war, and most channels of city authority were prostituted to graft that was generally largely expended in display.

I recall a prominent politician of that time who was chosen by councils for the head of one of the city departments with a salary of \$3,000 a year. He was not a man of fortune; on the contrary, he was probably bankrupt at the time he gained the office, but immediately

upon his election he gave an entertainment that not only crowded his house, but his entire yard that had been fitted up at an enormous expense, with a most lavish supper and abundance of wine. The entertainment cost nearly double an entire year's salary, but the expenditure of over \$5,000 for a single entertainment was regarded as a mere bagatelle in many of the official circles of that day. Hundreds of men who before the war regarded a glass of beer as a luxury, guzzled wine until many were intoxicated, and long before the midnight hour there was high revelry in house and yard to the music of hundreds of canary birds summoned for the occasion to greet the guests with song.

Every day about noon a party of ten or a dozen leaders assembled at Jerry Walker's, and their appetites were never appeased with less than a full basket of champagne, while on some occasions the gathering would multiply and two or three baskets would be smashed before the lunch ended. This reckless extravagance brought its inexorable penalty, and a majority of the men who thus had opportunities to possess large amounts of money by various species of graft died in comparative poverty.

Another instance that I recall pointedly illustrates the reckless methods by which our financial departments were then conducted. I was one day called upon by a prominent man of the city who had held high official position. He stated that he desired to engage me professionally in a matter that would be mutually advantageous to both of us. The Pennsylvania Railroad then paid, as I remember, about \$30,000 a year direct taxes to the city, and the proposed client suggested that I might, by reason of my close relations with Colonel Scott, obtain permission from the company to take its check to the tax office, pay the company's taxes, and receive a properly executed

receipt for the same. I said that it might be possible for me to obtain permission from the company to deliver its check for the payment of taxes, but naturally inquired how that could benefit either the client or myself.

He assured me that if I obtained the check for payment of the company's taxes he would go with me himself and I should personally see the two financial officers of the city who were then required to sign the receipt and receive a properly executed and bona fide receipt, and immediately after the payment of the tax, one-third of the full amount would be paid to me, and the remaining two-thirds would be appropriated to the client and parties inside of the tax office.

Of course the proposition was promptly rejected. It would not have done any good, and might have done me much harm if I had resented it in the aggressive manner that would have been fully justified under the circumstances. I declined the proffer on the ground that I could not join in a transaction that involved such a violation of the trust the company might repose in me, and that also might result in personal disgrace.

I asked him how it was possible for such transactions to be made without detection, and he informed me that it was not an uncommon thing to divide up between outside counsel and inside grafters payments made to the treasury in very large sums.

It seemed to me almost incredible, but the man understood his business well, was trained in all the high art of the grafting of that day, and was not in any sense a wild adventurer in the scheme.

It became an open secret some years after a prominent and generally respected citizen was chosen to the tax office that the first day he entered upon his duties he appropriated \$100,000 in cash to himself. I do not recall a single one of the larger thefts of public money

that brought the guilty parties to exposure and punishment. Occasionally a petty subordinate would be caught in an awkward imitation of his principals and go to prison, but the leaders who invented and executed the bewildering debauchery and profligacy of those days suffered no more than general suspicion that their wealth had been lawlessly obtained, and the public had learned to look upon it as the regulation thing to regard it with comparative indifference.

Revolution came, as it always must, to correct such appalling abuses, and it was the Committee of One Hundred that finally swept the grafters from power in a tempest of retribution. Unfortunately tempestuous revolutions speedily exhaust their powers, and after a decade, in which nearly every important office in the city, from mayor down, was filled by reform candidates, some of the shrewder of the old machine leaders, with new leaders gradually developed, stealthily crept into power, and substantial reform in the only truly American and most intelligent city of the continent lingered only as a memory.

LXXV.

ROBERT W. MACKEY.

The Ablest All-Around Republican Leader of Pennsylvania—Quay His Promising Lieutenant—How Quay Made Mackey State Treasurer—Mackey the Master Leader of the Party for a Full Decade—His Method of Controlling Conventions and Legislators—His Close Relations with Both Wallace and Randall—How He Saved the Electoral Vote of Florida for Hayes—Mackey Saved Wallace in His Contest for Senator—How He Defeated Fusion and Elected Hoyt Governor.

THE year 1869 brought to the front Robert W. Mackey, the ablest all-around leader the Republicans of Pennsylvania have ever created. Quay, although a young man, had become an important factor in State politics. He was first felt in 1863, when by his admirable management he nominated Judge Agnew, of his own town, for the supreme bench. Agnew had little popular following, although eminently fitted for the judicial office, and his nomination had to be accomplished by earnest political efforts and combinations, in which Quay had then proved himself a master.

In his last year of service in the house, in the session of 1867, the unfriendly barrier between him and the Cameron power of the State had been substantially overthrown, and in the Legislature of 1868 he readily accomplished the election of General W. W. Irwin, of Beaver County, to the office of State treasurer. He had in the early part of the war secured the appointment of Irwin as commissary general of the State, and as that position ended with the termination of the war, he asserted his leadership by making Irwin State treasurer.

Irwin was not a man of great political force, and owed his position entirely to Quay, but some months after Irwin entered the office of State treasurer a serious difference arose between Irwin and himself. The reasons for the estrangement were never made public by Quay, but he decided, some months before the Legislature of 1869 met, that Irwin should not be re-elected, and he brought out Mackey as his candidate.

Mackey was then cashier of the Allegheny Bank. He had started his career without fortune, and almost without friends, but General George W. Cass, then president of the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne & Chicago Railroad, and an active Democrat, procured a position for Mackey when yet in his teens, and Mackey rapidly advanced himself by his extraordinary ability. Although Cass was the leading Democrat of Allegheny and Mackey was rapidly developing as the leading Republican, Cass stood loyally by him in every struggle that Mackey had and was largely instrumental in enabling him to reach his important position in the bank. When Quay decided to make Mackey his candidate for State treasurer to defeat Irwin, Cass came promptly to Mackey's aid, and whatever financial influences were felt in the contest might have been traced directly to Cass.

So quietly did Quay manage his campaign against Irwin that Mackey was not publicly discussed until about the time that the Legislature met, but as the senators and representatives gathered in Harrisburg it was soon discovered that Mackey was a very formidable candidate, and long before the caucus met Irwin was hopelessly distanced in the race. I first met Mackey when he came on to Harrisburg to exploit his candidacy for State treasurer, and was greatly disappointed in his appearance. He had every indication of a racking consumptive, and looked more like one



Robert W. Mackay

who should be seeking some sunny place to winter for the preservation of his health than to be struggling for a political position. He had every sign of hopeless physical infirmity, and his stooping shoulders and shuffling gait indicated lack of vigor. He was then little known outside of Pittsburg, and most of the leaders of the party were startled at Quay's audacious movement to displace his friend from his own county whom he had placed in office and give it to a comparative stranger who was generally regarded as unable to render any special political service in return; but before Mackey was a year in the office of State treasurer he became not only the foremost of the Cameron lieutenants, but was well on the way to the absolute leadership of the party in the State.

Curtin was then in Russia, and although his organization was practically abandoned in the State, there was much irritation among his old friends who were severely ostracised by Senators Cameron and Cowan, who necessarily controlled the patronage of the National administration in Pennsylvania, and that bitterness asserted itself to a sufficient extent in the Legislature of 1870 to bring about a combination between the anti-Cameron Republicans of the Legislature and the Democrats that defeated Mackey for re-election and restored Irwin to the office from which Quay had ejected him. Mackey bore his defeat philosophically and immediately began his organization to re-elect himself the following year, and so complete and methodical was his organization made that he not only defeated Irwin with ease, but held his organization in the hollow of his hand from that time until his death some ten years later.

I was brought into more or less intimate intercourse with all the political leaders of the State for nearly half a century, and I have never known one on either

side who was such a thoroughly accomplished political master as Robert W. Mackey. There was not a quality of leadership that he did not possess, and there was hardly a fault in his leadership that could be presented. His whole time during the seasons when most politicians were taking little interest in politics was devoted to preparing the way for the control of the coming Republican State convention and the coming Legislature. When a Legislature adjourned he was thoroughly familiar with the individual qualities of every member, and he knew just who of his party should be left at home and who should be returned. He did not make his plans publicly known even in the localities where he was operating, but any member of the Legislature who for any reason was deemed only fit in Mackey's judgment for retirement to private life would discover when he turned his attention to his renomination that some unseen power had shaped the action of the party for his defeat, and those who in Mackey's judgment merited re-election were quietly aided in every way before the contest for nominations was opened, and thus, as a rule, the men he wished to be renominated won out with ease, and those who were deemed unworthy of renomination suffered defeat that apparently came from the voluntary action of their own people.

It was not Mackey's policy to debauch legislators or delegates to political conventions, but he expended money liberally in every senatorial and representative district to aid the election of the party candidates, and the result was that when a Legislature assembled at Harrisburg an overwhelming majority of the Republicans were Mackey's devoted friends. Unlike some political leaders, he had no love for striking down men who were obstacles to the consummation of his plans. He would always exhaust all friendly offices, but when it became necessary for him to accept open war with

any man he would strike from the shoulder, and few survived such a conflict with him.

In like manner he superintended the election of delegates to State conventions. He often made candidates for the Legislature and for delegates to conventions long before others thought of making a contest for the place, and when money was needed to reconcile party differences or to elect his favorite candidates it was always freely supplied. He was the one party leader in Pennsylvania who accepted no vacation in politics, and while others were letting politics run their course waiting for the time to come around for action, Mackey covered every district in the State and knew with almost absolute certainty who would be delegates to the State convention, and who the successful candidates for legislative nominations months before the people of the local districts thought of agitating the subject. He was universally popular, a delightful and genial companion, a most unselfish and faithful friend, and was scrupulous to the last degree in fulfilling every political obligation that he made. From the time of his generally accepted leadership, when he and Quay were the nominal lieutenants of Cameron until his death, he never was defeated in a Republican State convention and never lost control of a single Legislature.

Mackey's omnipotence as a leader was not only felt by the Republicans of the State; but it often invaded the lines of the Democracy, and I can recall several occasions on which Mackey absolutely controlled the final action of the Democratic State convention. He had the personal friendship of nearly every Democratic senator and representative, and he was generously kind to the members without regard to their political faith. And the Greenback organization, that was a somewhat formidable political factor during his leadership, he made a mere plaything in his hands.

He became the substantial owner of its leaders, and on more than one occasion made it play a most illogical part by which he saved his own party from defeat. The Republican majority in the State was not then overwhelming, and for many years the Greenback party held the balance of power and would logically have fused with the Democracy if there had been resolutely honest Greenback leadership. But for his ingenious control of political factors which were naturally hostile to the Republican party, the Republicans would have lost the Governor in 1875, when Hartranft was re-elected, and again in 1878, when Hoyt triumphed over Dill.

The Democratic leaders would appear in the senate and house at Harrisburg breathing implacable hostility to Mackey's absolute mastery, but before the session was half over a majority of them would be found co-operating with Mackey in matters of mutual interest, and but few of them ever remained to fight the battle to a finish. His strength was in his wonderful knowledge of men, his ingenious adaptability to the qualities of those with whom he came in contact, with a willingness to render service to any and all whenever possible, and his absolute fidelity to his pledges. He is the only one of all the great leaders I have known in Pennsylvania who never was accused of deception or failure in the fulfillment of his plighted faith.

While Cameron was accepted as the leader of the party, he was simply consulted in all the general movements made by Mackey, and I doubt whether Cameron ever attempted to reverse a policy that had been determined upon by his lieutenant. No man in the State ever wielded the same power in the Legislature for a full decade that was wielded by Mackey, and he always strengthened himself by rendering the kindest offices to all who had any just claim to Legislative

action. When a State convention met he seldom appeared in it, but as a rule he dictated every movement that was made, every platform that was adopted, and every candidate who was nominated. He was so infirm in health that he was often unable to leave his room, and I have seen him when unable to leave his bed, and when his doctor forbade any disturbance, turn the doctor out of the room and receive two or three of his leaders who needed directions from their master as to how unexpected complications should be met. He was not only great in all the details of politics which so many leaders forget, but he was equally great in the greatest emergencies which arose to be met by the party.

When he was State treasurer he suffered very heavy loss by the failure of Mr. Yerkes, then a banker in Philadelphia, and now the great railway magnate of London, but his friends at once came to his rescue, and some three or four banks of the State placed to the credit of the Commonwealth the full amount of the deficiency. The treasury then always carried a cash account of several millions, and of course the ~~credits~~ credits thus given, while making the treasury absolutely solid, were not drawn upon by the State treasurer until he had accumulated sufficient money to make the deposits good. His power over the Legislature saved him in that emergency. The period had come when the State war taxes were intolerably oppressive, especially upon our manufacturing interests, and it became a necessity to repeal the taxes to save many manufacturers from bankruptcy. The Legislature had been appealed to, but it was always unpopular to vote to relieve the rich of taxes, and nothing was accomplished. There was but one man who could bring the Legislature to the point of giving the relief that was indispensable, and that man was Mackey. A combination of manufac-

turers was effected, and proposed to give a large percentage of one year's taxes if the repeal could be accomplished. The proposition was accepted by an outside party, but in fact by Mackey, and the repeal was accomplished, and Mackey's losses were more than restored.

Mackey cared but little for money, except so far as he needed it in his liberal habits of life. During the decade of his great political power he lived largely on whisky, that he had learned to use chiefly for nourishment, but he never reached the stage of intoxication. He never knew what it was to enjoy a single day of good health during the period. He was a hopeless consumptive, and his lungs were measurably relieved by maintaining an external abscess, the healing of which would have been speedily fatal; and often his conversation would be interrupted by a paroxysm of coughing so violent that it seemed impossible for him to survive it, but when he mastered it, he would take the whisky stimulant, and proceed with his conversation as complacently as if he were in the most robust health.

It was Mackey who saved the electoral vote of Florida to Hayes in 1876. When the contest began after the November election the leaders of both parties were giving their best efforts to control the final declaration of the vote of South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana. Mackey was selected by the party leaders to visit Florida and take charge of the management of affairs in that State. He had purchased the Pittsburg "Commercial" from Mr. Brigham a few years before, and Brigham had settled in Florida, where he had become a political power, as he was an experienced politician and a man of much more than ordinary ability. He received what he regarded as an ample competence by the sale of his paper, and decided to spend the remainder of his days on an orange farm in Florida.

Mackey started on the same train and in the same car with two Democratic representatives, bent on the same mission, who did not personally know Mackey. He had every appearance of a far-gone invalid, and his distressing cough told the story that he was going South in search of sunshine and health. He overheard a conversation between the Democratic representatives in which they discussed their plans and determined in full detail how they were going to operate in Florida to obtain the electoral vote of the State. Mackey slipped out of the car, prepared a telegram to Brigham, giving the precise plans of the Democratic leaders, and before they arrived at the capital of the State all their movements were completely frustrated, and the electoral vote was gained for Hayes.

In 1869, when Governor Geary had been nominated for re-election, Mackey was not enthusiastically devoted to Geary and would have been quite willing to see him defeated if an acceptable Democrat could take his place. His old friend, General Cass, was a candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor, and Mackey exhausted his efforts to accomplish the success of his old friend and benefactor. Asa Packer was made a candidate for the nomination against his own wishes, and Thomas Collins, one of the leading railroad contractors of the State, then possessing ample fortune and considerable political experience, was devotedly attached to Packer.

Mackey ascertained that a number of commercial delegates in Philadelphia could control the nomination and give it to Cass, and without communicating with Cass or any of his friends, he made a deal with these delegates to support Cass, and put up his own checks for \$12,000. "Tom" Collins, as he was familiarly named, found that the Philadelphians were in the market, ascertained the price, and a few hours before

the ballot, he gathered up \$13,000 in spot cash, paid it over to the contracting leaders, and nominated Packer. Neither Cass nor Packer had any knowledge of the efforts made to purchase delegates in their interest, and Collins never informed Packer of the expenditure he had made to secure his acceptance as a Democratic candidate. I have heard Mackey refer to this incident as an evidence that in an emergency spot cash will beat checks.

During Mackey's rule there never was an apportionment bill passed that he did not fashion, and when in the senate and legislating to conform conditions to the new Constitution, I recall the care with which he revised every movement that was made. The regular senatorial term was to be four years thereafter, and one-half the senate was to be elected every two years, divided by odd and even numbers. He had the districts arbitrarily numbered so that the debatable districts would come in the off-years, when under his method of manipulation it was always possible to carry close or Democratic districts.

He framed every tax bill, and, by the generous policy he aided the corporations in obtaining, he greatly enlarged their taxes and chiefly with their consent. He studiously avoided everything having the appearance of arbitrary legislative action, and commanded practically universal confidence from all the great corporate and industrial interests of the State, as well as the confidence of the people. He dictated the laws providing for the contest of Presidential electors, and for the trial of all other disputed elections in the State. I mention these facts to show what a thorough master Mackey was in all the minutest details of political management. He had the keenest perception to devise the most plausible methods for carrying out his purposes, and no point of vital interest was overlooked.

During the entire period of Mackey's Republican leadership Wallace and Randall were the Democratic leaders of the State, and each had his ardent factional supporters against the other. They were seldom in accord, but both were devoted friends of Mackey, and he rendered most essential service to them that was not visible to the public. When he first became omnipotent in legislative control, a new congressional apportionment was to be made, and it was not only easy to make all the congressional districts of Philadelphia strongly Republican, but it required a shoe-string district running along the wharf from Southwark to Richmond to corral the Democratic majority in one district.

Naturally, the Republican leaders of the city wanted a Republican district in place of Randall's, but Mackey stood resolutely against it, and Randall's district was preserved by Mackey and afterward by Quay until Randall's death. Randall owed his district wholly to Mackey, and it is needless to say that in many ways Randall reciprocated the kindness when it could be done without the betrayal of his party.

Wallace always had very close relations with Mackey, and they rendered very important service to each other. While both maintained fidelity to their respective parties, they many times could give valuable personal or political aid to each other, and it was always done. But for Mackey, Wallace would have been defeated for United States Senator in 1875. Buckalew had become greatly offended at Wallace for refusing him the compliment of a nomination for re-election at the expiration of Buckalew's term.

Buckalew was intensely embittered and went to Harrisburg and got more than enough Democrats in a combination to defeat Wallace's election, as the Democratic majority was small on joint ballot. Mackey, of

course, represented the Republicans in the Legislature, and knowing that only a Democrat could be elected, was sincerely in favor of Wallace succeeding without making any proclamation of his wishes.

Buckalew's manager proposed to Mackey that if Mackey would unite the Republicans he would defeat Wallace and elect any Democrat that Mackey might name. It was a plausible proposition, and had Mackey and Wallace been in the earnest political antagonism that their surface actions indicated it would have been readily accepted. Mackey, after apparently holding the proposition under advisement until near the time of election, gave as his ultimatum that the Republicans would unite with the Buckalew Democrats and elect any Republican United States Senator that the Democrats might name.

He knew that the proposition was one impossible of acceptance, and that it would end in Wallace's election. I was present in Wallace's room in the Bolton House with a number of his leading friends on the day before the election of Senator, when he received information directly from Buckalew's manager that the contest was ended, and that they would yield to his election because they could not succeed with any other Democrat. Buckalew could not afford to elect a Republican Senator in a Democratic Legislature, and he saw that if there was any break in the Democratic ranks, more than enough Republicans to elect Wallace would declare that, in a choice between Democrats, they preferred him. Thus did Mackey make himself the leader of leaders of all political parties in the State, and his record of leadership stands out without parallel in the history of Pennsylvania politics.

Mackey made his great battle in 1878, when in co-operation with Cameron and Quay he nominated Judge Hoyt for Governor, one of the ablest men who ever

filled the position. Political conditions were very uncertain, as the Greenbackers swept Maine from her Republican moorings at the September election, resulting in Democratic-Greenback fusion to control the Governor and the Legislature. The Greenback element in Pennsylvania was more than sufficient to wrest the State from the Republicans, but Mackey controlled its organization as absolutely as he controlled that of the Republicans.

He had it meet first and nominate a candidate who was under contract not to surrender to fusion; and having the Greenback element entirely eliminated as a danger signal, with Quay as chairman of the State committee, they decided to open the campaign by a distinct declaration in favor of the sound money standard. That would have been utterly fatal if the Greenback element had not been under absolute control, but with that danger entirely eliminated, it was the winning card for the Republicans to play. The result was that Hoyt was elected by 22,353 plurality, while Mason, Greenback, polled 81,758 votes.

The severe strain upon Mackey in the great work of wresting victory in a contest where the people voted some 60,000 against him, with the opposition elements severed only by the most consummate leadership, was too great for Mackey's enfeebled power. He went to New York for rest immediately after the election to spend a week or two with his friend Daly, who nursed him with the greatest care, but finding that he did not improve, his great desire was to be brought to his home in Pittsburg, where, after a few weeks of suffering, the greatest of all our Pennsylvania politicians quietly slept the sleep that knows no waking.

LXXVI.

GEARY RE-ELECTED GOVERNOR.

The Curtin Element Decided to Defeat Geary Because the Whole Power of His Administration Had Been Directed to Overthrow Curtin—Chairman Covode's Conference with Mann and the Author—Benjamin Harris Brewster Retired from Attorney Generalship—F. Carroll Brewster Appointed—This Change Saved Geary's Election—How the Border Relief Bill Made a Judge—Brewster and the Author Become Close Friends.

THERE is always a general relaxation of the strains of politics after an exhaustive National battle, and although the majority for Grant in 1868 was large in both the popular vote and the Electoral College, the battle was a desperate one, and was desperately fought in all the debatable States from Connecticut to the Mississippi. Pennsylvania, on the largest poll ever cast up to that time, gave the Republicans less than 9,000 majority at the October election, and New York was carried by Seymour against Grant by 10,000.

When the political conflict of 1869 came along the Republicans of Pennsylvania were not eager for the fray. A Governor and supreme judge were to be elected in this State, and as Geary was an earnest candidate for re-election, and had the active support of Cameron, he was practically without competitors before the Republican State convention. His administration had not specially strengthened either the Governor or the party, and there were distinct murmurs of hostility on the part of some of the old Curtin followers, and very general indifference among the Republican people generally. Robert W. Mackey, who was just then

developing as a leader in the State, having been State treasurer for one term, was more than willing to allow Geary to be defeated if he could control the Democratic nomination.

I have stated in a previous chapter the desperate effort he made in the Democratic convention of that year to nominate General George W. Cass over Asa Packer. He had met every requirement of the commercial Democratic contingent that held the control of the nomination, and believed that he had secured the success of his old benefactor and devoted friend; but just on the eve of the nomination "Tom" Collins came in with his spot cash and nominated Packer. If Cass had been nominated by the Democratic convention he would certainly have been elected, as Mackey would have shown him more than fair play on the Republican side. All that the Democrats needed that year to win out against Geary was a square election in the city of Philadelphia. After the defeat of Cass, Mackey was quite indifferent as to Geary's success, but as he had no claim upon Packer's friendship, and had nothing favorable to expect from him as Governor, he finally decided that it was necessary for Geary to be elected, and he was party to the arrangements made in Philadelphia by which a majority was returned in the city sufficiently large to give him a second term.

Packer and Geary, the opposing candidates for Governor, were distinctly opposing types of men. Packer was severely quiet and unassuming in all his relations with men in public and private, and never made effort to popularize himself with the masses. He devoted himself strictly to his great business operations, and, outside of his immediate neighbors in the Lehigh region, he was little personally known by the masses throughout the State. He had long struggled, and often on the very verge of despair, to build up his

great Lehigh Valley Railroad system, and when he had it accomplished it absorbed his interests, and he had no taste for the diversion of political conflicts. He was forced into the nomination for Governor as he had been the year before forced into the position of being presented as Pennsylvania's Democratic candidate for President. Geary, on the other hand, mingled with the people, loved display, and had kind words and liberal promises for all who came within the range of his acquaintance. His administration presented no distinctly discreditable features, and there were no political grounds upon which he could be assailed with effect. The campaign dragged along in a perfunctory way, as Packer did not attempt anything like a canvass of the State, and Geary was not a formidable political disputant.

In every section of the State there were men of prominence and ability who had been practically retired from politics because of their devotion to Curtin, and this ostracism the Geary administration had aided in bringing upon them. John Covode was chairman of the Republican State committee, and thoroughly familiar with the political elements of the State. A month or so before the election he had been testing the conditions in various parts of the Commonwealth, and he had become alarmed at what was at least absolute indifference on the part of the Curtin people, as well as a large measure of indifference among the Republican voters generally. Colonel Mann, who was the Curtin leader of Philadelphia, had been forced off the ticket the year before, and his friends generally were made strangers to both National and State party patronage. He was still the great leader of the Republican organization of the city, and without him at the front Philadelphia was a doubtful political problem. He had been urged to take the stump for Geary and

had declined, and I had also declined a similar invitation on the ground that I had absolutely retired from active participation in politics, as I had fully determined at the close of the Grant campaign, when I settled in Philadelphia, to practise my profession.

Mann and I occupied the same suite of law offices, and Covode called upon us and made a very earnest appeal to both of us to go to the front in support of Geary's re-election. I peremptorily declined, not only because it was then my purpose to retire from all active political efforts, but also because the only return I had received from Geary for earnestly supporting him three years before was systematic personal defamation from his own cabinet. Mann declined for the reason that Geary had joined in the systematic and relentless ostracism of all of Curtin's friends in the patronage of both National and State administrations. Covode became greatly alarmed, as he well knew that if the anti-Cameron men of the State decided to resent the hostility Geary had exhibited to them, Geary's defeat was inevitable. He asked whether we had no conditions to propose by which the two political factions could be brought into accord in support of Geary, but my answer was that the only political desire I cherished was to be entirely relieved of all political obligations and duties, and that I could not be interested in Geary's re-election while he had as attorney general a man who had, without any provocation whatever, indulged in public defamation of my political record; and Mann joined in the declaration that there could be no hearty co-operation in support of the ticket from the anti-Cameron people while Geary's present cabinet remained in office.

Covode asked us to withhold definite answer for two or three days, saying that he would meet us again. On the second day after he left us he returned, obviously

after having conferred with Governor Geary, and made the plain proposition to us that Attorney General Brewster would be removed from office immediately after the election, and any person appointed as his successor whom we would name. We both answered that if the proposition should be seriously entertained no promise of a change in the State cabinet would be accepted, but that the change must be made as a condition precedent if we should decide to accept. This condition required Covode to ask that another interview be had on the following day, as he evidently had to confer further with his chief. He saw that Mann was inexorable, and he certainly knew that I specially desired not to become involved in politics at all, much as I was tempted to renew political efforts if thereby a change in the State cabinet could be effected. On the following day Covode appeared again, and stated that every condition we had proposed would be accepted; that an immediate change would be made in the attorney generalship of the State, and that any reputable Republican named by us would be made Brewster's successor. We accepted his proposition, and said that if he would return to our office in an hour we would name the new attorney general. Covode was greatly elated, as he believed that he had removed the most serious danger signal of the campaign.

When Covode left us I asked Mann whom he wanted for attorney general, to which he answered that Attorney General Brewster merited the severest punishment that could be inflicted upon him because of his persistent public criticism of both of us. He suggested that the man who would entirely fill the bill was Frederick Carroll Brewster, the half brother of Attorney General Benjamin Harris Brewster, as the appointment of Frederick Carroll would be the severest humiliation that could be given.



Benjamin Harris Brewster

Frederick Carroll Brewster was one of the most accomplished lawyers of the Philadelphia bar, but the two half brothers had never been upon terms even to the extent of personally recognizing each other. The sudden removal of Benjamin Harris Brewster from the attorney generalship, with Frederick Carroll, his unrecognized half brother, as his successor was a crushing blow to the attorney general, and it came like a bolt from an unclouded sky. He was then at Atlantic City enjoying a rest, and the first intimation he had of the matter was a request from the Governor for his resignation. He was dumfounded when notified that his resignation was desired, and when he learned who was to be his successor he peremptorily refused to resign. Covode made an earnest appeal to Mann and myself to allow the matter to go over until after the election, personally pledging himself that the change would be made, but we both peremptorily refused, and the result was the immediate removal of Benjamin Harris Brewster, and the appointment of his half brother.

But for this cabinet change Geary would undoubtedly have been defeated. In one of the earlier chapters, when speaking of Asa Packer as one of the men who was a leader in the development of the Lehigh region, I stated the fact that the leaders in Philadelphia, in a conference with Mackey some time after the election, met for the purpose of deciding whether Geary's election could be contested without involving themselves in personal peril. Geary's majority in the State was only a little over 4,000, being less than the majority returned in the city of Philadelphia, and it was then alleged to be largely or wholly fraudulent. The frauds perpetrated in Philadelphia were not conceived and executed for the purpose of electing Geary, but the arrangement made by Covode with Mann, who held the machinery of the city in his hand, made him willing

that Geary should profit by whatever was done for the election of city officers and members of the Legislature. I had no personal knowledge of the undercurrent political movements in the city by which the Republicans gained a decided majority, but I speak advisedly when I say that the leaders who managed Republican affairs in the city more than doubted Geary's honest election, and he was the only Governor of Pennsylvania who entered upon the highest trust of the State with a clouded commission. Johnson was elected in 1848 by only 300 majority, but he was accepted by all of every political faith as the honestly chosen Executive.

Governor Geary, who was entirely ignorant that any other than legitimate efforts had been made for his success, naturally assumed that his personal strength had given him the victory, and immediately after his second inauguration in January, 1870, he bloomed out as a full-fledged Presidential candidate. The Republicans had lost all of the debatable States in the election of 1869, and Geary plumed himself on his personal victory in Pennsylvania. There were already distinct mutterings not only throughout Pennsylvania, but throughout the North generally, against the administration of Grant, and Geary believed himself to be fairly in line for the succession. He was entrenched in the Governorship for three years more, and logically all who needed or desired his favor encouraged him in his aspirations for the Presidency. He struck out boldly for various reforms to popularize himself with the people, including an earnest official appeal to the Legislature for the immediate application of the surplus money in the treasury to the reduction of the State debt, which would have practically put the State treasurer out of business, as the only profits of the office were in his use of several millions of surplus money. He

more distinctly emphasized his appeal to popular favor by his veto of the bill for the construction of the Pine Creek Railway by the use of the credit of the State, by which he grievously disappointed Colonel Scott and others, who were struggling to enlarge the railway system of the Commonwealth, and who had made the movement, as they believed, with the approval of the Governor.

I was brought into more friendly relations with Geary during his second term, and found him a most useful factor in gaining an additional appropriation of \$300,000. to the people of Chambersburg. They had received a half million some five years before, and most of the people had rebuilt their homes and business places when prices were the highest ever known because of the inflation of currency, and bankruptcy finally threatened most of them. It was decided to appeal to the Legislature for additional aid, and, although I then resided in Philadelphia, I was called upon to aid them in the movement, and spent some weeks at Harrisburg struggling against very powerful opposition for the relief of my old neighbors. Governor Geary had agreed that he would approve any appropriation bill the Legislature passed, but refused to take the initiative by officially recommending it.

There was little prospect of success for the measure until a vacancy happened in the Chambersburg judicial district. Francis Jordan, then secretary of the commonwealth, was a brother-in-law of ex-Senator Louis W. Hall, then a resident of Harrisburg, and of William M. Hall, of Bedford, who was ambitious to succeed to the president judgeship of the district. Geary was naturally desirous to serve his secretary of the commonwealth, who was a most creditable public officer. He sent for me and proposed that if I would get the members of the Chambersburg bar to unite in recom-

mending Hall, of Bedford, for the judgeship he would send to the Legislature a special message in such terms as I desired, recommending the appropriation for the relief of Chambersburg. It is proper to say that Mr. Hall would not have been the choice of the members of the bar of Chambersburg for the judgeship. If he had been, no such proposition would have been made to me. I arranged by telegraph a confidential meeting of the entire bar of Chambersburg, and went there and presented the proposition to them. They were very reluctant to unite in recommending the proposed candidate for judge, but a very large proportion of the people of Chambersburg were on the verge of bankruptcy, and they finally agreed that if Geary would send a special message to the Legislature, as he proposed, they would unite in naming Hall for the judgeship. I returned to Harrisburg, reported to the Governor, and he at once asked me to sit down at his desk and write the message I desired. I did so; he immediately had it copied, signed it, and sent it to both branches of the Legislature. The whole force of the administration was earnestly thrown into the support of the appropriation, and it was by that arrangement, and that alone, that the additional \$300,000 were received by the Chambersburg sufferers. Hall was appointed and elected, and served acceptably as judge until the judicial apportionment under the new Constitution separated Franklin, leaving him the president judge of the Bedford District.

Geary continued as a hopeful candidate for the Presidency, and expected to unite the various elements of opposition to Grant. The first National convention of 1872 was held by the Labor Reformers in Columbus, and Geary's friends very actively supported his nomination. On the first ballot he received the largest vote of any, being 60 for Geary to 59 for Horace H.

Jay, 47 for David Davis and 15 for Wendell Phillips, with a number scattering. On the fourth ballot David Davis was nominated, with Joel Parker, of New Jersey, for Vice-President. Had Judge Davis been nominated by the Liberal Republican convention in Cincinnati the same year he would doubtless have remained in the field, and would probably have been elected, but after the Liberal Republicans nominated Greeley, Davis and Parker both declined, and the Labor Reform organization was practically retired from the contest. Geary gave a luke-warm support to Grant, but was not thereafter in very hearty accord with his party. He served through his second term, making a creditable record and suddenly died very soon after he retired from the Executive chair.

I had no personal acquaintance with Benjamin Harris Brewster beyond one or two very casual meetings, until after he retired from the attorney generalship. A few weeks after his retirement I met him one afternoon at George Lauman's, whose liquor store on Ninth, below Chestnut, was one of the general resorts of the town for politicians, members of the bar and others who dropped in during the afternoon because they were certain to meet congenial people. When I entered the room there were probably twenty congregated there, including ex-Attorney General Brewster. He immediately arose, advanced half way across the room to meet me, held out his hand and said in the hearing of all, "I want very much to know the man who was big enough to dismiss me from the attorney generalship of the State." He added that he had greatly misunderstood me, and he desired thereafter that we should be friends, saying in his enthusiastic way that if ever he could be of service to me he was more than willing to do so.

From that time until the day of his death I had no

more devoted friend than Benjamin Harris Brewster. He exhibited it on various very important occasions, and it was a great pleasure to me when I had opportunity to render him a service, as I did when he entered the cabinet as Attorney General of the United States. When I was counted out of the senatorship at the special election of 1872, he called at my office early the next morning, volunteered his professional services without charge to aid in conducting the case, and during the several weeks of the trial he was constant in aiding Cassidy and Hagert. He also volunteered in like manner several years later when Naval Contractor McKay brought eighteen libel suits against "The Times," including a civil suit for \$100,000 damages, and confidently expected to sell out "The Times" and send its editor to prison, Brewster came forward, volunteered to join in the defense without fee, and, although too ill to appear in court when the case was tried, he rendered very important aid in preparation for the trial. When President Dauphin, of the Louisiana Lottery Company, brought suit against me for \$100,000 in the city of New Orleans, after having failed in a similar suit in Pennsylvania, I called on Attorney General Brewster on my way home, and he voluntarily proposed to go into the United States Supreme Court and intervene on the part of the government to force the hearing of the Philadelphia case before that tribunal before the Louisiana case could be tried. He was none the less devoted to Cameron, but there never was an office of friendship that he could offer in my interest that was not freely and generously given; and of all the many friends who have fallen in the race, there are few whose passing away I more sincerely lamented than that of Benjamin Harris Brewster.

LXXVII.

THE ADVENT OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE.

Negroes Vote in 1871 under the Fifteenth Amendment—Large Republican Element Opposed Suffrage for the Black Man—Democratic Activity Quickened by the Issue—Colonel Mann Re-elected District Attorney—Bitter Feeling in the Sections of the City Where There Was a Large Negro Vote—Murderous Riots on Election Day, and Cato, Chase and Gordon Murdered on the Streets—None of the Offenders ever Brought to Justice—Immense Public Meeting Called for the Conviction of the Murderers—How the Negro Vote Was Demoralized.

THERE was almost a dead calm in Pennsylvania politics in 1870, when there were no State officers to elect. No Republican State convention was held in 1870, and there was, therefore, no official party deliverance on the subject of negro suffrage that was attained by the colored race that year by the supreme command of the fundamental law of the Nation. The Constitution of Pennsylvania provided that all "white" male citizens of the State, properly qualified as taxpayers and residents, should enjoy the right of suffrage. Thaddeus Stevens, who had been a member of the convention, refused to sign the Constitution for the single reason that it contained the word "white" in defining the qualification of electors.

The question of negro suffrage had been made an important political issue after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the National Constitution, proclaimed as part of the fundamental law on the 28th of July, 1868, which declared the negro as a citizen

of the United States, and provided that no State shall make any law to "abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." That amendment to the National Constitution, fairly interpreted, gave suffrage to the negroes, but the grant was hidden under diplomatic language, and was not accepted by any of the Northern States. Pennsylvania, although reliably Republican, did "abridge the privileges" of the colored citizens by denying them the right of suffrage, and the Republicans of the State on the hustings and in their party deliverances, denied that the fourteenth amendment gave suffrage to the black man. A very large proportion of the Republicans were unwilling to accept negro suffrage, and had it been enforced under the fourteenth amendment as early as 1868, it would have been disastrous to the party. Congress did not assume to control the question of suffrage in the States, as that was confessedly a State prerogative, but it provided that where any particular class of citizens was disfranchised the representation in Congress should be diminished accordingly. As Pennsylvania had the word "white" in her fundamental law, the negro voter was excluded, but the State was guilty of violation of the fourteenth amendment by abridging the privileges of the colored citizen.

The fifteenth amendment to the National Constitution met the issue boldly. Its full text is as follows: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." This amendment to the Constitution was ratified by the requisite number of States, Pennsylvania having voted for its ratification on March 26, 1869, and it was officially proclaimed as part of the Constitution, March 30, 1870, from which date the colored citizens of Pennsylvania had equal

right of suffrage with the whites. This amendment to the National Constitution did not assume to regulate the question of suffrage in the States, but it simply protected all races and classes of citizens from discrimination on account of race. It left the States free to limit suffrage to the standard of property, intelligence, residence, payment of taxes, etc., but it eliminated the race question, and required that every privilege granted to the whites should be granted to the blacks.

Fortunately the issue of negro suffrage had to be met by the Republicans in Pennsylvania in 1870, when no State officers were to be chosen, and when there were no National issues of vital interest to invite political activity. The aggressive hostility to negro suffrage was confined to particular localities, embracing the slum districts of Philadelphia and the mining regions, where there was a large citizenship of foreign elements. The Irish, as a rule, were specially hostile to negro suffrage, and the same prejudices obtained very largely with the most of our mining element; there was no serious contest that year, and no special effort was made to organize the negroes, as no State officers were to be chosen and no exciting contest on local places to be filled in Philadelphia. In addition to the special race prejudices, a very considerable number of native Republicans, including some of large intelligence, were earnestly averse to an extension of suffrage that would bring in a considerable number of voters who would largely increase the illiterate voters of the State. The result was that a very large proportion, and possibly even a majority, of the colored voters of Philadelphia were not organized and equipped for suffrage, and did not appear at the polls.

The Democrats organized to control the congressional districts and the Legislature, and made an unusually successful campaign. They could not hope to revolu-

tionize any of the congressional districts of Philadelphia, as nearly all the Democratic wards were in Randall's district, and the other four districts were strongly Republican. They did, however, make a combination in the Second district by which Charles O'Neill, who had represented the district for a number of years, was defeated by J. D. Creely, an Independent Republican, by nearly a thousand votes. Cessna, Republican, of Bedford, who represented the Sixteenth district, was defeated by B. F. Meyers; Morrell, Republican, of Cambria, who represented the Seventeenth district, was defeated by R. Milton Speer; Armstrong, Republican, of Lycoming, who represented the Eighteenth district, was defeated by Herman Sherwood; Gilfillin, Republican, of Mercer, who represented the Twentieth district, was defeated by Samuel Griffith; Henry D. Foster, who had been returned as elected in the Twenty-first district, but was ousted in a contest with Covode, was elected in that district over Andrew Stewart, and Donley, Republican, of Greene, who represented the Twenty-fourth district, was defeated by McLelland.

The only Democratic district gained by the Republicans was by the election of L. D. Shoemaker in the Luzerne district, over the late Chief Justice McCollum. Cessna, Morrell and Armstrong were all defeated by very small majorities. Meyers' returned majority over Cessna was 15, and Cessna contested, but failed to obtain a seat in the Republican House. Morrell was defeated by 11 and Armstrong by 27, but both refused to contest, as neither was willing to hold a seat in Congress on a doubtful title. The Democrats succeeded for the first time after the war in gaining control of the State senate, as the new Legislature had 17 Democratic senators to 16 Republicans. The Republicans, however, had 12 majority in the house. There is no

reason to doubt that the advent of colored suffrage was the chief, if not the sole, obstacle to Republican success in the State in the contest of 1870.

In 1871 there were two State officers to be elected—attorney general and surveyor general, and Quay asserted his political power by nominating Dr. Stanton, of Beaver, for auditor general. Stanton was a reputable village physician with little acquaintance in the State, and without political experience in leadership. He was nominated solely by the skillful management of Colonel Quay, and General Beath, a gallant soldier, of Philadelphia, was made the candidate for surveyor general. The Democrats entered the campaign with great confidence, relying upon the question of negro suffrage as the issue that would give them victory. To escape criticism for the attitude of the party in the Civil War, the Democratic convention unanimously nominated General McCandless, of Philadelphia, for auditor general, and Colonel Cooper for surveyor general, both of whom stood out conspicuously in the list of Pennsylvania soldiers who had proved their heroism in the flame of battle, and they made quite an aggressive campaign. The Democrats were confident of carrying the State outside of Philadelphia, and the Republicans appreciated their peril and made exhaustive effort to organize Philadelphia and bring out the largest majority that could be obtained.

Colonel Mann had passed a new election system, known as the registry law, that practically placed the whole election machinery of the city in his own hands, for he was then the absolute commander of the party organization. It enabled him not only to name the majority of the officers of each election board, but also to name the minority, although required by the law to have a minority ostensibly of different political faith from that of the majority. The result was that

the election boards of the city, in the districts where election frauds were common, were almost or entirely in the control of the Republican organization, as purchasable or utterly ignorant Democrats were appointed as minority election officers where voting early and often was the rule, while in the districts where fraud was unknown and could not be attempted with safety, Democrats of high character were selected as the minority officers.

Mann was renominated for district attorney, and he regarded it as the great struggle of his life to regain his position, from which he was compelled to retire in 1868 to harmonize the party. He was a master organizer, and had abundant aid in his political lieutenants, and ample means to elect himself and save the State ticket. A portion of the old anti-Mann Republicans either refused to vote for district attorney, or cast their votes for Furman Sheppard, his opponent, who had filled the office with much more than ordinary credit. The negroes were thoroughly organized, provided with tax receipts, and ward and division leaders were given positions, or pay, to see that the entire negro vote was polled. While there was little political excitement throughout the State, the battle in Philadelphia was one of the most desperate that was ever fought, both sides pressing the struggle with tireless energy, and employing all the resources they could command. In the districts where there was a large negro vote, and where the whites were below the average of general intelligence, campaign orators devoted themselves wholly to the task of inflaming the prejudices of the ignorant against the negro as a voter, and threats were made all through those regions of the city that even violent efforts would be employed to prevent the negroes from voting.

The negroes were aroused on the subject, as the

appeals were made to them to assert their rights if they ever intended to enjoy them, and solemn determination became very general amongst the negroes. The result was that many riots occurred in the downtown portions of the city, where there was a large negro vote, and three negroes, Messrs. Cato, Chase and Gordon, were murdered on the streets, and more than a score were seriously wounded by murderous attacks made upon the negroes when they attempted to vote. Professor Cato was one of the most cultivated negroes of the city, and neither he nor Chase nor Gordon was guilty of any provocation whatever beyond his appearance at the polls to exercise his rights as a citizen. The Republicans carried the city by some 13,000 majority, and the majority for the Republican candidate for auditor general in the State was little more than a thousand in excess of the majority received in the city. General Beath, who was a most gallant soldier and popular with the Grand Army, had over 20,000 majority in the State, and Mann was returned to the district attorney's office by a majority considerably less than that received by the Republican State candidates.

The Democrats lost the senate by one majority, the senators elected standing seventeen Republicans to sixteen Democrats, but after the election, and before the Legislature met, Senator Connell, of the Fourth district in Philadelphia, died, leaving the senate standing sixteen to sixteen, but the Republicans had a dozen majority in the house and on joint ballot. The senate remained a tie until the 30th of January, when a special election was held, in which Colonel Henry W. Gray was returned as elected over me as an independent candidate, but on a contest he was displaced and the seat given to me.

It was wholly Colonel Mann's battle in the city of

Philadelphia, and it was generally accepted that upon him depended the result in both city and State. His single ambition was to regain the district attorneyship, believing that once recalled to it by the people of the city he could hold it indefinitely. While Philadelphia has had great public prosecutors, such as William B. Reed, Furman Sheppard, Henry S. Hagert and Lewis C. Cassidy, who held the position for a brief period, it was not disputed that Mann was the ablest all-around prosecutor who ever filled the position. He was a man of the tenderest sensibilities, and often in the discharge of his official duties strained the law to serve the mission of mercy, but when great cases came into the oyer and terminer and he was called upon to summon his masterly abilities for the battle no man could have surpassed him, either as trial lawyer or advocate. His theory of the proper method of regaining political control in Philadelphia seemed to stand vindicated by his re-election, and he felt confident that, with the control of the election machinery of the city in his own hands, his power could be perpetuated indefinitely. In this he erred as nearly or quite as all political leaders err at some period of their careers. The registry law, by which he had practically made the Democrats voiceless in the control of the election boards of the city, aroused most violent opposition, and was the chief inspiration to the early revolution that swept him out of office by humiliating defeat three years later, and forced the constitutional convention that effaced the registry law and all its objectionable features from the statutes of the State.

The one ineffaceable stain upon the administration of justice in Philadelphia is the fact that none of the murderous rioters of election day in 1871 who killed Cato, Chase and Gordon and wounded many others, were ever brought to justice. Considering that Phila-

delphia had a Republican city administration, prosecuting officer and largely Republican judiciary, and that Cato, Chase and Gordon gave their lives in an unoffending effort to exercise the right of citizenship by voting the Republican ticket, it is a blistering reproach upon Philadelphia that not one of the criminals ever made atonement before the law. It was common in those days, and for years thereafter, for Republican speakers to accuse the South of hindering negro suffrage by violence and at times by murder, but here in Philadelphia, the Republican citadel of the State, three murders were committed on the public streets in open day, and a score or more wounded solely because they attempted in an unoffending manner to exercise their right as citizens and electors, and not a single criminal was brought to punishment. If the murders had been committed under cover of night and in the absence of witnesses, there might be some excuse for not discovering the guilty parties; but here was murder, red-handed, at noonday, in the public streets of the city, and not a pistol was fired or a knife drawn with murderous intent that was not in the presence of witnesses. Several persons were arrested, but they were not the real guilty parties, and the failure to discover who the murderers were and bring them to justice can be explained only by the assumption that lawless political interests, which at times serve fraudulent elections, were potent enough to shield the murderers of the black men whose exercise of suffrage in the City of Brotherly Love was made in the baptism of their own life's blood.

The murder of Cato, Chase and Gordon aroused public sentiment to aggressive action, and within a few days after the election when the murders were committed, a public meeting was called in Concert Hall, that was crowded to its uttermost with leading citizens and presided over by ex-Governor Pollock.

A number of speeches were made and resolutions adopted demanding the prompt arrest and punishment not only of the murderers of Cato, Chase and Gordon, but of all who had attempted by violence to prevent colored voters from exercising the right of suffrage. On the other hand, the worst elements of the colored people were aroused to avenge the wrongs of their race, and the lawlessness of the whites was a direct appeal to the baser elements of the blacks to resort to lawlessness in vindication of their rights.

The violence resulting in murder and serious injuries to many at the election of 1871, laid the foundation for the demoralization of a large portion of the colored voters of the city. They saw that the whites could resist them by violence without punishment, and they were inflamed to violent political efforts, which were at times inspired by corrupt compensation, to organize for the pollution of the ballot; and considering the conditions which then existed, with their limited opportunities for appreciation of the sanctity of citizenship, they are much less to blame for their demoralization than are those who taught them the way to crime.

Had the negroes been welcomed by their white fellow-citizens to the dignified citizenship the supreme law of the Nation had given them, there would have been an immense number of them ready to accept a just appreciation of its solemn responsibilities, and to teach their race the necessity of dignifying their citizenship, and proving that it had not been unworthily bestowed; but no such helping hand has been given to the negroes in this city, and to-day, with honorable exceptions to be found in every section of the city, the colored voters are rated as mere commercial quantities in politics. They long held control of the political power of the city, and had they been organized by the honest aid to which they were justly entitled from their

white fellow-citizens, they would not only have been a credit to our voting population, but their men of culture and distinction would have been called to positions of public trust, and thus invited all to fit themselves to win public confidence and political advancement; but with all the power they possessed, we have never nominated a colored man in Philadelphia for a political position above the office of councilman; not one has ever sat in the Legislature, not one has been nominated for any of the city offices, not one has been thought of for Congress, and they were denied even representation on the police of the city until Mayor King, Democrat, elected nearly a decade after the negroes had been enfranchised, first promoted them to positions on the police. For this demoralization the black man should not be held solely, or even chiefly, responsible, for the crime was not only made possible, but it was practically enforced by the political methods of the white man.

LXXVIII.

THE McCLURE-GRAY SENATORIAL
CONTEST.

Serious Revolt Against the Methods of the Grant Administration—Death of Senator Connell Made a Special Senatorial Election in January, 1872—Republican Leaders Tendered the Place to the Author, But with Conditions That Could Not Be Accepted—Interposition of President Grant Led to the Author's Final Acceptance of the Candidacy—Colonel Scott Dined with President Grant and Cameron and Urged to Force the Author to Retire from the Contest—A Tempestuous Political Struggle of Ten Days—Nineteenth Ward Rounders Decide That the McClure Meeting Should Not Be Held—How They Were Finally Persuaded to Peace.

THE year 1872 opened with the Republican sky overcast by clouded harmony and murmurs of discontent were heard in every section of the State and country. A large number of the ablest Republican United States Senators had become aggressively estranged from President Grant, who had entered the highest civil trust of the Nation an entire stranger to experience in civil administration, and had apparently not attempted to learn the difference between civil and military authority. A President who had provoked the open opposition of such Senators of his own party as Lyman Trumbull, of Illinois; Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts; Carl Schurz, then of Missouri, and Reuben E. Fenton, of New York, certainly exhibited a lack of the qualities of statesmanship. These eminent leaders of the party were not offended because of disappointment in the distribution of political favors. They represented the able and inde-

pendent statesmanship of the Nation, and throughout the ranks of the party in every section of the country there was very general discontent with the administration of Grant, who, like the Bourbons of old, had learned nothing and forgotten nothing in nearly four years of civil administration.

By the upheaval of 1872, although he escaped defeat by the folly of the opposition, he was somewhat tempered and liberalized in his views, but he never fully broadened out to the highest stature of both military and civil manhood until after his retirement from the Presidency at the expiration of two terms. He journeyed around the world, and came in much closer contact with the people than ever before, and had he been nominated and elected President in 1880, when his friends made a desperate battle for a third term in Chicago, I doubt not that he would have made as nearly a faultless President as any who had ever filled the position. In 1872, however, he rejected the counsels of all who came in contact with his policy, and obstinately invited defeat by driving outside the party battlements very many of the ablest leaders of the Republican party.

Revolt was exhibited in every part of Pennsylvania, and especially in Philadelphia, where opposition to ring rule had been intensified to the uttermost by the violent fall election of 1871. Open rebellion was threatened on every hand. The issue in Philadelphia was suddenly precipitated in the first month of the year. George Connell, who had served four terms in the senate, and was elected to the fifth term on the 10th of October, 1871, died within two weeks after his election, leaving a vacancy in the senate that then stood sixteen Democrats and sixteen Republicans. Although Mr. Connell died on the 27th of October, more than two months before the meeting of the Legis-

lature, it was held that the speaker of the senate could not issue a writ for a special election until the Legislature met and had official notification of the vacancy. The result was that the writ was not issued until the first week in January, and the 30th of the month was fixed for the special senatorial election.

I had taken no part in politics after locating in Philadelphia in 1868, not only because I felt that I had performed my full share of political service, but because my unfortunate financial condition demanded that I should devote my energies to my profession. I had not delivered a political speech during my residence in Philadelphia, with the single exception of a brief address at the indignation meeting held after the election of 1870 to denounce the murderous attacks made upon the colored men, resulting in the death of Cato, Chase and Gordon, and really had no part in the political movements in the city beyond two political episodes relating to Geary's cabinet and the special election of a senator in the city, which have been described in earlier chapters. Having been overwhelmingly bankrupted by the destruction of Chambersburg and rebuilding at the highest prices for material and labor, I desired only to be free to give my whole energies to business. I had been a resident of the city only a little more than three years and, of course, had no thought of being considered eligible for any city office, but a number of prominent business men, largely interested in the general development of the State and in liberal legislation to aid them, personally appealed to me to become a candidate for senator. Among them were Colonel Scott, whose vast railway interests were yet in their infancy as compared with the progress attained to-day, and William G. Moorehead, Jay Cooke's partner in what was then one of the greatest banking houses of the country, both of whom had gone through

desperate legislative struggles to enable them to develop the wealth of the State, with a number of the leading business houses largely interested in municipal and legislative reform. They earnestly urged me to consent to serve if elected, and they made like earnest appeals to the political leaders of the city, whose power over nominations was absolute, to tender me the nomination.

They knew that I was not in accord with the profligate rule of the city and that I was specially opposed to the registry law and the dishonest political methods by which political power was so often maintained. Fearing that the district might be in danger, the leaders finally agreed that they would tender me the unanimous nomination. That would have meant an election without a contest, making the one condition, however, that I should not attempt to repeal the registry law. A committee, consisting of William H. Kemble, John L. Hill and James McManes, called upon me and urged me to accept the nomination with the condition annexed. I told them frankly that I had openly opposed and denounced the registry law from the time it was first presented to the Legislature as a disgrace to the Republican party and a reproach upon every intelligent, honest Republican citizen of Philadelphia, and that I could not accept the condition. They answered frankly that I could not be nominated, to which I replied that as I sincerely desired not to be elected senator there were no regrets on my part, and I believed that the incident was closed. After further consultation the same committee returned with a modified proposition, that they would give me the unanimous nomination for senator and instruct me to support the registry law, assuming that I could avoid opposing it because of the instructions under which I was nominated. I answered that if the nomi-

nation was accepted with such instructions it would be the duty of the person nominated to obey them, but that I could not, under any circumstances, enter the senate without entire freedom to urge an honest election law. That ended the conference, and, as I supposed, eliminated me entirely from the senatorial contest, much to my own gratification.

A few days thereafter William G. Moorehead came into my office and said that he desired to make a personal explanation in confidence. He had in his hand a paper that I had not seen or heard of, signed by himself and some fifty or more prominent citizens of the ward in which I lived, urging me to accept the nomination for senator. He had not been advised of what had transpired between the political leaders and myself, and supposed the question was still an open one. He said he very much desired my election to the senate, as he had been one of the first and most earnest in urging me to become a candidate, but that he had just received from Washington official information that would place him, or any other, in antagonism to the President who favored my election to the senate. He was one of the first who had signed the paper, and he asked my permission to erase his name from it, but added that while he could take no public part in the contest he would gladly aid my election if I became a candidate to any extent within his power, and he proved his sincerity by a \$1,500 contribution to the cause. I asked him to let me see the paper, and he handed it to me. After looking over it I threw it into the open fire and said that I fully understood the delicacy of his position, and that as the paper was now destroyed he was entirely relieved. I added that now, for the first time, I felt inclined to become a candidate for senator. But for that incident I am quite sure that under no circumstances could I have been drawn


into a political contest at that time. The insolence of power as exhibited by a President dictating to the banker of the government whom he should support or oppose for a local legislative office provoked me to defiant resentment.

I immediately called together at Colonel Scott's office half a dozen or more of those who had been insisting upon my candidacy, and said to them that I was ready to make the battle, not as the candidate of the organization, but against it, if they were willing to support me, and they all heartily assented. It meant a desperate struggle against fearful odds, but I felt that the time had come when some one must lead a revolution and the duty seemed to devolve on me. There were a number of prominent candidates for the Republican nomination for the senatorship when it became known that my name was not to be presented, and after a desperate contest Henry W. Gray, then councilman from the Twenty-second ward, and prominent as the head of a piano-manufacturing company, a position that he has filled for many years with credit, was nominated. Within twenty-four hours after the nomination was made, a letter was delivered to me signed by some 800 citizens of the district, embracing the names of the leading business men and manufacturers, asking me to become an independent reform candidate for senator, and on the following day I published a letter of acceptance, leaving but ten days in which to make the battle in the district. There was not a reform organization in a single ward of the district, and I was in the position of a bankrupt candidate starting out without organization, or any of the ordinary political resources, to give battle to a compact political combination that had created the election board in every division of the district, and that could command tens of thousands to bring

out the vote and compensate fraud, but the time was ripe for rebellion, and I could do no less than accept the responsibility.

The same influence that made Mr. Moorehead withdraw from open support at a time when I had no longer thought of being a candidate reached Colonel Scott. Cameron was in the Senate and the next Legislature was to elect his successor. He knew that I was not in favor of Grant's nomination, as Grant well knew himself, and Cameron, knowing my close relations with Colonel Scott, believed that through Scott my retirement could be enforced. Scott sent for me the evening of the day that I announced myself as a candidate, and informed me that he was going South that night and would probably be away until after the election. He stated that he would stop in Washington, where he was to dine with Cameron and the President on the following day; that he might, after conference with friends in Washington, change his mind as to the advisability of my continuing as a candidate in the district; "but," said he, "you were always obstinate and I don't suppose that it would make any difference if I did advise you to withdraw." I told him that such a contingency would doubtless be met to his entire satisfaction. He obviously meant me to fully understand that any advices he gave me from Washington were not to be accepted, and without further conversation on the subject the matter was fully understood by both.

On the following day Scott dined with the President and Cameron and the question of the Philadelphia senatorship was the chief theme of discussion. Cameron said that there was a very short way to settle it; that I was bankrupt and largely dependent upon Scott in the practice of my profession, and that if Scott demanded my retirement I would not refuse obedience.



New Capitol

Scott reminded Cameron that he had many opportunities to discover how obstinate I was in political conflicts, and that he very much doubted whether he could accomplish my withdrawal. He agreed, however, that he would send to me any despatch that Cameron might prepare. After dinner the work of preparing a despatch for Scott to send to me was gravely considered by the President and the party, and Cameron finally drafted one that seemed to be satisfactory to all. It stated that Scott, after intercourse with a number of friends and on mature reflection, was fully convinced that it would be most unfortunate for me to make the battle for senator and urged me to retire. After the message had been fashioned to the entire satisfaction of the party and was about to be sent to the telegraph operator, Cameron called a halt and said that as Scott was going South and would not be home until after the election, I would be likely to put the despatch in the waste basket, and deny that I had ever received it. To which Scott answered that he could obviate that difficulty by sending the despatch to R. D. Barclay, his secretary, with instructions to deliver it to me in person and get the answer. The following morning Mr. Barclay came into my office, trying to exhibit the indifference that would become a man entirely innocent of what he was doing, and said that he had a despatch from Colonel Scott, with instructions to deliver it to me in person and get the answer. After reading the despatch I instructed Barclay to answer Colonel Scott that I was publicly committed to the contest and could not retire without dishonor.

A series of public meetings were at once announced by an improvised campaign committee covering every section of the district, and requiring me to speak from two to three times every night. The Democrats had

in the meantime endorsed my nomination, as did the reform organization of the city, and I doubt whether ever a campaign of ten days aroused such intense interest among the people of the district. Meetings were overcrowded on both sides, and the Machine organization was strained to the uttermost to arrest the overwhelming revolutionary tide that confronted it. Among other places meetings were called in the Nineteenth ward, then the center of repeating and other pollution of the ballot in the uptown districts, and the Machine thugs in that region openly declared that I should not be permitted to speak in the ward. It will grate very harshly on the ears of all fair-minded citizens when I state that District Attorney Mann and Sheriff Leeds called at my office and notified me that I could not speak in the Nineteenth ward because they would be unable to preserve the peace, and could not be held responsible for the result. Mann was personally friendly, but owed everything to the organization, and had to go with it. Leeds was part of the organization and believed in all its measures even to the most desperate of them. I reminded them that they should not call upon me, but as the highest officers charged with the protection of the peace and the maintenance of law and order they should go to the lawless people of the Nineteenth ward and notify them that freedom of speech was a right that belonged to all, and that any interference on their part would be promptly and severely punished. Leeds informed me that he could not maintain the peace, and the mayor was powerless, as the people there were in a riotous condition. I ended the conversation by notifying them that I would go there to speak at the time appointed, and that it was up to them to decide whether there should be riot or peace. After further conference with the mayor they decided that they must maintain the peace, and

hundreds of policemen were ordered to be on duty at the time.

Another question that was soberly considered in the office of the mayor of the city, in the presence of the district attorney, sheriff and Mr. McCullough, the secretary of the mayor, was whether the repeaters usually employed by the party could venture out to vote against me in the face of the general uprising of the people. Mann earnestly protested against the use of any unfair means to defeat me, and Robert S. Tittermary, who was present, and who was closely related to the repeating system of the city, strongly advised against it on the ground that the revolutionary spirit was too strong to attempt any violent measures. After considerable discussion it was decided that repeaters should not be called out, and Colonel Mann came to my office and congratulated me on my assured election, as it had been decided at the mayor's office that the election should be fairly and honestly conducted.

On the evening that I was to speak in the Nineteenth ward I applied to a friend in the city who understood just the kind of men I wanted and asked for a personal guard of twelve men, who were to be well armed and who knew how to fight in a battle with thugs. The men were not hard to obtain, and twelve men were brought together who had very positive instructions not to exhibit themselves in any ostentatious manner, that they should drop into the car along the route to the meeting, and when I got out of the car to be close around me without exhibiting any sign of their purpose. When the car stopped in front of the hall the streets were filled with a boisterous crowd and hundreds of policemen were there on duty. Policemen had been placed in every saloon near the hall, and instructions given that under no circumstances was I to be disturbed or interrupted. When I landed there the

sergeant of police met me and said he was instructed to escort me into the hall, to which I answered that I needed no escort and walked forward to enter the hall myself, along with the crowd, but around me were the men who were there for my protection.

The room was crowded to suffocation and a large majority of the men were evidently in a very bad humor and chafing under the restraint the police had put upon them. I never faced quite so uninviting an audience, but there was only one thing to do, and that was to either become master of the situation at once, or have the thugs become masters. I commenced by stating that election frauds were more flagrant in that ward than in any other in the city; that at the last election the return was grossly fraudulent and false, and that it was made with the approval of the political leaders. Someone in the rear of the audience yelled out: "That's a lie," but he was knocked down almost before the sentence was finished, and when someone attempted to come to his aid he was knocked down as quickly. For the first time the political thugs discovered that they were not entirely on safe ground, and the behavior of the audience thereafter was excellent. I walked out of the hall and down to the car apparently alone, but close by were the twelve faithful men, who were then quite out of humor themselves because they had not succeeded in getting a row worthy of the occasion. The experience of that evening ended all disturbance at my meetings and the battle was fought out to a finish without violence. On Monday night, the evening before the election, the Hartranft ball was held in the Academy of Music, and someone who had managed to get hold of one of my tickets brought it to the leaders at the Hartranft ball and insisted that now, as they could duplicate my ticket, the repeaters should be turned out the next day as the only hope of defeating me. There was

only a single name on the ticket, and I had a large ticket printed some three inches in length and one and a half inches in width. Nearly all of the leaders were present at the Hartranft ball, and some protested earnestly, including Mr. Tittermary, who was expected to take an active part, but they were overwhelmed and orders were issued that repeaters should resume their vocation the next morning and exhaust their power to increase the vote against me. Tittermary was in with the repeaters who operated that day and played his own part in the work. He was dependent upon the party and had to obey orders, but when midnight of election day came, after the returns had all been received, a friend asked me to go to a particular room in a hotel down Chestnut Street. I did so, and there found Robert S. Tittermary, who gave me the entire programme of the fraud, planned and executed to defeat me, with the names of the actors and every place where fraud had been perpetrated and how it had been done. The result was that when I commenced a contest I did not have to grope in the dark, but knew exactly where to strike and whom to summon. A card published the next morning stated my purpose to contest the election, and the first man at my office soon after breakfast was Benjamin Harris Brewster, to offer his services as counsel in the case, expressly providing that no fee should be paid. Henry S. Hagert, Lewis C. Cassidy and David W. Sellers also volunteered and rendered important service. It was not difficult to state the facts on which the contest was made in the petition to go to the senate, as I was minutely informed by Tittermary and later by others of all the plans adopted and carried into effect to defeat my election. Mr. Gray was returned as elected by 891 majority, and how that majority was falsely fashioned, and how it was corrected, will be an interesting story for another chapter.

LXXIX.

THE CONTESTED SENATORIAL ELECTION OF 1872.

The Author Returned as Defeated by 891 Majority—Protracted Struggle to Get a Petition for Contest before the Senate—Interesting Incidents of the Struggle—A Special Law Enacted to Try the Case—Plan of Leaders to Draw a Set-up Committee—Clerk Hammersley Refuses to Do It, and Informs the Author—A Democratic Committee Obtained—Appalling Fraud Developed in the Trial of the Contest—Jail Birds Hired to Swear Falsely That They Had Repeated for McClure—Colonel Gray Acquits Himself of the Frauds.

THE morning after the special election held on the 30th of January, 1872, when Henry W. Gray was returned as elected senator over me, by 891 majority, I proceeded at once to prepare a petition setting forth the numerous frauds which had been practised by which a majority of over 2,000 had been transposed to nearly 900 majority against me. It was not difficult to prepare the petition, as the facts were all in my possession. It was not really necessary to present all the varied phases of fraud which had been perpetrated in the contest, but as the complete details of the pollution of the ballot box were known to me. I presented in the petition every feature of fraud that had been instituted, and gave all the details of its execution, making the petition a printed volume of nearly 300 pages.

On the 8th of February the petition was presented to the senate, and Amos Briggs, as attorney for Mr. Gray, then holding the seat, appeared before the body and filed a plea denying the jurisdiction of the body under

the law. The general law of the State providing for legislative contests declared that no petition contesting a seat "shall be acted upon by the Legislature unless the same be presented within ten days after the organization of the Legislature next succeeding the election." As the special election was not held until nearly thirty days after the Legislature met, a strict construction of the act of 1839 precluded the admission of the petition; but the question had arisen in several cases, and in every instance it was accepted that when a special election was held during the meeting of the Legislature, the contestant was required to file his petition within ten days after the certificate of election was issued. The question was referred to the judiciary committee of the body, consisting of Messrs. White, Fitch and Munna, Republicans, and Messrs. Wallace and Davis, Democrats. By a resolution of the senate, Messrs. Strang and Warfel, Republicans, and Purman and Buckalew, Democrats, were added to the committee for the consideration of the special case, and the majority of the committee, on strict party vote, reported to the senate that the petition could not be received under any existing laws.

Senator White, of Indiana, who had long been prominent in the Republican leadership of the State, took the laboring oar to enforce the policy of denying me the right to contest the seat of Gray before the senate, and when the Republican majority of the judiciary committee united in the report against the reception of my petition, it was naturally assumed by White and his friends that I would be denied a hearing, and, of course, could not obtain the seat.

Partisan feeling was much embittered and White had every reason to believe that, with a Republican majority of one in the senate, as long as Gray held the seat he could indefinitely hinder the hearing of the

case, but he was not correctly advised as to the true conditions which existed in the senate. There were three Republican senators who were entirely satisfied that I had been elected, and who had decided that, at the proper time, they would assert themselves and assure a hearing of the case and my admission to the senate. These three Republican senators were Billingsfelt, of Lancaster; Strang, of Tioga, and Davis, of Philadelphia. Before the judiciary committee reported against receiving the petition, Strang, who was one of the additional members added to the committee, conferred with me on the subject, and I concurred in his views that he should agree with the majority, and not show his hand at that stage of the proceeding, as it was entirely competent for the senate, whenever it was decided that the act of 1839 did not cover the case, to decide in its own way how the case should be heard and determined, as the senate was the sole judge of the election and qualification of its members.

By agreement, Billingsfelt, a ruggedly honest German from Lancaster, and Strang, certainly then the ablest of the Republican leaders in the body, and Davis, who had been twice speaker of the house, decided that they would allow White's policy to prevail until he had settled the question that the act of 1839 did not apply, and then they would demand a hearing of the case under a much fairer law. Under the act of 1839 the drawing of the committee would have been a mere lottery, and they were more than willing to let White have his own way in rejecting that act, as it would be certain to result in a much fairer special provision, either by statute of both houses or by special order of the senate, to form a tribunal for the trial of the case. As soon as it was decided by the senate that under the act of 1839 the petition could not be received Senator Davis took the lead, and declared that it was the duty



Henry W. Gray

of the senate to receive the petition under a law of its own creation, and determine it as a matter of justice to the people of the district, as well as to the senate, and Strang and Billingsfelt both joined in the demand that the case must be heard. A special law was framed and as a matter of courtesy it was sent to the house for concurrence. A caucus was immediately called by the Republican leaders under Speaker Elliott, to decide against passing any law on the subject, believing that the senate would not attempt to treat the case without a statute passed by both branches. Thomas V. Cooper was then a member of the house and knew the situation thoroughly. He got together some twenty or thirty members, and gave notice that they would not obey the caucus decree to deny a hearing of my petition, and it had to be abandoned. The house, finding that the senate would act independently of it, finally agreed to accept the act prepared by Senator Billingsfelt, which provided that the senate should select six of the seven members of the committee to try the case, each senator voting for but three, and that the remaining senators, excepting the speaker and the senator whose seat was contested, should have their names put in a box, and thirteen names drawn therefrom by the clerk, after which each side should alternately strike names from the list until one remained, the remaining name to constitute the seventh member of the committee.

Under this law the Democrats selected Buckalew, of Columbia; J. Depuy Davis, of Berks, and Dill, of Union, and the Republicans elected White, of Indiana; Fitch, of Susquehanna, and Mumma, of Dauphin. The election of these members of the committee left in the senate fourteen Republicans, including the speaker and Senator Gray, whose seat was contested, and thirteen Democrats, but of the fourteen Republicans remaining the speaker's name and that of Senator Gray could not

go into the box, thus reducing the Republican force from which the additional member might be drawn to twelve, and with the names of Billingsfelt, Strang and Davis, who, without having made any public avowal of the subject, were positively and earnestly desirous to aid in giving me the seat because they were entirely convinced of my election, withdrawn from the Republican partisan column, left the opposition but nine senators while the thirteen Democrats, with Billingsfelt, Strang and Davis added, made seventeen who meant to have a thorough investigation, fully satisfied that it would give me the seat.

Of course the attitude of Billingsfelt, Strang and Davis was not known to White and his followers, and they were quite hopeful that they might obtain a committee that would be subject to partisan commands. So embittered had the struggle become that positive orders were given to George W. Hammersley, then chief clerk of the senate, to draw a majority of Republicans among the thirteen names to be taken from the box. Hammersley was a strong partisan, but an old and sincere friend of mine, and when he received the orders he immediately reported to me, and informed me that he would not under any circumstances perpetrate the fraud. There were two assistant clerks, the senior of whom was Thomas B. Cochran, of Lancaster, a resolutely honest official, and the other was McKee, of Westmoreland, who was presumed to be entirely obedient to orders. Hammersley advised me that he would simply notify the masters that he would not serve in drawing the committee, and he knew that they would attempt to have McKee take his place, but Billingsfelt was at once advised of it, and as Cochran was his own immediate constituent, he solved the problem very quickly by moving that Assistant Clerk Cochran take the place of the chief clerk in drawing the committee. With him against them, the Repub-

licans were in the minority, and they were compelled to assent to Cochran serving.

I was amazed to learn from Hammersley that it was a very easy proceeding for the clerk to bring out names entirely according to his own wishes, by simply rolling tightly the tickets containing the members not wanted, and rolling more loosely the tickets containing the names of members whose selection was desired. As the box is shaken in public view of the senate after the tickets are placed in it, the closely rolled tickets would settle to the bottom, and the looser ones remain on top, but Cochran folded his tickets all alike, and the drawing was watched with breathless interest. The senate was crowded to the uttermost and two Republican members who were paired with absent Democrats were forced to violate their pairs and permit their names to go into the box. They were Mr. Delamater,* of Crawford, father of the later senator who was candidate for Governor in 1890, who was paired with Senator Knight, of Bucks, and H. Jones Brooke, of Delaware, who was paired with Senator Finley, of Somerset. All that was necessary for these paired senators to fulfill their solemn compact was to refuse to answer when called to have their names placed in the box. It was well known to all the members of the body that both Delamater and Brooke had paired with Democrats who were then absent, but both responded to their names, and although challenged by my counsel, they both denied the obligation of the pair and that was conclusive. Senator Finley had been suddenly called to Philadelphia the day before, and after arranging the

* Senator Delamater, after noticing this statement in the public press, recently wrote the author that injustice was done him in stating that he had violated his pledge, as he had notified Senator Knight before the case came before the senate that he would withdraw his pair because of the protracted illness of Senator Knight.

pair with Brooke, submitted it to me for approval. I at once assented to it, as I did not doubt that Mr. Brooke would faithfully fulfill his obligation, but when challenged he arose in his place and denied that he was paired with Senator Finley. Finley was telegraphed at once the situation, and he returned the same evening. On the following morning he went into the senate before it had been called to order, found Brooke in his seat, and informed him that he had violated his solemn faith, and that if he did not rise in the senate and confess that he had violated his pledge, Finley declared that he would horsewhip him before he left the Capitol, and the rugged senator from the glades of the Alleghenies meant just what he said. Brooke at once admitted to Finley that he had paired and that he would make a declaration to the senate, and when the body was called to order he arose in his place and said that he had unintentionally violated his solemnly plighted faith to the senator from Somerset, but that he did it when under the influence of opiates, having been ill for some time, and that all memory of his pair had faded away. Brooke had long been in public life, was quite sensitive as to his reputation for integrity, and with tears scalding his cheeks he begged of the senate to forgive the wrong he had unconsciously committed, and accept his assurance that only severe mental and physical disturbance had made it possible.

Fortunately the violated pairs did not affect the result. The names drawn from the box ran very nearly even in both parties, and when the twelfth was called six Democrats and six Republicans were on the list. Nearly all of those present in the body naturally assumed that the next name called would be conclusive as to the final judgment of the case, and the painful silence was broken when Clerk Cochran announced the name of William M. Randall, Democrat, of Schuylkill,

making seven Democrats and six Republicans in the list drawn from the box, but of the six Republicans one did not doubt my election, and would doubtless have so decided had he been called to serve on the committee. Billingsfelt, Strang and Davis united in the request that I should not compel them to serve on the committee if I could avoid it, but that if necessary any of them would accept the responsibility, but with seven Democrats of the thirteen drawn I could safely strike all the Republicans, while Gray could only strike six of the seven Democrats named, and he left the name of Judge Broadhead, Democratic senator from Carbon, who composed the seventh member of the committee.

With a committee drawn that was assumed on all sides as willing to do full justice to my claim for the seat, the desperate Republican leaders decided that they would make it impossible for me to finish the contest before the close of the session. The committee was finally secured on the 21st of February, and at once organized with Buckalew as chairman and commenced its sessions in Philadelphia at the Washington House. The committee sat patiently day and night, and as we were fully prepared for the exposure of the frauds the evidence was appalling to the leaders of the city. In order to show the methods of the leaders distinctly at the outset, I selected the Twentieth division of the Nineteenth ward, where they had returned thirty-five votes for me and 191 against me. I placed copies of the poll list in the hands of several thoroughly intelligent and energetic business men, and had them subpoena every man whose name was on the poll list to testify before the committee. The result was that a thorough canvass of the precinct was made, and 103 testified that they had voted for me, twenty-five testified that they had not voted at all,

their names having been voted on by repeaters, and the men who made the canvass found that forty-four of the names on the poll list were entirely fictitious, and that no such persons lived in the division. This development appalled the leaders and the next week we were dumfounded by the Legislature passing through both branches a resolution fixing the 24th of March for final adjournment, which was done solely to make it impossible, as they believed, for me to expose sufficient frauds to overcome the majority returned against me, as it left us but little more than three weeks which had to be divided with the other side.

A conference was held that night with Brewster, Cassidy, Hagert and Sellers, who were acting as my counsel, and the first impression of all was that it would be impossible to finish the case in time for a report that session, and the committee would naturally die with the Legislature. Cassidy was at times of most heroic mold, and he proposed that we should go before the committee the following morning, propose to close our case in eight days, giving the other side eight days to follow, and we to have two days in rebuttal, when the case must close. The natural inquiry of the other counsel was how the case could possibly be tried in so short a time, to which Cassidy answered: "That's our business to find out; this is our only chance." He added that we had a friendly court, and that it was for the counsel to determine how the case should be presented to justify the committee in reaching a just judgment. It was known that Buckalew would not reject the entire poll of a precinct, but Cassidy suggested that if the return was clearly tainted Buckalew would reject the return, and count only such votes as would be proven before the committee. That policy was adopted, although kept sacredly secret in our own counsels. Some ten or twelve of the worst precincts were selected

in which to prove that the return was false and fraudulent and could not be accepted.

It required but few witnesses to establish that fact, but had the policy been understood by the other side they could have met us by calling individual votes in those precincts. Instead of confining our witnesses to ten or a dozen precincts whose returns were absolutely false, we would examine perhaps 200 or 300 witnesses a day at the several sessions, and not over twenty-five of the whole number would apply to the precincts really assailed. We proved frauds of the most flagrant character, but they really counted nothing in making up the case as it had been decided to present it, and the opposition was entirely deceived as to our purpose. When we closed after eight days in the presentation of many hundreds of witnesses, not more than 200 of the witnesses called were really vital, but they misled the other side and they never attempted to prove their vote in the precinct where we had the return absolutely tainted.

The vote was then counted and announced every hour, and the list of voters on the poll list was classified by hours. When our testimony was boiled down to the vital point we had proved in each of the assailed precincts that the return announced in each of them was false by several votes at eight o'clock in the morning, at one o'clock in the afternoon and at eight o'clock in the evening—in each case having proved more votes for me than had been returned; and while we had specially assailed ten or a dozen precincts we had generally assailed fully a hundred precincts, all of which were more or less rotten. The result was that when the testimony closed we showed that there were no lawful returns from these precincts, that they were proven to be false and fraudulent at three different hours of the day, and the committee very properly accepted the view and counted only such votes as had been proved

before the committee, resulting in my declared election by 210 majority.

It is a notable fact that there was not an allegation of fraud presented to the committee in a single precinct of the district that had returned me a majority, nor was one fraudulent vote proved as having been cast for me. An attempt was made to halt the terrible current of political frauds developed by the testimony, but it resulted only in making the fraudulent leaders openly disgrace themselves. They became impatient under the daily development of fraud that was made before the committee, while not a single allegation had been made of fraudulent effort on my side. Some of the more desperate leaders of the city decided that they would do something toward balancing the account of fraud and force the stain of corruption upon my side. They gathered up five of the lowest vagrants of the city, all of them jail birds, one known as the "Educated Hog," another as "Stuttering Jimmy," another as "Flying Dutchman" and all bore like distinctive names. They were gathered at the Little Brown Jug, a back saloon near Walnut and Sixth Streets, and after inspiring them by a liberal use of bad whisky it was arranged with them to attend the hearing that day and each swear that they had acted as a band of repeaters on election day, had voted for me twenty or thirty times, and were paid by my friends. Among those who were present and had knowledge of this movement was Mr. Tittermary, who had given me the information in relation to the frauds perpetrated, and who had himself led repeaters. He knew that these men had been paid ten dollars a piece, and would be paid ten dollars more after they had testified. They were in charge of a man named Douchman, who was a brother of the "Flying Dutchman," but not entirely of like vagrant qualities.

Douchman was paid \$200 for handling these men and he was instructed by Tittermary to go with a friend whom he had chosen to a private room in the Washington House, where the meeting was held, and to send for me and tell me exactly what had been done. I was sent for to go to the room, and there found Douchman and the friend who had brought him. Douchman stated frankly that he was in for all he could make and that he had \$200 from the other side, but if it paid quite as well he would rather turn the thing to an honest account. I asked him what he would require to have three of his five witnesses tell the truth. He promptly informed me that he would have it done any way I desired for \$200. I said to him that if he did as I directed he would be paid the money, and the friend present assured him that he could accept my word. I directed him to pick out three of the men who would tell the truth and allow the other two to have no knowledge of the transaction, but they were to be placed at the head of the five and be called out first. The result was that within half an hour the five witnesses appeared and the "Educated Hog" and "Stuttering Jimmy" were first called, and both testified that they did not live in the district, but that five of them had been employed—naming all of them—to repeat for me, and that they had voted from twenty to thirty times and were liberally paid by some person, they did not know whom, but it was not myself. I had much difficulty in getting Mr. Hagert, who had charge of the case that day, to let the witnesses go, as the situation could not be explained at the table. He had sent both of them to prison and felt like destroying their reputation as witnesses, but I finally, in a quiet way, got him to understand that he must simply let them go and he reluctantly assented. The third witness called was the "Flying Dutchman," and when asked whether he had

voted at the election, he said no; that he didn't live in the district; that he hadn't voted on that day at all; that he and four others had that morning been employed at the Little Brown Jug and been paid ten dollars apiece to come there and testify that they had repeated for McClure, but that it was entirely false and he wasn't going to perjure himself. Briggs supposed that this was an individual defection and made the mistake of calling another witness. He answered precisely as did the "Flying Dutchman," and then the whole thing was accepted all around as a corrupt set-up to suborn perjury, to fasten the semblance of fraud upon my claim. I promptly paid Mr. Douchman his \$200 and thought he had well earned the money.

The case was practically abandoned by the opposition after the exposure of the Little Brown Jug witnesses, and soon thereafter Senator Gray gave up his seat in the senate and did not return to it. The Legislature, learning that we were not to be defeated by final adjournment on the 24th of March, promptly rescinded the resolution so that we could have had increased time, but we did not need it. The result was that on the 27th of March the majority of the committee reported to the senate that the return of Henry W. Gray was false and fraudulent, that I had received a majority of the votes cast at the election, and I was sworn in as senator. It is due to Mr. Gray to state that in all the many and varied frauds proved against his cause there was no evidence that he had participated in or had personal knowledge of the corrupt methods adopted to effect his election, and he volunteered as one of the last witnesses in the case before the committee to testify that if frauds had been committed to accomplish his return as senator he had not advised or assented to any other than lawful methods to secure his election.

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